What is Relevance? Defining Intersectional Praxis in Uruguay

• Published date: 01 March 2011
• DOI: 10.1177/1065912910382301
• Date: 01 March 2011
• Author: Erica Townsend-Bell
• Subject Matter: Mini-Symposium

Political Research Quarterly

64(1) 187 –199

© 2011 University of Utah

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DOI: 10.1177/1065912910382301

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What is Relevance? Defining

Intersectional Praxis in Uruguay

Erica Townsend-Bell1

Abstract

This ar ticle examines intersectional praxis via a focus on what constitutes relevant axes of difference. The author

argues that a discussion of relevance should focus on two important issues: (1) which categories are of analytic

importance and (2) those categories that activists consider relevant. This approach allows for activist debates over

the most important social divisions in society while establishing some minimal number of axes that must be included

to qualify activism as intersectional. In the Uruguayan case , gender and class constitute minimally important axes of

difference; however, race and, less centrally, sexuality and ability constitute central points of debate.

Keywords

intersectionality, praxis, difference

Among the many foci of intersectionality research is a

concern with the ability to “inspire political action and

policy development” (Phoenix and Pattynama 2006, 189).

To that end, recent work has focused on intersectionali-

ty’s application to welfare, black feminist politics, gen-

der mainstreaming, coalition politics, HIV/AIDS policy,

congressional politics, and much more (Bredström 2006;

Hancock 2004; Hawkesworth 2006; Jordan-Zachary

2008; Simien 2006; Strolovitch 2007; Verloo 2006;

Yuval-Davis 2006a, 2006b). This article maintains this

focus via attention to intersectional praxis. My interest is

in how intersectionality as an analytic tool might be

deployed by actors on the ground, particularly social jus-

tice groups. Specifically, what does a normative commit-

ment to the application of intersectionality toward

activism—that is, a praxis of intersectionality—look like,

and what forms does it take?1

Intersectionality theory stipulates that all relevant cat-

egories of difference (race, class, sex[uality], etc.) are

mutually constituted and thus inseparable analytically

and experientially.2 Thus, an interest in normative com-

mitments to intersectional praxis raises many of the same

questions about intersectionality that have appeared in

regard to other inquiries, including what methodologies

best illustrate the theory of intersectionality (McCall

2005; Weldon 2006). In particular, a focus on intersec-

tional praxis raises key questions about intersectionality:

What constitutes relevance? Does a recognition that cat-

egories (or systems or processes) of difference are inter-

locking mean that they must be consistently equal in

importance (García Bedolla 2007; Hancock 2007; Knapp

2005; Weldon 2006; Yuval-Davis 2006a, 2006b)? Where

does the list stop (or does it), and what exactly is inter-

secting (Ludvig 2006; Phoenix and Pattynama 2006;

Prins 2006; Simien 2006; Verloo 2006)? These questions

are central to any focus on intersectionality, especially its

application to politics.

This article examines intersectional praxis via a focus

on what constitutes relevant axes of difference in a par-

ticular case. I offer the beginnings of a general model of

praxis via attention to a general definition of relevance. I

argue that a discussion of relevant categories of difference

should focus on two important issues: (1) which catego-

ries have been shown to be analytically important and

(2) those categories that activists consider relevant.3 These

may or may not overlap, but both are important, and they

are interrelated. Some social divisions carry more weight

than others, in part because some social divisions affect

almost everyone, while others affect only some; the over-

looked “necessitate social struggle to render them visible”

(Yuval-Davis 2006b, 203). This implies that there can be

significant social divisions, or axes of difference, whose

importance is contested or fully unrecognized at the prac-

tical level, but whose analytic relevance is clearly

1University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA, USA

Corresponding Author:

Erica Townsend-Bell, 341 Schaeffer Hall, Iowa City, IA 52242, USA

Email: erica-townsend-bell@uiowa.edu