When Do Female MPs Represent Women’s Interests? Electoral Systems and the Legislative Behavior of Women
| Published date | 01 December 2020 |
| DOI | 10.1177/1065912919859437 |
| Date | 01 December 2020 |
| Author | Daniel Höhmann |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
research-article2019
Article
Political Research Quarterly
2020, Vol. 73(4) 834 –847
When Do Female MPs Represent
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Women’s Interests? Electoral Systems and https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912919859437
DOI: 10.1177/1065912919859437
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the Legislative Behavior of Women
Daniel Höhmann1
Abstract
Research on women’s political representation has repeatedly shown that female legislators represent women’s interest
more strongly than their male colleagues. However, a growing body of literature shows that the parliamentary behavior
of female members of parliament (MPs) and the relationship between descriptive and substantive representation of
women is affected by a number of institutional variables. This paper contributes to this debate by analyzing the effect
of the electoral incentive structure on the substantive representation of women. Drawing on the Competing Principals
Theory, it is expected that female legislators more frequently act on behalf of women if their re-election does not
depend on the representation of local interests in electoral districts. The empirical analysis uses the German mixed
electoral system and analyzes the representation of women’s issues in oral and written parliamentary questions tabled
in the German Bundestag between 2005 and 2013. The results of a hurdle regression model show that female MPs
are more likely to concentrate on the representation of women’s interests if their re-election is secured and if they
do not have to fight for additional local votes from their district.
Keywords
electoral systems, gender, substantive representation, women’s interests, parliamentary questions
Introduction
2006; Xydias 2013, 2014). However, our knowledge
about the effect of institutional variables on the parlia-
Research on women in parliaments often proposes a link
mentary behavior of female MPs and the substantive rep-
between the descriptive and substantive representation of
resentation of women is still limited. As Krook (2018:
women and suggests that having a higher proportion of
187) points out, it is particularly striking that the effect of
female legislators leads to a higher representation of
the incentive structures from different electoral systems
women-specific interests (Wängnerud 2009). Because
on female legislators and the substantive representation
female members of parliament (MPs) share gender-spe-
of women has only been studied very rarely to date.
cific experiences and problems with the female popula-
Although mainstream parliamentary research has repeat-
tion—so the argument goes—it is expected that they are
edly shown that politicians adapt their parliamentary
more concerned with women-specific topics and that they
behavior to the incentives of different electoral systems to
also represent these issues more frequently in the parlia-
increase their re-election probability (Carey and Shugart
mentary process compared with their male colleagues
1995), an explicit application of these findings to the leg-
(e.g., Mansbridge 1999; Phillips 1995). Numerous empir-
islative behavior of women is still missing.
ical studies regarding the behavior of female MPs con-
In order to contribute to this debate, this article ana-
firm this hypothesis (e.g., Gerrity, Osborn, and Mendez
lyzes the effect of the electoral incentive structure on the
2007; Swers 2002; Volden, Wiseman, and Wittmer 2018).
substantive representation of women by female legisla-
More recently, scholars have begun to investigate the
tors. Explicitly, the analysis intends to answer the research
causal mechanisms of how descriptive representation is
translated into more substantive representation of women.
1University of Bamberg, Germany
They have shown that the political and institutional condi-
tions in the legislature (e.g., partisanship, quotas) moder-
Corresponding Author:
ate the parliamentary behavior of female MPs and
Daniel Höhmann, Professorship for Empirical Political Science,
University of Bamberg, Feldkirchenstrasse 21, 96052 Bamberg,
significantly affect their possibilities to focus on the repre-
Germany.
sentation of women’s interests (e.g., Barnes 2016; Dodson
Email: daniel.hoehmann@uni-bamberg.de
Höhmann
835
question of whether the electoral incentive structure has
In contrast to a growing number of studies that either
an effect on whether and to what extent female legislators
use parliamentary speeches (e.g., Bäck, Debus, and
more strongly represent women-specific issues compared
Müller 2014) or bill sponsorship (e.g., Volden, Wiseman,
with their male colleagues.
and Wittmer 2018) to study the parliamentary behavior
On a theoretical level, this article explicitly links the
of female MPs, this study uses written and oral parlia-
assumptions of mainstream parliamentary research about
mentary questions (PQs) as a measure of women’s sub-
the incentives and constraints of different electoral sys-
stantive representation. Since the Bundestag is a
tems to the study of the substantive representation of
party-centered parliament that is characterized by strong
women. Assuming that female MPs generally have
party unity (Sieberer 2006), speeches and bill proposals
stronger intrinsic motivations to act on behalf of women
are significantly influenced by the party leadership and
compared with male MPs (Phillips 1995), I theoretically
rather reflect the ideological position of the party as a
expect that the electoral incentive structure of single-
whole. Since the present analysis is primarily interested
member district systems (SMD) constrains female MPs
in the behavior of individual MPs, these indicators are
from representing women’s issues and that the substan-
not appropriate in this case. PQs, by contrast, are usu-
tive representation of women should be higher in propor-
ally not directly controlled by the party leadership and
tional electoral systems (PR). Drawing on the therefore provide a better and more valid measure of the
assumptions of the Competing Principals Theory (CPT;
individual preferences of MPs (Martin 2011b).
Carey 2007), the electoral incentive structure of SMD
Based on an original dataset, the results of a hurdle
systems forces female legislators to represent the local
regression model show a significant interaction effect
interests of the majority of the people in a geographic
between gender and the electoral incentive structure.
district to increase their chances of being re-elected. An
Female legislators are more likely to act on behalf of
exclusive representation of women’s interests and a
women if their re-election is secured and if they do not
simultaneous disregard of the male constituency or other
depend on the representation of local interests from the
local issues could thus be a risky strategy. However, in
constituencies in their districts. Thus, the theoretical link
proportional systems, electoral districts are state- or
between descriptive and substantive representation has to
nationwide and the re-election probability mainly be qualified and should take the effect of different elec-
depends on the vote share of the national party. This
toral systems into account.
opens up the possibility to concentrate on the representa-
tion of broader interests and thus gives female MPs the
Previous Research on Electoral
chance to focus on the substantive representation of
Systems and the Substantive
women-specific issues (Taylor-Robinson 2014: 258;
Representation of Women
Tremblay 2006).
On the empirical level, the paper provides the first
With an increasing number of women in parliaments,
analysis of the effect of different electoral incentives on
research on gender and politics has started to analyze
the behavior of female MPs in a European national parlia-
the behavior of female legislators and investigated the
ment. The empirical analysis uses the German mixed
question of whether women make a difference once
electoral system and analyzes the substantive representa-
elected to the legislative arena. On a theoretical level,
tion of women between 2005 and 2013.1 In general,
it is expected that female legislators represent wom-
mixed electoral systems offer a promising research
en’s interests in parliament more frequently compared
design, given that the behavior of legislators that are
with their male colleagues because they share gender-
elected in different electoral systems can be observed
specific experiences and problems with the female
within the same country. However, most MPs simultane-
population. Drawing on the works of Pitkin (1967) and
ously run as dual candidates in both electoral tiers and
Phillips (1995), a causal link between descriptive and
thus simultaneously face electoral incentives from the PR
substantive representation is postulated, that is, having
and the SMD tier. In order to take these “contamination
a higher proportion of women in parliaments leads to
effects” (Ferrara, Herron, and Nishikawa 2005) into con-
an increased representation of women’s issues (Dovi
sideration, I use the re-election safety of a legislator in the
2002; Mansbridge 1999).
two different tiers to operationalize the overlapping elec-
The empirical findings of a number of empirical
toral incentive structure of MPs (Stoffel 2014b; Stoffel
...
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