When food‐delivery platform workers consent to algorithmic management: a Foucauldian perspective

• Published date: 01 November 2020
• Author: Sophia Galière
• Date: 01 November 2020
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/ntwe.12177

© 2020 Brian Towers (BRITOW) and

John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Workers’ consent to algorithmic management 357

New Technology, Work and Employment 35:3

ISSN 1468-005X

When food-delivery platform workers

consent to algorithmic management: a

Foucauldian perspective

Sophia Galière

This paper extends research on algorithmic management by

examining mechanisms of compliance. Algorithmic manage-

ment has predominantly been analysed in terms of the exer-

cise of disciplinary power over workers and rational control

of labour. Facing algorithms, platform workers would be in

a situation of fear, passivity and frustration. In this paper,

we utilise the Foucauldian framework of ‘dispositive’ in or-

der to reconceptualise platforms as exerting both rational

and normative control. Based on a qualitative case study

of the food-delivery platform Deliveroo, we underscore that

algorithmic rational control, although fallible, is being re-

inforced by techniques of subjectication. Several disposi-

tives on the platform, such as the pay-per-delivery and shift

picker systems, generate an active mobilisation of workers.

Our discussion highlights the governmentality power of al-

gorithmic management, which builds consent by promoting

a hyper-meritocratic ideal of justice.

Keywords: gig economy, platform work, algorithms, Deliv-

eroo, food-delivery platforms, dispositive, Foucault, govern-

mentality.

Introduction

Does algorithmic management necessarily create a climate of fear, passivity and frus-

tration, as claimed by Kellogg et al., 2020? This paper addresses the issue of power in

algorithmics-mediated forms of work (Aroles et al., 2019) using a qualitative case study

of the food-delivery platform Deliveroo.

The question of power is especially pertinent since algorithmic management has so

far been described as exerting strict rational control over workers (Rosenblat and Stark,

2016; Kellogg et al., 2020). This rational control would be so strong that it could replace

HR practices of task assignment and performance management (Duggan et al., 2020).

Put simply, the rational power of algorithmic management is reminiscent of the

Tayloristic dream of a Scientic Management (Schörpf et al., 2017; McGaughey, 2018)

in which the technique would make it possible to coordinate work remotely. As with

Taylorism, algorithmic management showcases a strict separation between technology

designers and performers, bringing the concept of technical alienation back into focus.

Moreover, this risk of technical alienation is coupled with a second risk of economic

Sophia Galiere Université d’Angers, is an Assistant Professor and member of Angers Research Group

in Economics and Management (GRANEM). Her research include new forms of organizing, algorith-

mic management, materiality and empowerment of platform workers.