When rules are more important than justice.

• Author: Phillips, Dawn M.
• Position: Supreme Court Review

Carlisle v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1460 (1996)

1. INTRODUCTION

   In Carlisle v. United States,(1) the United States Supreme Court held that a federal district court lacked the authority to grant a motion for judgment of acquittal filed one day after the expiration of the time period prescribed by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(c). Rule 29(c) requires that when a jury has returned a guilty verdict, motions for judgment of acquittal must be filed within seven clays of the jury's discharge.(2) The Supreme Court found that the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (the "Rules") prohibit a trial court from granting an untimely motion for judgment of acquittal.(3) In addition, the Court found that a district court does not possess an inherent supervisory power that would allow it to enter a post-verdict judgment of acquittal sua sponte.(4)

   This note argues that the Supreme Court correctly found that the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not permit the granting of an untimely post-verdict motion for judgment of acquittal. Rule 29(c), when read in conjunction with Rule 45(b), prohibits a trial court from granting a motion for judgment of acquittal filed after the expiration of the seven-day time period included in Rule 29(c), unless the court has extended the time limit during the seven days. However, this note also argues that the Supreme Court erred when it rejected the existence of an inherent supervisory power as an alternative authority for the trial court's action. The Court justified its decision by noting the absence of any long, unquestioned power of federal district courts to acquit for insufficient evidence sua sponte after return of a guilty verdict. However, there is a tradition of entrusting lower courts with the responsibility of ensuring justice and protecting innocent criminal defendants from wrongful convictions. The Court's refusal to acknowledge this tradition of supervisory power led to the incarceration of a man whom the trial judge believed was innocent.

2. BACKGROUND

   1. RULE 2 AS A GUIDE TO INTERPRETATION OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

      The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure became effective on March 21, 1946.(5) Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 2 explains the purpose of the Rules.(6) The Rules were adopted for three main reasons. The first reason for the adoption of the Rules is to "secure simplicity in procedure."(7) The courts have reached the goal of simplifying procedure by finding that the Rules were designed to abolish the technicalities which led to the dismissal of cases or the reversal of convictions for reasons unconnected with the guilt or innocence of the defendant.(8) The second reason for the promulgation of the Federal Rules is to ensure "fairness in administration."(9) This purpose of the Rules has been cited to justify the establishment of uniform procedures among the district courts to ensure the equal treatment of every defendant.(10) The final reason given for the adoption of the Rules is to eliminate "unjustifiable expense and delay."(11) The Supreme Court has accepted this purpose of the Rules as expressed in Rule 2. In Bruton v. United States,(12) the Supreme Court opined that the Rules are intended to promote economy and efficiency so long as the rights of the defendant are not compromised.(13) In interpreting Rule 2, the Supreme Court also said that the Rules "were designed to eliminate technicalities in criminal pleading and are to be construed to secure simplicity in procedure."(14) In Fallen v. United States,(15) the Court stated that Rule 2 makes clear that the Criminal Rules "are not, and were not intended to be, a rigid code to have an inflexible meaning irrespective of the circumstances."(16)

   2. FEDERAL RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 29

      When promulgated, Rule 29(a) abolished the common law motion for a directed verdict and replaced it with the motion for judgment of acquittal.(17) The change in name did not alter the purpose or scope of the motion.(18) Rule 29(a) allows the trial court to enter a judgment of acquittal if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of the offense.(19) The 1966 amendments to Rule 29 divided sub-section (b) into sections (b) and (C).(20) Currently, section (b) gives the trial court the authority to defer its decision on a motion for judgment of acquittal made at the close of the government's case or at the close of all of the evidence.(21) Rule 29(b) allows the court to "decide the motion either before the jury returns a verdict or after it returns a verdict of guilty or is discharged without having returned a verdict."(22) However, if the court defers decision on the motion, the court must "decide the motion on the basis of the evidence at the time the ruling was reserved."(23) Section (c) provides that a defendant may enter a motion for judgment of acquittal if a jury enters a guilty verdict or is discharged without having returned a verdict.(24) Prior to 1966, many believed that a defendant had to move for judgment of acquittal at the close of all the evidence to preserve the right to make the motion again after the jury's discharge.(25) The amended Rule makes it possible, however, to file a motion for judgment of acquittal after the jury's discharge regardless of whether the motion was made before submission to the jury.(26) The 1966 amendments also extended the time period during which one must file a motion for judgment of acquittal to seven days after the jury's discharge.(27)

