What Is Obvious? Federal Courts’ Interpretation of the Knowledge Requirement in Post–Farmer v. Brennan Custodial Suicide Cases
| Date | 01 March 2015 |
| Published date | 01 March 2015 |
| Author | Christine Tartaro |
| DOI | 10.1177/0032885514563269 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
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Article
The Prison Journal
2015, Vol. 95(1) 23 –42
What Is Obvious?
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DOI: 10.1177/0032885514563269
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Interpretation of the
Knowledge Requirement
in Post–Farmer v. Brennan
Custodial Suicide Cases
Christine Tartaro1
Abstract
The Supreme Court ruling on Farmer v. Brennan established the federal
court standard for determining when corrections staff members should be
held legally responsible for inmates’ injuries resulting from inmate–inmate
violence or self-harm. Legal scholars lamented that requiring plaintiffs to
prove deliberate indifference placed a heavy burden on plaintiffs. Two slightly
encouraging signs appeared to be Farmer’s end to the “individual-specific”
rule and the decision that courts had the option of ruling that the threat of
harm was too obvious for the defendants to ignore. This article involves a
review of post-Farmer custodial suicide cases and the impact that these two
aspects of the Farmer decision has had on these cases.
Keywords
Suicide litigation, Section 1983, Farmer v. Brennan, self-harm, Eighth amendment
Suicide is the leading cause of death in jails and the fifth most common cause
of death in state prisons in the United States (Noonan, 2012). Lawsuits tend
1The Richard Stockton College of New Jersey, Galloway, USA
Corresponding Author:
Christine Tartaro, Professor of Criminal Justice, The Richard Stockton College of New Jersey,
101 Vera King Farris Drive, Galloway, NJ 08205, USA.
Email: Christine.tartaro@stockton.edu
24
The Prison Journal 95(1)
to follow attempted and completed suicides that occur in custody, and plain-
tiffs typically seek relief in both federal and state courts. Schlanger (2003)
surveyed state prison systems and 44 jails with a capacity of at least 1,000
inmates and asked about the types of inmate lawsuits that have been filed
against their facilities. Approximately one third of the large jails and prison
systems had been sued for a custodial suicide in the 3 years preceding the
survey. Suicide cases ranked seventh among reasons why the large jails were
subject to litigation.
Incarcerated inmates have a right to certain protections under the constitu-
tion. People who are not in custody of a prison, jail, or law enforcement
agency have the freedom to pick up a telephone and dial 911 or travel to a
medical office for assistance with physical and mental health problems.
Placement in custody removes that ability, and the result is that the govern-
ment entity who takes away that freedom becomes responsible for prevention
of and response to serious harm. Custodial staff members who do not handle
this protection properly put their agency at risk of litigation.
Options for Relief in Court
Inmates, or families of inmates in the event of an inmate’s death, can file a
tort claim in state court or a civil rights claim in federal court. A tort is a pri-
vate wrong or injury that the court may remedy by awarding the plaintiff
compensation and damages in the form of a monetary award (Wallace &
Roberson, 2000). In the event of an inmate suicide or attempted suicide, the
most common type of tort is negligence, where the plaintiffs allege that offi-
cials committed a breach of duty that was the proximate cause of some harm.
Tort cases do not allow for plaintiffs to ask for attorney fees or any injunctive
relief (Anderson & Dyson, 2001).
Tort claims involving custodial suicide or attempted suicide usually
involve wrongful death lawsuits, and the standard for establishing wrongdo-
ing on the part of the defendants is negligence. The establishment of negli-
gence involves the question of whether the officer’s act or failure to act
created an unreasonable risk to the detainee. There are four elements required
for proving negligence: (a) the officials responsible for the inmate had a legal
duty to care for that person, (b) there was a breach of that duty, (c) the breach
was the proximate cause of injury, and (d) there was an actual injury
(Kappeler, Vaughn, & Del Carmen, 1991).
