Welfare Stigma Re‐Examined
Published date | 01 December 2015 |
Author | TOMER BLUMKIN,YORAM MARGALIOTH,EFRAIM SADKA |
Date | 01 December 2015 |
DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12109 |
WELFARE STIGMA RE-EXAMINED
TOMER BLUMKIN
Ben-Gurion University
YORAM MARGALIOTH
Tel-Aviv University
EFRAIM SADKA
Tel-Aviv University
Abstract
We dissect welfare stigma into two types: traditional and
statistical, and show that the latter can be employed as a
desirable form of a welfare ordeal, as its costs are positively
correlated with ability.
1. Introduction
In a second best setting, an egalitarian government seeking to target benefits
to the least well-off members of society is faced with a fundamental screen-
ing problem of identifying the deserving individuals. The government uses
various devices to overcome this problem. Direct devices include means test-
ing by reviewing documentation, conducting interviews, and testing by spe-
cialists.1Indirect screening includes targeting groups (tagging, according to
Akerlof 1978): basing welfare eligibility on observable characteristics such as
old age, level of education, or observable disability, correlated with ability;2
1See Besley and Coate (1995) for a general characterization of means-tested income main-
tenance programs.
2For a more recent treatment of the role of tagging in enhancing target efficiency, see
Boadway and Pestieau (2006) and Cremer, Gahvari, and Lozachmeur (2010).
Tomer Blumkin, Department of Economics, Ben-Gurion University, Beer-Sheba 84105,
Israel; CesIfo; and IZA (tomerblu@bgu.ac.il). Yoram Margalioth, The Buchmann Faculty
of Law, Tel-Aviv University, Tel-Aviv, Israel (margalio@post.tau.ac.il). Efraim Sadka, The
Eitan Berglas School of Economics, Tel-Aviv University, Tel-Aviv 69978, Israel; CesIfo; and
IZA(sadka@post.tau.ac.il).
The authors thank an associate editor and three anonymous referees for their com-
ments and constructive suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies.
Received August 13, 2013; Accepted August 15, 2013.
C2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
Journal of Public Economic Theory, 17 (6), 2015, pp. 874–886.
874
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