War-Time Military Service Can Affect Partisan Preferences

• Published date: 01 September 2023
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/00104140221141837
• Author: Anna Getmansky,Chagai M. Weiss
• Date: 01 September 2023
• Subject Matter: Articles

Article

Comparative Political Studies

2023, Vol. 56(10) 1475–1505

© The Author(s) 2022

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DOI: 10.1177/00104140221141837

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War-Time Military

Service Can Affect

Partisan Preferences

Anna Getmansky

1

and Chagai M. Weiss

2



Abstract

Does war-time military service affect partisan preferences? We argue that

military service increases the salience and potential costs of war. Therefore,

soldiers who serve during mismanaged wars will associate the ruling party with

incompetence and be lesslikely to support the ruling party in thefuture. To test

our argument, we analyze almost 50 years of Israel National Election Studies.

Employing a regression discontinuity design, we show that compared with

respondents who were too young to serve in the Yom Kippur war, respondents

just old enough to serve reportlower support for theLabor party well afterthe

war ended. This effect is likely driven by soldiers’unwillingness to supporta party

they associate with security incompetence. We further show that the negative

effect of military service does not materialize in well-managed wars, contributing

to the literature on the political consequences of war and attitude formation.

Keywords

conf‌lict processes, elections, public opinion, voting behavior

Does war-time military service affect soldiers’support for the incumbent? A

robust literature in political science considers the general effects of wars and

their costs on public support for incumbents (Baker & Oneal, 2001;Berinsky,

1

London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK

2

Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA

Corresponding Author:

Chagai M. Weiss, Conf‌lict and Polarization Lab, Stanford King Center on Global Development,

616 Serra Mall, Stanford, CA 94305, USA.

Email: cmweiss@stanford.edu

2007;Boettcher & Cobb, 2009;Gartner & Segura, 1998;Karol & Miguel,

2007). Other studies document how military service, specif‌ically combat

experiences, can shape political participation and conf‌lict-related preferences

(Bauer et al., 2016;Blattman, 2009;Costalli & Ruggeri, 2019;Grossman

et al., 2015;Littman, 2018;MacLean & Elder, 2007). Recent advances that

consider the partisan consequences of military experience, and particularly

participation in war, yield mixed results, with studies showing that military

experience can have positive (Norpoth, 2020), negative (Barreto & Leal,

2007), or limited long-term effects on soldiers’support for incumbents and

off‌icers overseeing a war effort (Erickson & Stoker, 2011;Green et al., 2019).

Identifying whether military service at times of war affects individual-level

partisan preferences is important for several reasons. First, answers to this

question can inform our understanding of war’s political consequences. This

is especially the case in Israel, as well as 60 other countries (Grewal & Cebul,

Forthcoming), where some form of conscription is mandated by law, and

political backlash informs leaders’willingness to use force (Tomz et al.,

2020). Second, evidence regarding the effects of wartime military service on

partisan preferences, contributes to the literature on stability and change in

partisanship and other political attitudes, providing insight about the con-

ditions under which voters translate personal experiences, oftentimes obtained

during impressionable years, into information that shapes their long-term

political preferences (Aguilar et al., 2011;Aksoy et al., 2020;Dinas &

Northmore-Ball, 2020;Krosnick & Alwin, 1989;Lupton, 2022;Margalit,

2013;Osborne et al., 2011;Pop-Eleches & Tucker, 2020;Sears & Valentino,

1997).

Previous studies suggest that conf‌lict experiences can increase nationalistic

preferences (Baker & Oneal, 2001;Lesschaeve, 2020), augment hawkish

attitudes (Grossman et al., 2015), and reinforce in-group identif‌ication

(Littman, 2018) among individuals exposed to violence. In line with these

advances, studies show that war experience can lead veterans to support

leaders overseeing a war effort (Norpoth, 2020). Other studies that focus on

self-interest mechanisms suggest that war experience might reduce support for

the incumbent party overseeing a war effort, at least in the short-term period

after a war (Barreto & Leal, 2007;Erickson & Stoker, 2011). Finally, more

general f‌indings on war and domestic accountability suggest that the effect of

war might vary conditional on war dynamics (Gartner, 2008a), costs (Karol &

Miguel, 2007), and leader performance (Croco, 2011). It follows that the

effects of military service during wars may cut both ways and increase or

decrease support for the war-time incumbents. Thus, theory and evidence are

needed to determine whether, how, and under what conditions military service

during interstate wars affects soldiers’partisan preferences and support for the

party who oversaw the war effort.

1476 Comparative Political Studies 56(10)