What a difference world events make.

• Author: Farrell, Lawrence P., Jr.
• Position: President's Perspective

The United States military lays out a strategic plan every four years in the Quadrennial Defense Review. The latest QDR was shaped by the administration's 2012 strategic guidance that calls for a pivot, or rebalance, to Asia-Pacific and a gradual disengagement from the still-volatile Middle East and South Asia.

China has argued that the pivot is intended to counter its influence. The United States disagrees. However, China's muscle flexing--and push for turf in disputed islands and economic zones--has sparked calls for increased U.S. engagement as a stabilizing influence.

How quickly things can change.

Events in Africa--Morocco, Libya, Algeria, Mali, Chad, Nigeria--and the Middle East--Iraq and Syria--have undercut many of the U.S. strategic assumptions. The reality on the ground has trumped the validity of declarations such as, "al-Qaida has been decimated," and "al-Qaida is on the run."

The fact is that radical offshoots of al-Qaida, whatever one elects to call them, are on the rise. Governments are finding themselves unable to cope or, at best, can cope only marginally. Only recently, U.S. officials declared Iraq to be a stable, democratic entity and a partner. Months later, the Islamic State of Iraq in the Levant--also known as Islamic State of Iraq and Syria--has captured Tikrit (the hometown of Saddam Hussein) and Mosul (the second largest city in Iraq), and is now marching to Baghdad.

No one knows how this will play out, but this surprising turn must certainly poseanew the questions and assumptions we have about an Afghan National Security force assuming responsibility to defend that troubled nation after U.S. forces leave in December. It also must cause the United States to reexamine its postulated force level of less than 10,000 troops to be left behind--primarily trainers--post 2014, and the zero number (like 1raal oast 2015.

The assumptions of relative stability in Iraq and Afghanistan and the Middle East in general that underlie the pivot-to-the-Pacific strategy are at this point questionable, if not invalid. And if the Pacific rebalance remains a priority, who specifically is the primary threat in the region and how does the U.S. military posture to coun-ter or deal with that threat?

The U.S. search for a strategic focus after the end of the Cold War has still not been resolved.

The Cold War was certainly challenging, but developing a strategic framework and force posture was straightforward. We knew clearly who the enemy was...