What Money Can’t Buy: Wealth, Inequality, and Economic Satisfaction in the Rentier State

• Author: Justin J. Gengler,Jocelyn Sage Mitchell
• Date: 01 March 2019
• Published date: 01 March 2019
• DOI: 10.1177/1065912918776128
• Subject Matter: Articles

776128PRQXXX10.1177/1065912918776128Political Research QuarterlyMitchell and Gengler
research-article2018
Article
Political Research Quarterly
2019, Vol. 72(1) 75 –89
What Money Can’t Buy: Wealth,
© 2018 University of Utah

Inequality, and Economic Satisfaction
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DOI: 10.1177/1065912918776128
in the Rentier State
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Jocelyn Sage Mitchell1 and Justin J. Gengler2
Abstract
How do perceived inequalities in allocation impact citizen satisfaction with state-distributed benefits in rentier societies?
Resource-rich rentier regimes are widely theorized to maintain the economic and political satisfaction of subjects
through wealth distribution. Yet, while qualitative research in the rentier states of the Arabian Peninsula has identified
unequal distribution as a source of discontent, the relative importance of objective versus subjective factors in shaping
satisfaction at the individual level has never been systematically evaluated. Here we assess the impacts of inequality
on the nexus between wealth and satisfaction among citizens of the richest rentier regime in the world: the state of
Qatar. Using original, nationally representative survey data, we test the effects of two separate mechanisms of unequal
distribution previously identified in the literature: group-based discrimination, and variation in individual access owing
to informal influence. Results show that perceptions of both group- and individual-based inequality dampen satisfaction
with state-distributed benefits, irrespective of objective socioeconomic well-being. The findings demonstrate that even
in the most affluent of rentier states, economic satisfaction derives not only from absolute quantities of benefits but
also from subjective impressions of fairness in the distribution process.
Keywords
rents, authoritarianism, Qatar, state-society relationship, distribution, wasta
Introduction
This immediate focus on the level of wealth distrib-
uted among Qatar’s citizenry, while understandable,
Authoritarian regimes dependent upon external sources
obscures wide differences in individual economic out-
of revenue—or rentier states—are widely theorized to
comes. A 2016 survey of citizen income in five of the six
maintain the economic and political satisfaction of their
oil-producing Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states—
citizens through rent-funded patronage. The Persian Gulf
Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia—found
emirate of Qatar is the richest of these rentier states,
that Qataris had both the highest average household
owing to immense oil and natural gas revenues: the coun-
income as a whole but also the greatest deviation in
try boasted a per-capita gross domestic product (GDP;
income individually (Social and Economic Survey
adjusted by purchasing power parity) of nearly $120,000
Research Institute 2016). Although some of this variabil-
in 2016, a figure that balloons to almost $700,000 per
ity, in Qatar and elsewhere, can be attributed to objective
citizen when one excludes Qatar’s large population of
differences in individual qualifications, motivation, and
expatriate workers (Kinninmont 2013). As a conse-
skill, differences in economic outcomes also stem from
quence, Qatar is also likely the most generous rentier
disparities in the processes of top-down distribution in
state, providing its small national population of around
rentier states. Unequal access may restrict the benefits
three hundred thousand individuals with wide-ranging
subsidies and direct wealth transfers. Qatar should thus
1
be a most-likely case for the wealth-satisfaction nexus
Northwestern University in Qatar, Doha, Qatar
2Social and Economic Survey Research Institute, Qatar University,
articulated both by scholars and in more popular analy-
Doha, Qatar
ses. As one BBC News correspondent quipped in 2009,
“It’s wrong to say Qataris are born with a silver spoon in
Corresponding Author:
Jocelyn Sage Mitchell, Northwestern University in Qatar, P.O. Box
their mouths. It’s a gold spoon, encrusted with diamonds”
34102, Doha, Qatar.
(Adler 2009).
Email: jocelyn.mitchell@northwestern.edu