      The judgment of acquittal is intended to protect innocent defendants from juries that might find them guilty despite insufficient evidence.(28) A court cannot direct a verdict of guilty because that would violate a criminal defendant's right to trial by jury.(29) A defendant may move for judgment of acquittal at the close of the government's case, once all of the evidence has been presented, or within the required time period after the jury's discharge.(30) Regardless of when the motion is made, the appropriate standard to assess the motion is whether the government presented evidence sufficient to support a finding of guilt.(31) If a jury returns a guilty verdict, the government can appeal a trial court's order granting a motion for judgment of acquittal because a successful appeal by the government would not necessitate a retrial in violation of the Double jeopardy Clause.(32) Instead, the appeals court would remand the case for reinstatement of the jury verdiCt.(33) A trial court may also enter a judgment of acquittal if the jury is discharged without returning a verdict.(34) However, the government cannot appeal a judgment of acquittal made in cases where the jury failed to reach a verdict because a successful appeal would result in the need for a retrial in violation of the Double jeopardy Clause.(35)

   3. FEDERAL RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 45

      Rule 45 deals with the administration of the time limits embodied in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.(36) Rule 45 (a) addresses how time periods should be computed under the Federal Rules.(37) Rule 45(a) provides in pertinent part, "When a period of time prescribed or allowed is less than 11 days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays shall be excluded in the computation."(38) Section (b) of Rule 45. authorizes courts to extend time limits in certain situations.(39) The limitations on enlargement found in Rule 45(b) have been strictly construed.(40) Rule 45(b) states:

      When an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified

      time, the court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion ... (2)

      upon motion made after the expiration of the specified period permit

      the act to be done if the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect;

      but the court may not extend the time for taking any action under Rules

      29, 33, 34, and 35, except to the extent and under the conditions stated

      in them.(41)

   4. THE ROLE OF AN "INHERENT SUPERVISORY POWER" IN MODERN SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE

      McNabb v. United States(42) is thought to be the first case in which the Supreme Court relied on its "supervisory power" to justify a decision.(43) In McNabb, police officers obtained a confession from suspects after unremittingly interrogating them.(44) As a result, the Court excluded evidence obtained in violation of a federal statute that made certain investigative techniques unlawful.(45) The Court asserted that it possessed the authority to establish "civilized standards of procedure and evidence" for the federal courts.(46) Specifically, the Court reasoned that "[i]n the exercise of its supervisory authority over the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts" it was "guided by considerations of justice not limited to the strict canons of evidentiary relevance."(47) After McNabb, the Supreme Court repeatedly relied on its supervisory power to remedy potential injustices(48) and to preserve the integrity of the courts.(49)

      After McNabb, the federal appellate courts also began relying on their supervisory power to justify decisions. For example, in Helwig v. United States,(50) the Sixth Circuit ordered a new trial to allow a defendant to introduce exculpatory evidence even though the evidence was not newly discovered.(51) The court based its order for a new trial on its supervisory power.(52) The Sixth Circuit cited McNabb to justify its "exercise of judicial supervision [over] the administration of criminal justice."(53)

      Many courts of appeals have recognized that courts must possess a supervisory power to ensure that justice is done.(54) For example, in United States v. Brown,(55) the Seventh Circuit utilized its supervisory power to require federal district courts faced with deadlocked juries to issue jury instructions in compliance with the standards suggested in an American Bar Association publication.(56) The Second Circuit relied on its supervisory power in United States v. D'angiolillo,(57) when it refused to dismiss indictments that...