Who's to blame for September 11?

• Author: Rothschild, Matthew
• Position: Editorial

The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States Thomas H. Kean, Chair W. W. Norton. 567 pages. $10.00.

On page 340 of The 9/11 Commission Report is this sentence: If the government's leaders understood the gravity of the threat they faced and understood at the same time that their policies to eliminate it were not likely to succeed any time soon, then history's judgment will be harsh."

Let's call the roll.

Bill Clinton

The much-maligned former President comes out pretty well in the report. It shows that President Clinton recognized that "terrorism was a national security problem" and was "deeply concerned about bin Laden." Clinton issued three Presidential Decision Directives about the threat. He received "a special daily pipeline of reports" about bin Laden and authorized his capture or killing. But the report faults Clinton for not responding to the October 12, 2000, attack on the USS Cole, which killed seventeen and wounded forty. It said he was more interested in brokering a peace between Israel and the Palestinians in his last few months in office.

Eerily, Clinton received warnings similar to those that Bush later got. On December 4, 1998, he received a Presidential Briefing that said, "Bin Laden Preparing to Hijack U.S. Aircraft and Other Attacks." It added that "two members of the operational team had evaded security checks during a recent trial run at an unidentified New York airport."

Sandy Berger

Clinton's National Security Adviser also comes off well. He was alert to the risk of terrorism earlier than most. He deputized counterterrorism expert Richard Clarke and gave him wide authority, placing him on an equal footing with cabinet members involved in national security. Berger and Clarke worked admirably together to prevent the Millennium Plot from coming to fruition at the end of 1999, the report says. And Berger urged aggressive action against Al Qaeda after the Cole attack. "According to Clarke, Berger upbraided DCI [Director of Central Intelligence] Tenet so sharply after the Cole attack--repeatedly demanding to know why the United States had to put up with such attacks--that Tenet walked out of a meeting of the principals." Berger also stressed to the Bush transition team, and especially Condoleezza Rice, the gravity of the Al Qaeda threat.

William Cohen and the Joint Chiefs

Clinton's Defense Secretary William Cohen was exceptionally cautious. Relying on the advice of Joint Chiefs of Staff head General Hugh Shelton, Cohen scorned the idea of attacking bin Laden and his operations. Together, Cohen and Shelton concluded that the 1998 cruise missile retaliation against Al Qaeda for the embassy bombings in Africa was a waste of million-dollar weapons that hit only "jungle gym" equipment, in Shelton's words. And they repeatedly dragged their feet on any plans until the intelligence was clearly actionable, the report notes, a standard that was never met.

For instance, after the Cole bombings, when all the intelligence was pointing toward Al Qaeda, the Pentagon still doubted it. A State Department counterterrorism official exclaimed, "Does Al Qaeda have to attack the Pentagon to get their attention?"

Richard Clarke

He is the one consistent voice in the report who recognized the danger of bin Laden early on and tried to grab everyone by the lapels to listen to him. Like a modern-day Cassandra, he repeatedly underscored to his superiors in both Administrations the urgency...