Wage Discrimination in India's Informal Labor Markets: Exploring the Impact of Caste and Gender

Published date01 February 2013
Date01 February 2013
AuthorKlaus Deininger,Songqing Jin,Hari Nagarajan
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/rode.12020
Wage Discrimination in India’s Informal Labor
Markets: Exploring the Impact of Caste and Gender
Klaus Deininger, Songqing Jin, and Hari Nagarajan*
Abstract
Although there has been considerable interest in wage discrimination in India, available studies have
largely dealt with formal rather than informal markets that are of little relevance for the poorest people.
Focusing on India’s informal labor markets leads to three findings of interest.First, gender wage discrimina-
tion is larger in informal than in formal labor markets, resulting in losses that are larger than receipts from
one of the country’s most important safety-net programs. Second, economic growth will not make gender
discrimination in wage labor markets disappear. Finally, contrary to what is found for gender, the hypoth-
esis of no significant wage discrimination based on caste cannot be rejected.
1. Introduction
Discrimination, defined as a systematic gap in rewards to factors of production that is
due to easily identifiable, though economically irrelevant group characteristics (e.g.
skin color or gender), has long attracted the attention of economists.Even if it implies
sub-optimal outcomes, a caste-based equilibrium can be self-fulfilling and persistent
over time (Akerlof, 1975). While competition can make discrimination disappear
(Becker, 1971), it may persist even in developed countries (Holzer and Neumark,
2000). Moreover, discriminatory practices affect not only current outcomes but also
groups’ social identities and their long-term potential (Hoff and Pandey,2006).
Economic study of discrimination is thus motivated by the moral case for equal
treatment and the potentially far-reaching growth-reducing impacts of discrimination.
The latter arise because discrimination will affect labor supply and lead to underutili-
zation of valuable resources (Klasen, 2002).This can distort incentives for investment,
e.g. in education of girls versus boys based on an expectation that these returns may
be different (Alderman and King, 1998). As a result, inequality traps where a disad-
vantaged group faces a long-run opportunity set much worse than that of another
group even though a better set would be possible (Bourguignon et al., 2007), can arise.
Reinforced by a social order built on endogamous castes—originally based on
occupation—often reinforced by residential segregation, discrimination is particularly
pronounced in India. While caste is losing its relevance for occupational choice in
many urban centers, it continues to exert influence in rural areas of India, especially
Northern ones (Hoff and Pandey, 2006). Caste differences and prejudices may be
* Deininger: The World Bank, MSN MC 3-300, 1818 H St NW, Washington, DC 20433, USA. Tel: (202) 473-
0430; Fax:522-1151; E-mail: kdeininger@worldbank.org. Jin (corresponding author): Michigan State Univer-
sity, Agriculture Hall, 446 W.Circle Dr., Room 211F, East Lansing, MI 48824, USA; Tel: (517) 353-4522; Fax:
432-1800; E-mail: jins@msu.edu. Nagarajan: National Council for Applied Economic Research, Parisila
Bhawan—11 Indraprastha Estate, New Delhi 110002, India; Tel: (91-11) 331-7860; Fax: 332-7164; E-mail:
hknagarajan@ncaer.org. Financial support from the TFESSD Trust Fund and the DFID-World Bank col-
laborative program is gratefully acknowledged. Tore Olsen and Sonal Vats provided excellent research
assistance.The views and opinions expressed in this paper are solely those of the authors.
Review of Development Economics, 17(1), 130–147, 2013
DOI:10.1111/rode.12020
© 2013 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
reinforced by gaps in land and human capital endowments (Deshpande, 2001) or long-
standing bias against females as manifest, for example,in female infanticide (Gleason,
2003). Although the undesirable impacts are well understood,overcoming discrimina-
tion is not easy,partly because efforts at affirmative action often become embroiled in
politics (Deshpande, 2007).
Efforts to quantify the extent of discrimination in India and its evolution over time
will thus be of policy relevance. While some studies have explored statistical discrimi-
nation in wages, they focus on the formal sector only, thus leaving out the roughly
70% of India’s population living in rural areas. This is important because, unless they
have access to resources such as land and capital to allow self-employment, most rural
poor have to rely on casual and informal labor markets to survive. In addition to vola-
tility,e.g. due to climatic shocks, discrimination in these markets will affect the welfare
and scope for investment by the poorest groups in society.
We use a nationally representative household survey to extend analysis of wage dis-
crimination to the informal sector, focusing on three questions, namely to (i) quantify
the size of discrimination in casual labor markets compared to what is found in formal
settings; (ii) explore whether caste- or gender-based discrimination is more important;
and (iii) compare discrimination in villages with high and low income levels. Results
suggest that: (i) discrimination in informal markets is more pronounced than in formal
ones; compared to less than 30% of gender wage gaps in formal labor markets (Jacob,
2006), 61% of gender wage gaps for all casual workers and 76% of the gap for agricul-
tural workers is attributable to discrimination; (ii) wage differences between sched-
uled castes and tribes (SC/STs)1and the rest of the population reflect differences in
endowments rather than discrimination; and (iii) gender discrimination in rich villages
is higher than in poor villages so that growth alone may not make it disappear, as has
been found for dowries (Anderson, 2003).
This implies that ways to improve outcomes for women in casual labor markets may
be justified. Initiatives to expand women’s access to productive assets, e.g. through
inheritance legislation such as recent reforms of the Hindu Succession Act, measures
that make it easier to rent land, or credit access via self-help groups, all go in this
direction. Research to assess the extent to which these measures’ affect discrimination
and female empowerment is desirable.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 draws on the literature to set out our
conceptual framework and approach. Section 3 presents data and uses descriptive
evidence to highlight caste- and gender differences in India’s informal sector. Section
4 presents results from wage regressions in agriculture and non-agriculture and
decomposition of wage differentials. Section 5 concludes with a number of policy
implications.
2. Motivation and Framework
The literature points to continued relevance of gender and caste differentials.We thus
discuss techniques to decompose differences in wage rates as well as the assumptions
about the “unbiased” situation underpinning them. This links to a discussion of the
estimation strategy,in particular strategies to control for selection, used in subsequent
sections of the paper.
Discrimination: Empirical Evidence and Policy Implications
Since wage discrimination, defined as the gap in earnings between different types of
workers that remains once all observable characteristics have been accounted for
WAGE DISCRIMINATION IN INDIA’S INFORMAL LABOR MARKETS 131
© 2013 Blackwell Publishing Ltd

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