Plaintiffs who sue in the federal courts do so through title 42, Section
1983, of the U.S. Code, commonly referred to as “Section 1983.” Section
1983 lawsuits deal with the conditions of the inmates’ confinement, including
denial of medical care or proper suicide prevention. Civil rights claims
Tartaro
25
provide plaintiffs with more options for relief, including not just monetary
awards that torts offer but attorney’s fees and injunctions (Anderson &
Dyson, 2001). While the potential rewards associated with civil rights claims
are attractive to plaintiffs, the legal standards established by years of federal
court decisions has made it very difficult for plaintiffs to succeed.
Proving that law enforcement or correctional personnel violated the con-
stitutional rights of inmates, as is required in federal court, is much more
difficult than proving negligence in state court. Prior to 1964, few inmates
succeeded in convincing federal courts that they were even entitled to civil
rights protections. The case of Ruffin v. Commonwealth (1871) set the prec-
edent that inmates were to be considered “slaves of the state” and, therefore,
were not entitled to protection under the Bill of Rights. The federal courts
overturned Ruffin in the 1960s with Fulwood v. Clemmer (1962) and Cooper
v. Pate (1964). In both cases, the courts acknowledged that the Bill of Rights
applies to inmates and that meant that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of
cruel and unusual punishment included protections for convicted offenders.
While the Eighth Amendment does not specifically address pretrial detain-
ees, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause demands that the rights
of pretrial detainees be at least as great as those afforded to convicted offend-
ers (see City of Revere v. Massachusetts General Hospital, 1983).
Deliberate Indifference Pre-Farmer
The specific issue of inmates’ rights to medical care was not addressed until
the Supreme Court heard the landmark case of Estelle v. Gamble (1976).
Gamble was a Texas prison inmate who was assigned to farming duty. On
November 9, 1973, Gamble was unloading a truck when a bale of cotton fell
on him. He was seen by a doctor who diagnosed his injury as a lower back
strain. The doctor prescribed a muscle relaxer and a pain reliever and placed
Gamble on “cell-pass, cell-feed” status for 2 days, meaning that Gamble was
to remain in his cell except for meals and showers. The doctor also ordered
that Gamble be moved to a lower bunk bed, but the prison administration did
not comply with that order. After additional checks by the doctor, the cell-
pass, cell-feed status was extended a few more times until Gamble had been
out of work for 3 weeks. In early December, the doctor cleared Gamble for
light work duty. The inmate claimed that he was still too injured to work and
refused his assignment. He was placed on disciplinary segregation and
ordered to see another doctor. The second doctor prescribed medication for
high blood pressure and back pain. The prescription for his blood pressure
medication, however, was not filled for 4 days because the correctional staff
lost it. Gamble continued to receive medical care through December and
26
The Prison Journal 95(1)
January, and the Department of Corrections ordered Gamble back to work
again in January. During a January 31, 1974, disciplinary hearing, a member
of the prison medical staff testified that Gamble was in “first-class” medical
condition and could return to work. The prison staff moved Gamble to soli-
tary confinement as punishment for his refusal to work. Gamble’s medical
condition worsened while on solitary, and he was hospitalized for heart prob-
lems. Gamble filed suit the following month, claiming that the prison staff
violated his Eighth Amendment rights with their inadequate medical care.
Gamble’s complaint was eventually heard by the Supreme Court, and
while he lost, the case is remembered for setting the standard needed for
inmates to prove that their medical care, or lack thereof, violated the constitu-
tion’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. The Estelle court estab-
lished deliberate indifference as the standard for judging violations of the
constitution when the issue in question is satisfactory medical care. The court
ruled that inmates had to prove that the staff’s action or inaction resulted in
“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Years later, the Supreme Court
further defined deliberate indifference as entailing “something more than
negligence, but is satisfied by something less than acts or omissions for the
very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result. Thus,
it is the equivalent of acting recklessly” (Farmer v. Brennan, 1994, p. 818).
The loss of Gamble’s blood pressure prescription, which resulted in a 4-day
delay in his treatment, was considered to be an accident by the court, as there
was no proof that the staff intentionally withheld the medication from the
inmate (Estelle v. Gamble, 1976).
Estelle v. Gamble involved the question of when deprivation of medical care
for a physical ailment becomes a constitutional violation. Federal courts had
not yet addressed the question of inmates’ rights to mental health care. That
opportunity came when Larry Grant Bowring filed suit for...
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