War and Reason: Domestic and International Imperatives.

• Author: Gilligan, Michael

In their monograph, War and Reason: Domestic and International Imperatives, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman offer an impressive analysis of interntional conflict. Those familiar with Bueno de Mesquita's earlier work will notice similarities in War and Reason.(1) This volume is certainly part of that larger project of building "an expected utility theory of war," however it is a substantial improvement over earlier efforts, particularly in its modeling of the strategic interaction between countries.

The "interaction game" put forward by Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman is a modification of the now-standard crisis bargaining games used by so many in the literature.(2) The game begins with a chance move to determine which player will be player A and which will be player B, player A having the advantage of moving first. Each player has the opportunity to make at least one demand. The players then have the option of accepting the status quo or acquiescing to the other players demand - in either case ending the game, or making a counter-demand. If the players choose to make counter-demands (i.e., do not accept the status quo or acquiesce) then the game moves to a stage in which the use of force is a possibility. If both players choose not to use force, then negotiations ensue; if one player does not use force in response to the other players use of force, the former player capitulates; and, finally, if both players use force, war ensues. In short, the terminal nodes (possible outcomes) of the game are: (1) both players accepting the status quo; (2) one player acquiescing to the other's demand; (3) both players negotiating; (4) one player capitulating to the other's use of force; or (5) war. Obviously, these outcomes vary depending on whether A or B capitulates or strikes first in war.

Of course, any model is a simplification of reality, so it is necessary to make assumptions. But here, as in any model, a few of the assumptions are questionable. The most controversial assumptions are first, that the expected gross benefits of negotiating are the same as those of war, and second, that countries' domestic political costs of initiating the use of force rise with their expected probability of success in a conflict. The first of these assumptions is troublesome because it implies that the net benefits of negotiation are always higher than those of war (since war always involves higher costs than negotiation). This may not always be the case, particularly when a small, weaker nation may hope to gain more from war than from negotiation, and may be especially true if the resolve of the stronger country is in question (the Confederacy's attack of Fort Sumter and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor come to mind). The second assumption is even more problematic because it implies that the costs to the more...