Who captures the state? Evidence from irregular awards in a public innovation grant program

Published date01 December 2024
AuthorYanbo Wang,Jordan Siegel,Jizhen Li
Date01 December 2024
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1002/smj.3635
RESEARCH ARTICLE
Who captures the state? Evidence from
irregular awards in a public innovation grant
program
Yanbo Wang
1
| Jordan Siegel
2
| Jizhen Li
3
1
HKU Business School, University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Hong Kong SAR
2
University of Michigan Ross School of Business, Ann Arbor, Michigan, USA
3
School of Economics and Management, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China
Correspondence
Yanbo Wang, HKU Business School,
University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong,
Hong Kong SAR.
Email: yanbo.wang@hku.hk
Funding information
The National University of Singapore,
Grant/Award Number: R-
313-000-130-133; The China National
Natural Science Foundation,
Grant/Award Number: 71772103; UGC
General Research Fund, Hong Kong,
Grant/Award Number: 17504422; HKU
Shenzhen Research Institute,
Grant/Award Number: SZRI2023-TBRF-
01
Abstract
Research summary: This study utilizes the adminis-
trative data of an innovation grant program in a major
emerging economy to study which firms are best posi-
tioned to capture the state and access resources beyond
what their rule-complying merits command. We trace
the grant allocation process and directly observe occur-
rences of rule-violating funding. We show that firms
vary in capability to secure irregular awards, depending
on factors such as geographic proximity and the social
and bureaucratic setting within which entrepreneurs
and officials interact. Furthermore, by comparing the
actual allocation of irregular awards with the counter-
factual scenario in which recipients were evaluated
solely based on grant rules, we conclude that crony cap-
italism, rather than bureaucratic heroism, is the pri-
mary driver of irregular awards.
Managerial summary: Governments often use inno-
vation grant programs to promote firm innovation, but
these programs sometimes fail to achieve their objec-
tives due to grant officials violating policy rules to
Received: 18 November 2019 Revised: 21 April 2024 Accepted: 14 May 2024
DOI: 10.1002/smj.3635
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License, which permits
use and distribution in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, the use is non-commercial and no modifications or
adaptations are made.
© 2024 The Author(s). Strategic Management Journal published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
2420 Strat Mgmt J. 2024;45:2420–2458.
wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/smj
provide resources to undeserving firms. We study a
public funding program in a major emerging economy
to analyze the bureaucratic structure and the social
dynamics within which entrepreneurs and bureaucrats
interact to identify the sources of state-resource mis-
allocation. We find that geographic distance,
intragovernmental checks and balances, and the lack of
direct social intermediary connecting entrepreneurs
with bureaucrats help reduce the likelihood of collu-
sion for state-resource misallocation. Our results gener-
ate insights to help guide the (re)design of public
funding programs, particularly in countries with low
levels of transparency and public accountability.
KEYWORDS
bureaucrats, corruption, emerging markets, innovation, public
policy
1|INTRODUCTION
We study how and why some firms are well positioned to “capture the state,”defined as the
exercise of influence upon government officials to access state-controlled resources beyond
what their rule-complying merits command. It is well known that state-controlled resources
can be key for firm survival and growth (e.g., Armanios et al., 2017; Hiatt et al., 2018;
McDermott et al., 2009), and that firms make deliberate efforts to influence resource allocation
(e.g., Choi et al., 2015; Jeong & Siegel, 2018). While much research has focused on formal and
legal lobbying activities affecting policymaking and state-resource allocation (e.g., Hornstein &
Zhao, 2018; Kim, 2019; Shi et al., 2021), there is limited knowledge about firms' illicit efforts
leading to rule-violating state-resource allocation. This gap is striking considering the academic
interest in firms' illegal strategic behavior and various theoretical perspectives applicable to
study these activities (e.g., Castro et al., 2020; Dorobantu et al., 2017; Jia et al., 2023).
