When the State Becomes Complicit: Mayors, Criminal Actors, and the Deliberate Weakening of the Local State in Colombia

• Published date: 01 August 2023
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/00104140221139380
• Author: Camilo Nieto-Matiz
• Date: 01 August 2023
• Subject Matter: Articles

Article

Comparative Political Studies

2023, Vol. 56(9) 1295–1327

© The Author(s) 2022

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DOI: 10.1177/00104140221139380

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When the State Becomes

Complicit: Mayors,

Criminal Actors, and the

Deliberate Weakening of

the Local State in

Colombia

Camilo Nieto-Matiz

1



Abstract

Some politicians engage in relationships with criminal actors in pursuit of

mutual interests. How does their rise to power affect state capaci ty? I focus

on one of Colombia’s worst episodes of criminal politics to understand how

the victory of paramilitary-friendly mayors impacted subnational taxation.

Focusing on close races, I f‌ind that the victory of a paramilitary-friendly

mayor in 2007 led to a substantive drop in property taxation in subsequent

years. I argue that criminal collusion allows politicians and criminals to

accumulate wealth and political power, but doing so requires them to

deliberately undermine local state institutions. Indeed, the evidence suggests

that municipalities governed by paramilitary-friendly politicians experienced

aweakeningofpropertyrights,theworsening of local judicial institutions,

andanalterationoftheelectoralplayingf‌ield. Rather than a mere con-

sequence of criminal collusion, state weakening is a politically strategic

decision that serves the interests of both criminals and politicians.

1

Department of Political Science and Geography, University of Texas at San Antonio, San Antonio,

TX, USA

Corresponding Author:

Camilo Nieto-Matiz, Department of Political Science and Geography, University of Texas at San

Antonio, One UTSA Circle, San Antonio, TX 78249-0608, USA.

Email: camilo.nieto-matiz@utsa.edu

Keywords

criminal politics, property taxation, state capacity, violence, paramilitaries,

Colombia

Introduction

A few months after the paramilitary demobilization in 2005, the mayor of

Taraz´

a, Colombia, paid a public tribute to Cuco Vanoy, a former paramilitary

commander, and expressed his gratitude for his contribution to the region’s

social and economic development. Years later, wiretapping evidence also

revealed the close relationships between Taraza’s police department and

Autodefensas Gaitanistas, the main paramilitary successor group in the re-

gion. In one of his conversations with a member of the criminal group, a police

off‌icer stated: “I am with you, I am 99.9% gaitanista”(El Tiempo, 2010).

It is not uncommon for state off‌icials and criminal actors to engage in

collusive relationships, whereby the former distribute state resources and

selectively enforce institutions in exchange for f‌inancial and political support

(Bailey & Taylor, 2009;Trejo & Ley, 2020). Recent studies have explained

how criminals, sometimes in partnership with state agents undermine the

principles of democracy and electoral competition (Acemoglu et al., 2013),

weaken civic life and citizenship (Córdova, 2019;Ley, 2018), and hinder the

rule of law (Auyero & Sobering, 2019).

There is, however, still some disagreement on whether and how collusion

with criminal actors affects the state. Some claim that state-criminal collusion

may enhance it: in an insightful, almost Tilly-esque, interpretation, Koivu

(2018) holds that while f‌ighting crime develops the state’s coercive capacity,

collusion may promote economic institutions in the short term. States may

turn a blind eye to criminal activities, so long as they contribute to the de-

velopment of markets and the economy. Indeed, activities such as drug-

traff‌icking, construction, real estate, and agribusiness can increase the basis of

revenue and motivate states to behave complicitly (Devine et al., 2020;

McSweeney et al., 2017). Moreover, if state-crime collusion reduces f‌ighting

between criminals and the state, the absence of violence may help off‌icials

protect property rights and enforce contracts more easily (Besley & Persson,

2008;Sobek & Thies, 2015).

However, one could also expect state-criminal collusion to be deleterious

for the public interest and state institutions: actors, such as drug cartels or

militias, inf‌iltrate the state to promote certain policies and procure the non-

enforcement of institutions, with harmful consequences for the provision of

public goods (Dal Bó et al., 2006;Daly, 2021;Di Cataldo & Mastrorocco,

2021). Based on Colombia, Acemoglu et al. (2013) suggest that collusion may

ultimately weaken the state, as colluded politicians, who received key

1296 Comparative Political Studies 56(9)

electoral support in exchange for economic and political resources, see

themselves unwilling to eliminate the groups that aided them. Similarly, as

Hidalgo and Lessing (2019) show in Brazil, state off‌icials may initially

tolerate paramilitaries, but then become incapable of eliminating them later.

Either way, the negative effects of collusion on state capacity result from the

unintended consequences—both in terms of incentives and ability—of allying

with criminal actors.

The literature has made important progress in the understanding of state-

criminal collusion, but we still know little about how and why such type of

arrangement affects the making and unmaking of the local state, in particular

its capacity to extract resources. While the weakening of state institutions may

be an unintended consequence of crime, deliberately undermining the state is

also a politically strategic choice for state off‌icials and criminals.

How does the rise of politicians with previous ties to criminal actors affect

subnational state capacity? This article studies how political parties with

previous ties to criminal groups undermine f‌iscal extraction in Colombian

municipalities. My central argument is that state-criminal collusion allows its

participants to accumulate wealth and political power, but doing so requires

state off‌icials, in collaboration with criminals, to deliberately weaken local

state institutions. By intentionally preventing and delaying additional in-

vestments in property rights institutions and hiding critical information from

the state, politicians and their criminal partners ultimately depress the state’s

extractive capacity. My argument draws on a body of research that views state

weakening as a politically strategic decision by state off‌icials to pursue their

private and political goals.

I explore this argument by focusing on the aftermath of the parapol´

ıtica

scandal, whereby politicians sought electoral support from paramilitary

groups in exchange for access to resources and legislation. Concretely, I focus

on the 2007 mayoral elections, a period where the criminal market had become

particularly fragmented due to the process of remilitarization (Daly, 2016;

Nussio & Howe, 2016). Moreover, by 2007, paramilitaries had been able to

build extensive networks in state institutions and security agencies (Guti´

errez

San´

ın, 2019). Some of the politicians that came under investigation for being

involved with paramilitaries years earlier used the local elections to maintain

their grip to power by promoting their successors, both relatives and political

allies, as candidates for mayoral and gubernatorial off‌ice. Put differently, this

was a moment where politicians had a lot at stake and winning elections,

through their successors, was essential.

Learning about the effects of criminal collusion on local state capacity is

challenging. As some instances of collusion are unobserved and kept secret, it

is rare to f‌ind “smoking gun”evidence that politicians actively seek to un-

dermine state institutions. I circumvent some of these challenges by using a

regression discontinuity design and comparing tax revenue in areas where

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