Voter Behavior in Democratizing Nations: Reconsidering the Two-Step Model

• Date: 01 March 2005
• DOI: 10.1177/106591290505800110
• Published date: 01 March 2005
• Author: Philip Paolino
• Subject Matter: Articles

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PRQ_March05_III 3/24/05 9:19 AM Page 107
Voter Behavior in Democratizing Nations:
Reconsidering the Two-Step Model
PHILIP PAOLINO, UNIVERSITY OF NORTH TEXAS
A prominent literature on voting behavior during democratic transition in Mexico focuses upon two consid-
erations: voters’ attitudes toward the dominant party and their uncertainty about the consequences of opposi-
tion government. These two considerations are said to form the first step of a “two-step” process that voters
use to determine which party to support. In this article, I examine the evidence for this argument, using data
from both Mexico and Taiwan and conclude that voters in nations with hegemonic parties give greater weight
to the public policies of the dominant party than the two-step model argues. These findings have important
implications for the opposition’s behavior in trying to complete a transition from a one-party dominant gov-
ernment to a multi-party democracy.
The process by which nations transform their govern- the governing party because they otherwise do not even
ments from authoritarian regimes to competitive
consider supporting an opposition party. Policies are rele-
democracies is a terribly important problem for polit-
vant only for voters who reject the dominant party. Their
ical scientists. In the past 20 years, this gradual transforma-
hypothesis is foremost a theory consistent with simple ret-
tion in Eastern Europe, Asia, and Latin America has created
rospective voting theories (e.g., Key 1966) that evaluations
the promise of a more peaceful and prosperous world. At
of the incumbent influence voter behavior. They also intro-
the same time, the transition has moved much more slowly
duce a second condition that voters must meet before con-
in other parts of the world, most notably the Middle East
sidering the opposition; overcoming qualms about support-
and Africa. Democratization is particularly important in
ing a party without any record to indicate how it would
these areas because the continued presence of authoritarian
have governed had it been in office (Downs 1957).
governments constitutes a great danger to peace.
Domínguez and McCann’s (1995, 1996) studies have
In nations undergoing the transition from one-party rule
greatly influenced later studies of electoral behavior in
to a multi-party democracy, defeating the dominant party is
Mexico. For instance, Lawson (1997: 19) refers to this
often a key to advancing democratic reforms. In these cases,
model in citing polls showing “many among the 40 percent
significant questions concern how voters approach these
of Mexico City residents who say that they would never vote
elections. To what extent are these elections primarily refer-
for the PRI remain undecided about which opposition party
enda on the dominant party’s performance? How willing are
they prefer” to bolster his argument about calculations the
voters to support an opposition party with little or no record
opposition used in determining how best to unseat the PRI.
of governing? What role do policies play in voters’ decisions?
Other studies of Mexican elections build upon their study
Prominent research on voters’ behavior during demo-
by examining the role of voter uncertainty about the oppo-
cratic transition in Mexico focuses upon these questions and
sition (e.g., Cinta 1999, Morgenstern and Zechmeister
examines voters’ decisionmaking in such a situation. In
2001, Poirè 1999).
their analysis of the 1988 and 1991 Mexican elections,
While this research focuses upon electoral politics in
Domínguez and McCann (1995,1996: 11) argue for a “two-
Mexico, the theory may apply to other developing multi-
step model” of voters’ behavior:
party democracies with dominant parties where voters have
an inability to evaluate the opposition’s ability to govern.
Voters decide, first, on their view of the ruling party. For
Voters in nations as diverse as Mexico, Taiwan, and Senegal
those open to the possibility of being governed by
have recently faced this situation during their democratic
another party, but only for them, there is a second step.
development. There are also other newly democratized
They support an opposition party, and they choose
nations, in Africa and Asia, where new hegemonic parties
among such parties motivated by policy preferences and
could arise, extending this model’s relevance to other cases
social cleavage attachments.
in future years. For this reason, closer consideration of this
model is valuable for political scientists concerned with
This implies that attitudes toward the dominant party are
democratization.
the most important consideration for voters in such elec-
It is, however, important to note cases where the model
tions and that democratic transition to multi-party democ-
does not apply. Voters in elections following the sudden
racy occurs only when enough people are dissatisfied with
overthrow of an authoritarian government, such as in
Romania after the fall of Ceausescu, are not expected to
evaluate the former regime as described by the two-step
Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 58, No. 1 (March 2005): pp. 107-117
model. Similarly, the model fits less well in a nation, like
107

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POLITICAL RESEARCH QUARTERLY
Zimbabwe, where the opposition has united behind one
and the opposition’s ability to govern, but are also likely to
opposition party. Attitudes toward the dominant party and
consider the dominant party’s public policies. In the conclud-
uncertainty about the opposition may be relevant in these
ing section, I offer arguments for why the two-step model may
nations, but voters may have an easier time comparing the
not widely describe voter behavior and discuss the implica-
competing parties across a wider range of attributes. Finally,
tions for opposition parties’ behavior in such nations.
Domínguez (1999) writes that other explanations of voter
behavior may supersede the two-step model, even prior to
BACKGROUND
the dominant party’s defeat, as voters worry less about
opposition government and give greater weight to prospec-
The PRI had won every presidential election in Mexico
tive and retrospective performance.
since the 1920s and had not been challenged seriously until
Beyond understanding voting behavior, this theory has
the 1988 election. In that election, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas,
ramifications for opposition party strategy in relevant
a former governor and son of a past Mexican president, left
nations. Opposition candidates who do not correctly recog-
the PRI to run as an independent after the PRI selected
nize the central cleavage in the electorate could instead
another candidate,...