What Can Reform Street-Level Bureaucrats’ Unwarranted Discretionary Behaviors? Principles? Principals? Or Both?

• Published date: 01 April 2024
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/02750740231213093
• Author: Deborah A. Carroll,Jungwon Yeo
• Date: 01 April 2024

What Can Reform Street-Level

Bureaucrats’Unwarranted

Discretionary Behaviors?

Principles? Principals? Or Both?

Deborah A. Carroll

1

and Jungwon Yeo

2

Abstract

In this paper, we ask whether principles—relevant institutions, including administrative reform, legal and judicial support, and

information and communication technology (ICT)—and principals—ordinary people that are capable, knowledgeable, and

willing—can help enhance accountability of street-level bureaucrats (SLBs) by mitigating unwarranted discretionar y behaviors.

We examined the New York City Police Department by constructing and analyzing a unique dataset drawn from multiple

sources and by using the SLB literature to inform our empirical model specif‌ication. Fixed effects regression analysis revealed

the potential of principlesand principalsin motivating or reducing police off‌icers’use of force resulting in substantiated civilian

complaints. Specif‌ically, proactive policing strategies, exonerated civilian complaint dispositions, court summons following

arrests, andICT are theprinciples, and a low-poverty population served by policeare the principalswe found to inf‌luence

discretionary police behavior.

Keywords

street-Level bureaucrats, accountability, discretionary behavior, New York City police department, policing

Introduction

Police brutality has been one of the major public administra-

tion issues in the U.S. for a long time. In recent years, with

advanced information and communication technology

(ICT), such as that utilized through mobile devices and

social media, we have become acutely aware of strained

police-civilian relations that affect communities and the indi-

viduals who live and work within them. While calls for police

reform are not new, recent social movements, such as “black

lives matter”and “defund the police,”have been signif‌icant in

terms of increasing public awareness on the importance of

police reform. However, thus far, the outcomes of such move-

ments have largely been limited to semantics or political

slogans expressing emotion and anguish regarding police bru-

tality rather than resulting in actual reforms to tackle the main

issue. In addition, in the face of increasing violence in the U.S.,

defunding or dismantling the police is not a practical approach.

We need to focus on reform that can make the police more

accountable. The real challenge is to identify methods or

approaches for reforms that improve police behaviors in practice.

According to Lipsky (2004, 2010), police off‌icers are

street-level bureaucrats (SLBs) who deliver services directly

to the public. All SLBs are allowed—and often required—to

exercise some level of discretion in implementing public pol-

icies, which sometimes lead to unintended outcomes. Given

the complex, uncertain, and continuously evolving public

service contexts, discretion may help SLBs make behavioral

decisions that are more contextually appropriate and account-

able (Zacka, 2017), and it may help them implement policies

more effectively to better respond to the needs of the public.

The common expectation for allowing discretion is that

SLBs will abide by formal rules, normative values, and

respond to the needs of civilians when they exercise discre-

tion (Yeo & Jeon, 2021). However, extant research and prac-

tice offer evidence of SLBs’misuse of discretionary

authority, which often becomes harmful to the public—the

ultimate principals of SLBs. Such discretion abuse by

SLBs often directs scholarly discourse to reexamine the

1

Department of Public Policy, Management, and Analytics, University of

Illinois Chicago, Chicago, IL, USA

2

School of Public Administration, University of Central Florida, Orlando, FL,

USA

Both authors have made equal contributionsto this work and are designated

as co-f‌irst authors. Their names are listed in alphabetical order.

Corresponding Author:

Deborah A. Carroll, Department of Public Policy, Management, and

Analytics, University of Illinois Chicago, 400 S. Peoria Street (MC 278),

Chicago, IL, 60607-7101, USA.

Email: deborahc@uic.edu

Article

American Review of Public Administration

2024, Vol. 54(3) 242–254

© The Author(s) 2023

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DOI: 10.1177/02750740231213093

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