Whiteness and the Polarization of American Politics

• DOI: 10.1177/1065912908322408
• Author: Joel Olson
• Published date: 01 December 2008
• Date: 01 December 2008
• Subject Matter: Mini Symposium: American Political Development through the Lens of Race

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Political Research Quarterly

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December 2008 704-718

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Whiteness and the Polarization

of American Politics

Joel Olson

Northern Arizona University

Scholars tend to agree that American politics has become polarized along partisan and ideological lines, yet the causes

of polarization are in much dispute. The author argues that polarization and the culture wars are a consequence, in

part, of the changing nature of white identity after the civil rights movement. The transformation of whiteness from

a form of social standing to a norm produced ressentiment among whites, which Republican strategists mobilized by

depicting Democrats as the party of intellectual snobs and undeserving rabble and the GOP as the party of the virtu-

ous middle. Normalizing this middle and the snobs as white polarized whites along partisan and ideological lines, cre-

ating an incentive to win votes by appealing to hot-button cultural issues such as welfare, abortion, and gay marriage.

Keywords: whiteness; political polarization; culture wars; Spiro Agnew; ressentiment; virtuous middle

The polarization of American politics is a hotly

debated topic in political science. Scholars tend

to agree that the American political system has

become increasingly divided along partisan and ideo-

logical lines, as suggested by vitriolic presidential

campaigns, the decline of bipartisanship in Congress,

and the increasingly nasty tone of political discourse

in the media and on the Internet. Scholars also agree

that the parties have sorted themselves ideologically,

with liberals now consistently voting for Democrats

and conservatives consistently voting for Republicans.

Yet there is little agreement regarding the causes of

this polarization. This article explores the role that

race plays in political polarization, or the tendency

for politicians and voters to act along partisan and

ideological lines. I argue that polarization has

resulted, in part, from the changing nature of white

identity, or whiteness, and the strategic response to

this change by political elites. I further suggest that

the transformation of whiteness and subsequent

polarization lie at the roots of the “culture wars.”

During slavery and segregation, white identity

functioned as a form of racialized standing that

granted all whites a superior social status to all those

who were not white, particularly African Americans.

The loss of individualized standing due to the victo-

ries of the civil rights movement, however, led to

anger, anxiety, and resentment among many whites, and

a desire to restore that standing. This white ressenti-

ment, as I call it, presented a political opportunity for

the minority party, if they could mobilize it. Yet given

post–civil rights movement norms against overt

racism, Republican strategists could not do so in a

way that straightforwardly evoked white standing.

They solved this problem by creating a narrative that

portrayed the Democrats as the party of intellectual

elites and undeserving rabble. The GOP, meanwhile,

represented the “virtuous middle” squeezed in

between. In constructing this conflict, Republican

elites implicitly racialized both the virtuous middle

and the “snobs” as white. By dividing the white elec-

torate, they set the foundation for a polarized republic.

Prior to the 1960s, party identification among

white voters tended to reflect regional, ethnic, and

religious differences at least as much as ideological

ones. But the aggressive effort to distinguish a virtu-

ous middle from the snobs and the rabble contributed

to splitting the white vote along ideological lines. In

turn, increased ideological coherence created an

incentive for each party to bundle positions on racial

issues with hot-button “cultural issues” such as wel-

fare, abortion, and gay marriage. This contributed to

Joel Olson, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Northern

Arizona University; e-mail: joel.olson@nau.edu.

Author’s Note: Thanks to Joe Lowndes, Julie Novkov, and the

anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments on earlier

drafts and to Tom Brunell, Lyle Graham, Hahrie Han, and Fred

Solop for helping me think through several points. Thanks also to

Adria Mooney for research assistance.