Weekly Case Digests February 28, 2022 - March 4, 2022.

• Author: Hawkins, Derek
• Position: Roscoe Chambers v. Andrew Ciolli, Warden, State of Wisconsin v. Dallas R. Christel and State of Wisconsin v. Steven G. Breneman

Byline: Derek Hawkins

7th Circuit Digests

7th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: Roscoe Chambers v. Andrew Ciolli, Warden

Case No.: 21-1485; 21-1486

Officials: ROVNER, SCUDDER, and KIRSCH, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Habeas Relief Due Process Violation

Roscoe Chambers, a federal prisoner, appeals the denial of two petitions for a writ of habeas corpus, see 28 U.S.C. 2241, asserting that he was denied due process in prison disciplinary hearings. The district court in both cases found that Chambers received the process he was due. Because the issues presented in the two appeals are similar, we have consolidated them for disposition and affirm.

Both of Chambers's petitions concern his loss of good-time credit arising out of incidents that occurred during a six-month period between 2018 and 2019 at his prior facility, the United States Penitentiary Lewisburg in Pennsylvania. In the first case (No. 19-cv 50247), Chambers was disciplined with the loss of 41 days for refusing a prison guard's instructions to provide a urine sample, disobeying a staff member's order, and acting with insolence towards the staff member. After an initial hearing before a Unit Disciplinary Committee, the charges were referred to a disciplinary hearing officer who determined that Chambers had committed the infraction. The officer credited the account of the reporting guard over Chambers's testimony that he never was asked for a urine sample and that this could be confirmed by surveillance video showing that the guard did not have a urine specimen cup while approaching his cell.

In both appeals, Chambers presses similar arguments to those that he raised in the district court. For substantially the same reasons, we agree with the district court's analysis. Federal courts must affirm prison disciplinary decisions if they are supported by "some evidence," Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst., Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985), and the district court was right that the incident reports sufficed to clear that low bar. Further, the court was correct that prison officials may deny access to witnesses whose testimony would be irrelevant. See Pannell v. McBride, 306 F.3d 499, 503 (7th Cir. 2002). The court also appropriately concluded that the record in the second case lacked any evidence of bias. Chambers's remaining arguments are frivolous.

Chambers, a frequent litigant, is warned that he risks monetary sanctions if he continues to repeat in future cases these arguments that we have found to be frivolous. See Alexander v. United States, 121 F.3d 312, 31516 (7th Cir. 1997).

Affirmed

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7th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: Yorie Von Kahl v. Michael Segal, Warden, et al.,

Case No.: 19-3026

Officials: EASTERBROOK, WOOD, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Plea & Sentencing Collateral-attack Waivers

Yorie Von Kahl is serving a life sentence, plus consecutive terms of ten and five years' imprisonment, for murdering two deputy United States Marshals and committing related crimes.* The judgment was affirmed on direct appeal, and a collateral attack under 28 U.S.C. 2255 failed. United States v. Faul, 748 F.2d 1204 (8th Cir. 1984); Von Kahl v. United States, 242 F.3d 783 (8th Cir. 2001). A debate about the length of his custody is the principal issue in Von Kahl's petition under 28 U.S.C. 2241.

Von Kahl also wants to relitigate the issues presented in his collateral attack, but 2241 allows review of a conviction or sentence only when 2255 is inadequate, see 2255(e), and we know that 2255 is adequate to resolve these issues because they were resolved under that statute. Section 2241 is not a means to get a second opinion in a different circuit. See Vialva v. Watson, 975 F.3d 664 (7th Cir. 2020); Lee v. Watson, 964 F.3d 663 (7th Cir. 2020); Roundtree v. Krueger, 910 F.3d 312 (7th Cir. 2018); Harris v. Warden, 425 F.3d 386 (7th Cir. 2005). No more need be said on this subject.

So Von Kahl's presumptive release date is February 12, 2023. The Bureau must let him go then unless the Commission acts under the statutory proviso and "determines that he has seriously or frequently violated institution rules and regulations or that there is a reasonable probability that he will commit any Federal, State, or local crime." The onus of making such a finding is on the Commission. We mention the possibility here only to clarify that February 12, 2023, is a presumptive parole release date, not an outer limit to his custody. The outer limit is the end of his life.

Affirmed

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7th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: Sachin Gupta v. Chad Melloh, et al.,

Case No.: 19-2723

Officials: KANNE, ROVNER, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Summary Judgment Issue of Material Fact

In the process of arresting a highly inebriated Sachin Gupta, a police officer tugged on his handcuffed arm causing him to fall forward on his head and chest and fracture a vertebra in his neck. The officer asserts that he used a reasonable amount of force on a suspect who was resisting arrest. Gupta asserts that the use of force was excessive given that he was not resisting the arrest, and also intoxicated, unsteady on his feet, and handcuffed with his hands behind his back. As these conflicting accounts make clear, there are material disputes of fact that make resolution of this case on summary judgment inappropriate. We therefore reverse and remand to the district court for the appropriate fact finder to determine which version of the facts might prevail.

Reversed and remanded

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7th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: Wisconsin Central LTD., v. Surface Transportation Board, et al.,

Case No.: 20-3507

Officials: EASTERBROOK, ROVNER, and KIRSCH, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Statutory Interpretation Facilities for Interchange or Traffic

This case pits Wisconsin Central (a subsidiary of Canadian National) against Soo Line (a subsidiary of Canadian Pacific). The question is where, in the Chicago area, Wisconsin Central will receive traffic from Soo Line. Wisconsin Central prefers Belt Railway's yard; Soo Line prefers the Spaulding yard near Bartle`, Illinois, about 25 miles to the west. The Surface Transportation Board ruled that Wisconsin Central cannot insist that Soo Line deliver to Belt Railway. 2020 STB LEXIS 428 (Oct. 29, 2020).

According to the Board, a carrier's power to designate a place where it will receive traffic is limited to portions of line that the designating carrier owns. Because Wisconsin Central does not wholly own Belt Railway, it may be used to interchange traffic only with the consent of the other carrier. We get the sense that this fight is principally about who should bear the cost of Belt Railway's services, but the Board did not resolve that dispute. Instead it held categorically that, in the absence of agreement about where to exchange traffic, the receiving carrier must designate a place on its own property.

The exchange of rail traffic is governed by statute, not by regulation or common law. The governing statute is 49 U.S.C. 10742, which provides: "A rail carrier providing transportation subject to the jurisdiction of the Board under this part shall provide...