Walking the Tightrope: Finding Balance Between Strict Nondelegation and the Administrative State through an Examination of State Experiences

• Author: Rachel Scholz-Bright
• Position: J.D., Georgetown University Law Center, 2021; A.B., Dartmouth College, 2018
• Pages: 427-449

Walking the Tightrope: Finding Balance Between

Strict Nondelegation and the Administrative State

through an Examination of State Experiences

RACHEL SCHOLZ-BRIGHT*

ABSTRACT

Nondelegation doctrine is the subject of renewed debate in the wake of

Justice Gorsuch’s dissent in Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019).

Despite longstanding precedent following the more lenient “intelligible princi-

ple test,” nondelegation proponents argue that nearly any legislative delegation

to the executive branch is unconstitutional. Strict nondelegation opponents, in

addition to arguing in favor of some delegation’s constitutionality, also highlight

the concern that implementing a stricter nondelegation doctrine would seriously

hinder the administrative state’s ability to function. To evaluate the possible conse-

quences of implementing stricter nondelegation for the administrative state, this

paper examines the experiences of three states that have longstanding, strict non-

delegation doctrines: Florida, Texas, and Oklahoma. Examining how these state-

level nondelegation doctrines have interacted with the growth, development, and

vitality of each state’s administrative state can provide an analogy for how imple-

menting strict nondelegation may work federally. Despite these states’ restrictive

nondelegation doctrines, each has maintained a strong and extensive administra-

tive state, suggesting the conventional wisdom may be wrong: stricter nondelega-

tion may coexist with a viable regulatory system.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 428

II. BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 429

A. Justice Gorsuch and Gundy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 430

B. The Modern Nondelegation Debate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 431

1. Pro-Nondelegation Scholarship. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 432

2. Anti-Nondelegation Scholarship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 432

3. Consequences of Nondelegation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 433

* J.D., Georgetown University Law Center, 2021; A.B., Dartmouth College, 2018. © 2022, Rachel

Scholz-Bright. I would like to thank Professors Paul Clement and Lisa Blatt for their guidance on an

earlier version of this note during their Separation of Powers seminar. I would also like to thank the

editors of the Georgetown Journal of Law and Public Policy for their thoughtful suggestions.

427

III. STATE NONDELEGATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 434

A. Existing Literature. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 434

B. States with Non-Strict Separation-of-Powers Clauses. . . . . . . 435

C. States with Strict Nondelegation Doctrines. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 436

1. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 437

2. Oklahoma. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 438

3. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 440

D. State Doctrine Effects on Each Administrative System . . . . . . 441

1. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 441

2. Oklahoma. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 444

3. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 445

IV. APPLYING THE STATE EXPERIENCES TO THE FEDERAL CONTEXT . . . 446

A. The Equivalency of the Federal and State Frameworks . . . . . 447

B. Potential Implementation of Federal Nondelegation . . . . . . . 448

V. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 449

I. INTRODUCTION

Justice Gorsuch’s recent dissent in Gundy v. United States

1

has sparked

renewed debate over the propriety of implementing a strict nondelegation doc-

trine. The dissent also raises questions about how a stronger barrier to legislative

delegation would challenge administrative agencies’ ability to promulgate rules

and make policy. To explore the potential consequences of a stricter federal non-

delegation doctrine, this paper examines the experiences of three states—Florida,

Oklahoma, and Texas—with longstanding nondelegation doctrines that are

stricter than the current federal “intelligible principle” test. Contrary to the con-

ventional wisdom that adopting strict nondelegation would cripple the adminis-

trative state, these states’ robust administrative systems coexist with strict

nondelegation, suggesting the doctrine may not present a substantial barrier to

continued regulatory government.

This paper proceeds in Part II by surveying the current federal debate over non-

delegation. In Part III, it examines the existing nondelegation doctrines of

Florida, Oklahoma, and Texas, which provide models of relatively nationally rep-

resentative states with well-established, strict nondelegation doctrines. Part III

1. 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2131–48 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).

428 THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 20:427