When Free Traders Become Protectionists: Constituent Advocacy at the International Trade Commission

• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.12198
• Published date: 01 August 2018
• Author: Todd Allee,Kristina Miler
• Date: 01 August 2018

KRISTINA MILER

University of Maryland

TODD ALLEE

University of Maryland

When Free Traders Become

Protectionists: Constituent

Advocacy at the International

Trade Commission

LEGISLATIVE STUDIES QUARTERLY, 43, 3, Au gust 2018

DOI: 10.1111 /lsq.12198

V

C2018 Washington University in St. Louis

377

Although Members of Congress vote on few trade bills, they participate

regularly in venues such as the International Trade Commission (ITC), where

important trade policy decisions are made. We assert that once removed from

the voting chambers of Congress, legislators are motivated overwhelmingly by

the desire to advance constituents’ trade policy interests, even those that contra-

dict the member’s established positions on trade. Utilizing an original dataset on

legislator participation in antidumping cases, we find that both Democratic and

Republican members advocate protection at the ITC when they have numerous

firms and constituents in their district who benefit from trade restrictions, par-

ticularly when they receive sizeable financial contributions from them. Notably,

self-proclaimed free-traders are just as likely to seek protection for their constitu-

ents as are trade opponents. Away from Capitol Hill, then, trade policymaking

exhibits few partisan and ideological influences and serves as a means for mem-

bers to expand political support.

[Correction added on 21 August 2018, after first online publication:

Abstract was added to article]

Trade policy is salient and contentious. We see this in the recent

campaign rhetoric regarding the loss of American manufacturing jobs. It

also is evident in the vigorous debates over the merits of the North Amer-

ican Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the recently abandoned

Trans-Pacif‌ic Partnership (TPP). The political battle lines on trade seem

clear, with devout free traders pitted against protectionists who oppose

continued trade liberalization.

However, we argue that trade is a less rigid issue than it may seem.

Existing research on Congress and trade, which looks at roll-call votes on

major trade legislation, identif‌ies ideology and party as driving forces on

support, even if doing so contrasts with their established positions on

trade. Working to have AD duties placed on foreign imports can offset

past votes in support of free trade in a setting that is observed primarily

by important, protection-seeking constituents. Moreover, members can

rationalize their protectionist behavior in a specif‌ic instance because AD

are permitted under global trade rules and can be defended as a response

to foreign dumping.

Totestthesearguments,weproduceandanalyzeauniquedataset

on congressional support for protection at the ITC. We f‌ind thatmembers

of Congress are most likely to participate in the administrative protection

process when they represent large numbers of ind ividuals and f‌irms who

prefer protection and when they are highly reliant on campaign contribu-

tions from the industries requesting protection. Partisanship plays no

role, since Republicans support protection at the ITC as much as Demo-

crats, which ref‌lects that these venues are more insulated from party

politics. Most striking is that members regularly act contrary to their

stated views on trade, that is, free traders are just as likely to advocate

trade protection for constituents at the ITC as are protectionists.

Our f‌indings have multiple implications for an era in which trade

has reemerged as a major political issue. We illustrate how politicians

can successfully navigate polarizing issues like trade in which they have

constituents on both sides of an issue. Voting for free trade but then

working for protection may seem puzzling at f‌irst blush, but it is a ratio-

nal strategy that allows politicians to expand political support. Our

research also demonstrates the value of administrative agencies as venues

for constituency representation. We highlight the importance of political

visibility, and lack thereof, in facilitating the representation of multiple

2 Kristina Miler and Todd Allee

378

the issue. Yet a broader consideration of trade policymaking activity in

other settings reveals that politicians are less dogmatic on trade than is

believed. In particular, members of Congress regularly have the opportunity

to participate in administrative agencies where important new trade restric-

tions are decided. Our central claim is that participation in these important

but less studied venues is unlikely to be driven by strong ideology or parti-

sanship but instead by a desire to advance important constituency interests.

We therefore investigate the involvement of members of Congress

in the process of imposing antidumping (AD) duties, the preeminent tool

of modern trade policymaking. The International Trade Commission

(ITC) investigates and authorizes AD trade protection, yet members of

Congress can play an important role in its enactment, such as by testify-

ing in person at ITC hearings or writing letters to the Commission. We

assert that away from the spotlight and partisanship of Capitol Hill, legis-

lators are likely to be trade pragmatists who work to build constituent

constituencies. Although votes in support of trade agreements are easily