What drives Russia's involvement in Africa? [An Afrocentric review of Russia–South Africa relations, 2000–2018]

• Published date: 01 May 2021
• Author: Vongani M. Nkuna,Kgothatso B. Shai
• Date: 01 May 2021
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1002/pa.2176

ACADEMIC PAPER

What drives Russia's involvement in Africa? [An Afrocentric

review of Russia–South Africa relations, 2000–2018]

Vongani M. Nkuna | Kgothatso B. Shai

Department of Cultural & Political Studies,

University of Limpopo, Mankweng, South

Africa

Correspondence

Kgothatso B. Shai, Department of Cultural &

Political Studies, University of Limpopo,

Private Bag X1106, Sovenga 0727, South

Africa.

Email: kgothatso.shai@ul.ac.za

Russia's engagement with African governments has been a subject of debate

amongst scholars of International Public Affairs and other cognate academic disci-

plines since the demise of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and early 1990s. This is

a result of different approaches in Russia's engagement with African governments

since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. To this end, Russia's engagement with Afri-

can states is multi-dimensional, ranging from political, economic (mining and energy

sectors) and security factors. In order to locate the key drivers of Russia's Africa Pol-

icy towards an individual state, this qualitative study provided an Afrocentric review

to assess the post-Cold War Russia's Africa policy paying special reference to

Russia–South Africa relations. Afrocentricity is the theoretical paradigm employed to

review the nature of Russia's Africa Policy towards South Africa. The authors rely

methodologically on document review methods.

1|INTRODUCTION

Intherecentpast(2000–2019), a great deal of literature on the Union of

Socialist Soviet Republics (USSR) (henceforth referred to as the Soviet

Union) relations with Southern African states have been produced by

scholars of International Politics, History and other cognate academic dis-

ciplines (Fidan & Aras, 2010; Shubin, 2010). However, the post-Cold

War Russia's continental engagement with African states has not been

widely covered. Most studies on this subject have assumed a North[ern]

angled perspective; which only provides a partial explanation and under-

standing of the extent to which Russia's foreign policy impacts African

nations. According to Filatova (2000), Russia–Africa relations are driven

by two leading factors: (a) Russia traditionally consists of different politi-

cal and geographical arrangements with African states (b) Russia has

never colonised any African state. Therefore, the recently rekindled rela-

tionship of Russia with African states like South Africa can be justly

attributed to Russia's interests in the continent's natural resources.

Seemingly, the historical ties between Moscow (capital city and adminis-

trative hub of the government of Russia) and Pretoria (capital city and

administrative hub of the government of South Africa) serve as a basis

for Russia's access to South Africa's natural resources (Arkhangelskaya &

Shubin, 2015). Among the natural resources that South Africa is endo-

wed with and are of strategic value to Russia include minerals, metals

and gas (Shai, 2009).

Regardless of the above, it is apparent that between the years

1956–1990s, there were no formal bilateral relations between Russia

and Apartheid South Africa. However, throughout the apartheid era

(1948–1994), the Soviet Union provided assistance (political educa-

tion, financial and military training) to South African liberation move-

ments' military wings such as Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) of the African

National Congress (ANC). In this case, the Soviet Union's assistance

helped African freedom fighters to wage a struggle against the apart-

heid government's capitalist and segregationist policies. Such interna-

tional liberation solidarity has served as a stepping stone for future

strengthened relations between Russia and African states. To be pre-

cise, in the 1990s, Russia relations with African states, including

South Africa, changed when the first president of the Russian Federa-

tion Boris Yeltsin came into power in the year 1992, as he introduced

a neo-liberal foreign policy (Omadoure, 2015). Two imperatives offer

a better explanation of the improved relations between Russia and

African states since the early 1990s. Firstly, by the early 1990s, the

Cold War was dormant and, therefore, Russia's foreign policy was no

longer defined by Cold War politics but its genuine strategic calcula-

tions which were largely based on its economic interests. Secondly,

most of Russia's Cold War benefactors (liberation movements) were

now governing political parties in Africa (Shai, 2009).

It is instructive to note that the Soviet Union was dissolved in

1991.Theforegoingobservationshouldbeunderstoodwithinthe

Received: 27 November 2019 Accepted: 4 May 2020

DOI: 10.1002/pa.2176

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https://doi.org/10.1002/pa.2176