The foremost obstacle to studying state capture has been misconduct identification. Due to
their legal and ethical implications, dealings such as state-resource misallocation are usually
concealed by the involved actors for self-protection. Thus, data on such activities usually
“become available when a social-control agent detects misconduct and decides to act against it”
(Greve et al., 2010, p. 94). However, social-control agents rarely act randomly (Bergemann &
Aven, 2023; Delios et al., 2021) and thus caught misconduct may systematically differ from
uncaught misconduct. For example, when illicit-action takers are politically powerful, media
and law enforcement are likely to look away from their transgressions (Ang & Jia, 2014; Graffin
et al., 2013). Studying only cases of caught misconduct is likely to introduce significant biases.
Scholars have also used surveys to elicit information on illicit behaviors such as bribery, cor-
ruption and other forms of state capture (e.g., Birhanu et al., 2016; Wu, 2009). While insight-
generating, this approach has limitations. Due to social desirability and legal concerns
WANG ET AL.2421
(Aven, 2015), corruption-entangled individuals have minimal motivations to honestly report
their illicit activity to researchers. Also, given the secretive nature of illicit deeds, individuals
not directly involved can only report speculated rather than actual occurrences (Delios
et al., 2021). Survey-based studies are likely to conflate perception- and experience-based
measures.
The empirical challenges above can be yet more daunting in studying firms' capture of gov-
ernment bureaucrats. In contrast to legislators and politicians that are in the spotlight of public
scrutiny, bureaucrats are much less visible as they usually operate behind the iron curtain of
government bureaucracy (Wilson, 1989). Furthermore, given politicians' power and visibility,
researchers can often infer their exercise of influence (and abuse of power) in channeling state
resources to family and friends (e.g., Siegel, 2007). Bureaucrats, however, are usually at lower
levels of power and their offenses tend to be smaller in scale and less likely to attract the atten-
tion of social-control agents such as the mass media.
We study firms' capture of state bureaucrats to access public innovation grants in a major
emerging economy (Country X).
1
Rather than regular awards that are allocated according to
firm merits and well-specified funding rules, we investigate “irregular awards”that are allo-
cated to firms whose rule-complying merits would not have earned them such access. We con-
ceptualize irregular awards as the outcome of public-private collusion in which grant officials
deliberately misallocate state funding to illicitly advance certain firms' interests. We look at the
cost of information acquisition and collusion coordination and examine how three sets of
factors—the geographic proximity between grant officials and resource-seeking firms, the
bureaucratic structure and process within which grant allocation decisions are made, and
the focal firm's state affiliation through equity ownership—jointly shape the two parties' likeli-
hood to collude.
The focal grant program setting provides advantages in studying illicit state capture. First,
we use the funding agency's internal, administrative record to directly observe the incidence of
grant misallocation. By observing state officials' deliberate violation of well-specified policy
rules regardless of whether they were caught by the media or law-enforcement agencies, our
approach helps reduce the concern of selection biases in illicit behavior identification.
Second, this setting allows us to examine how firms interact with an important yet under-
studied actor—government bureaucrats—in nonmarket strategy research. While studies have
examined firms' efforts to access state resources (e.g., Henisz & Zelner, 2012), the nonmarket
strategy literature has mainly focused on how firms design strategies and utilize connections to
influence (usually top) policymakers. Prior literature has found that top-level politicians are
motivated above all else by extending their time in office (Besley, 2005). Politicians have also
been shown to value the advancement of their policy goals and their post-political-career
employment possibilities (Vidal et al., 2012).
To understand the differential motivations of bureaucrats, the most influential theory is
from Wilson (1989), who argues that bureaucrats, relative to other political actors, are some-
what more constrained by formal structures and processes, and also that bureaucrats often
place high priority on securing professional standing within their governmental agency. As Wil-
son (1989) explains, this often involves a combination of embracing the larger agenda, goals,
and mission of their agency, of staying consistent with the norms of their technical field that
1
We anonymize the specific country name at the suggestion of the editor in order to be maximally protective of
individuals in the country setting. The editorial review was conducted with the specific country known, and after the
review team's concerns were addressed, we anonymized the country context.
2422 WANG ET AL.

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