---

76
Political Research Quarterly 72(1)
that accrue to some while boosting the fortunes of others.
and mediated access via informal influence. Such find-
This suggests that wealth alone may not be a sufficient
ings give substance to the notion that the link between
condition for economic satisfaction, as beneficiaries may
distributed oil wealth and economic satisfaction in rentier
regard even an objectively large allocation as an unfair
societies is more than a simple pocketbook transaction.
one in relative terms.
As Qatar and other resource-dependent states seek to rein
Indeed, qualitative work undertaken in the GCC states
in welfare spending in a world of lower oil and gas prices,
has identified unequal distribution as a source of eco-
changing citizens’ impressions about the processes of
nomic and even political discontent, mirroring a large
allocation may become as important as material distribu-
body of research in psychology and sociology that estab-
tions themselves.
lishes a general dampening effect on satisfaction of per-
ceived distributive unfairness. In the Middle East and
North Africa context, two separate mechanisms have
Wealth, Inequality, and Economic
been associated with distributive inequality: first, broad
Satisfaction
group favoritism, usually occurring along descent-based
Rentier states regularly receive significant amounts of
lines (Okruhlik 1999); and, second, informal connections
wealth (“rents”) from external sources (e.g., tolls, hosting
and influence that mediate individual access to resources
fees, or hydrocarbon exports) that are paid directly to the
(Buehler 2016; Cunningham and Sarayrah 1994). state (Mahdavy 1970). These rents reduce the need for
Although the latter phenomenon of personal intercession
rentier countries to tax citizens, thus fundamentally
finds parallels worldwide, Hertog (2010, 283) argues that
changing the state-society relationship from extraction to
“the specific combination of abundant state resources and
distribution (Delacroix 1980; Luciani 1987). This distrib-
limited state capacity” of the rentier Gulf monarchies cre-
utive relationship undergirds the so-called “rentier bar-
ates a particularly ubiquitous type of informal influence
gain”: the state offers welfare benefits to citizens, whose
that permeates the structures of these societies.
contingent economic satisfaction outweighs desire for
Qatar’s combination of expansive welfare benefits and
radical transformation of the political status quo (Brynen
high variability in individual economic circumstances
et al. 2012; Kamrava 2013; Ross 2001, 2012).
make it a crucial case study (Gerring 2007) to assess the
All political systems contain inequalities both in distri-
effects of inequality on the nexus between wealth and sat-
bution processes and outcomes. These distributional
isfaction in allocative regimes. In a type of state that pur-
inequalities are particularly prevalent in rentier states,
posefully engages in top-down distribution of resource
which have both more resources per citizen to distribute
revenues to foster economic and ultimately political sat-
and lower state capacity relative to the size of these
isfaction among its citizenry, how do inequities in alloca-
resources to equitably and transparently deliver these
tion impact the degree to which citizens feel contented
goods and services (Hertog 2010, 287). Yet the earliest
with their personal share of these benefits? Is there a
articulations of the rentier state framework explicitly
threshold of individual wealth beyond which unfairness
denied the political relevance of such inequalities. Luciani
ceases to matter, or does inequality exert a more system-
(1987, 74) asserts that the unequal distribution of benefits
atic and thus potentially more corrosive effect? With its
unrivaled patronage of citizens, Qatar represents perhaps
is not relevant for political life, because it is not a sufficient
the hardest test of the theory that distributive inequality
incentive to coalesce and attempt to change the political
dampens economic satisfaction in the rentier state.
institutions. To the individual who feels his benefits are not
In what follows, we demonstrate that the process by
enough, the solution of manoeuvering for personal advantage
which economic distribution engenders economic satis-
within the existing setup is always superior to seeking an
faction in these resource-rich regimes is conditioned at
alliance with others in similar conditions.
the individual level by subjective perceptions of fairness
that extend beyond citizens’ objective socioeconomic
More recent iterations focus on the political weight of
well-being. Using original data from the first-ever nation-
some individuals and groups over others. Bueno de
ally representative survey of citizen satisfaction with
Mesquita and colleagues (2003, 38) argue that the state’s
rentier benefits in Qatar, we find that perceived inequality
distribution of resources must ensure the satisfaction of a
in allocation—both between citizens on one hand and
“winning coalition” of essential supporters, leaving the
between citizens and noncitizens on the other—is associ-
...