Who are the Cosmopolitans? How Perceived Social Sorting and Social Identities Relate to European and National Identities

• Published date: 01 June 2024
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/00104140231194054
• Author: Ronja Sczepanski
• Date: 01 June 2024
• Subject Matter: Articles

Article

Comparative Political Studies

2024, Vol. 57(7) 1210–1239

© The Author(s) 2023

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DOI: 10.1177/00104140231194054

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Who are the

Cosmopolitans? How

Perceived Social Sorting

and Social Identities

Relate to European and

National Identities

Ronja Sczepanski

1



Abstract

Transnational European identities inf‌luence public debates and electoral

dynamics across Europe, with sociodemographic factors strongly associated

with these identities. Meanwhile, little attention has been paid to how people ’s

perceptions of a political group’s sociodemographic prof‌ile relate to their

identif‌ication with Europe. I argue that such perceptions, in combination with

social identities, are signif‌icantly associated with the strength of individuals’

identif‌ication with political groups. An individual is more likely to have a

robust European identity if they perceive that social groups they like share the

same pro-European opinion. In contrast, if they perceive that groups they like

align with the anti-European camp, they are likely to have a weaker European

identity. By employing novel survey data from Italy and Austria, I f‌ind empirical

support for my argument. This paper contributes to the debate on the

mechanisms that connect social and political identities and explains how

cleavages emerge in the mass public.

1

ETH Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland

Corresponding Author:

Ronja Sczepanski, ETH Zurich, Haldeneggsteig 4, Zurich 8092, Switzerland.

Email: ronja.sczepanski@eup.gess.ethz.ch

Data Availability Statement included at the end of the article

Keywords

identities, cleavage formation, European Union, sorting

Introduction

The transnational–nationalist divide in the Western European public is

shaping global and national politics alike. People who identify with a

transnational territorial unit such as Europe tend to vote more for left-

libertarian parties, favor more open borders, and support transnational in-

stitutions such as the European Union (De Vries & Van Kersbergen, 2007;

Hooghe & Marks, 2009;Karstens, 2020). In contrast, those who exclusively

identify with their nation-state are more supportive of radical-right parties,

hold more negative attitudes toward immigrants, and even favor the exit from

transnational institutions such as the EU (Curtis, 2014;Hobolt, 2016;Hooghe

& Marks, 2009,2018). This raises questions about the factors that drive the

adoption of identities in emerging cleavages such as the transnational–na-

tionalist divide.

Research has identif‌ied a socially clustered picture of who adopts a Eu-

ropean identity alongside their national identity across Western Europe.

Highly educated individuals, white-collar workers, urbanites, and young

people are more likely to adopt a European identity and cosmopolitan attitudes

than their counterparts (Bornschier et al., 2021;Fligstein, 2009;Maxwell,

2019). Researchers have put forward two main explanations for why some

social groups tend to belong to the transnational camp and others to the

national camp. The utilitarian approach focuses on how the redistributive

consequences of European integration determine whether a person will adopt

a European identity (Gabel, 1998). On the other hand, seminal work from the

cleavage literature (Bartolini & Mair, 2007;Kriesi et al., 2006,2008)

highlights the importance of individual values, which are shaped by socio-

structural factors such as education and are then mobilized by parties. Ed-

ucation is argued to play an especially critical role in equipping individuals

with progressive values (Kriesi et al., 2006).

I offer a third, complementary theoretical account of how social groups are

connected to political identities, emphasizing the role of social sorting next to

social identities in the formation of transnational identities. My view differs

from the others in that I do not assume that social structuring is only driven by

differences in values and material interests that are inherent to specif‌icsocial

groups. Rather, the sorting of socio-structural groupsinto identity camps serves

as information in itself and as a crucial moderator between social and political

identities. Research has shown that social group cues and social sorting play

a critical role in who adopts a political identity or position and how strongly

they do so (Huber, 2021;Kane et al., 2020;Mason & Wronski, 2018;Thau, 2019).

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