“We Don’t Negotiate with Terrorists”—Afghanistan, Bargaining, and American Civil–Military Relations

Published date01 October 2023
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X221077299
AuthorAdam Barsuhn
Date01 October 2023
Subject MatterCommentaries
https://doi.org/10.1177_0095327X221077299
Armed Forces & Society
2023, Vol. 49(4) 953 –964
© The Author(s) 2022
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DOI: 10.1177_0095327X221077299
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Commentary
1077299AFSXXX10.1177_0095327X221077299Armed Forces & Society XX(X)Barsuhn
research-article2022
We Dont Negotiate with
Terrorists”—Afghanistan,
Bargaining, and American
CivilMilitary Relations
Adam Barsuhn
1
Abstract
The United States governments inability to view the conf‌lict with the Taliban through
the lens of the bargaining model of war was a fundamental element of its failure in
Afghanistan. This problem was reinforced by a dysfunctional civilmilitary relations
shaped by Samuel Huntingtons theory of objective control, resulting in the military
pursuing campaigns of attrition that f‌it its organizational preferences but did not
advance civilian political goals. These issues are evident in three different moments
during the War in Afghanistan where the U.S. failed to seize an opportunity that could
have changed the result of the conf‌lict.
Keywords
Afghanistan, civilmilitary relations, foreign policy, bargaining model
At the beginning of the 1997 action movie, Air Force One, the United States President
played by Harrison Ford declares to the world, We will never negotiate with ter-
rorists.Besides setting up the subsequent drama of the president f‌ighting terrorists on a
plane, the lines represent a core ethos of American foreign policy: the United States will
never give into bullying, cowardly terrorists who attack the weak and innocent.
1
Department of Social Sciences, United States Military Academy, West Point, NY, USA
Corresponding Author:
Adam Barsuhn, Department of Social Sciences, United States Military Academy, Building 607, Cullum Road,
West Point, NY 10996, USA.
Email: adam.barsuhn@westpoint.edu

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