Vote Switching in Multiparty Presidential Systems: Evidence from the Argentine Chamber of Deputies

• Published date: 01 May 2022
• Author: Alejandro Bonvecchi,Paula Clerici
• Date: 01 May 2022
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.12333

397

LEGISLATIVE STUDIES QUARTERLY, 47, 2, May 2022

DOI: 10.1111/lsq.12333

ALEJANDRO BONVECCHI

Universidad Torcuato Di Tella (UTDT)/Consejo Nacional

de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas (CONICET)

PAULA CLERICI

Universidad Torcuato Di Tella (UTDT)/Consejo Nacional

de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas (CONICET)

Vote Switching in Multiparty

Presidential Systems: Evidence from

the Argentine Chamber of Deputies

Why do legislators switch their votes between the committee and floor

stages in multiparty presidential systems? The literature on the US Congress has

argued that switches are conditional on cross- cutting pressures by competing

principals (i.e., party leaders and interest groups), partisanship, electoral compet-

itiveness, ideology, seniority, and informational updates. This article argues that

unlike in the US two- party system, in multiparty systems electoral competitive-

ness increases the likelihood of switching. Additionally, the practice of switching

is more likely for legislators whose competing principals are leaders with conflict-

ing electoral interests. We test these hypotheses analyzing vote switches between

committee reports and roll- call votes in the Argentine Chamber of Deputies. Our

results indicate that legislative vote switching indeed behaves differently in multi-

party than in a two- party presidential system.

Why do legislators switch their vote between the committee and

floor stages of lawmaking? The literature on the US Congress has

argued that switches are conditional on cross- cutting pressures by

competing principals (i.e., party leaders and interest groups), parti-

sanship, electoral competitiveness, ideology, seniority, and informa-

tional updates. Legislators may be cross- pressured by party leaders

who control selective incentives in Congress— such as committee

appointments, resources, and campaign funds— and interest groups

who may mobilize against them and defund their future campaigns.

Majority party legislators may additionally experience pressure from

the Executive branch— that is, from Presidents seeking to consoli-

date their agenda. Electorally vulnerable legislators may be less likely

to switch their vote than those competing in more secure districts.

© 2021 Washington University in St. Louis

398 Alejandro Bonvecchi and Paula Clerici

Ideologically extreme legislators may be less likely to switch than

moderates, whereas senior legislators may be more likely to do so

than rookies. And legislators in general would be more likely to

switch upon informational updates on bills— such as committee re-

ports, hearings, and other cues that may increase issue salience.

To what extent may these arguments obtain in multiparty set-

tings? While claims about informational, ideological, and seniority

effects may arguably be construed as general, those about compet-

ing principals, partisanship, and electoral competitiveness may be

affected by idiosyncrasies. The competing principals in a two- party

system with decentralized candidate- selection procedures may in-

deed be the Congressional party leaders who control parliamentary

resources and the constituent interest groups who finance electoral

campaigns; whereas in multiparty systems with more centralized

candidate- selection methods, they may also include local party lead-

ers and the President. Partisanship in a two- party system may be less

conducive to switching than in multiparty systems, where plurality

congresses may be the rule, and thus cross- party coalitions may be

consistently necessary to pass legislation. Electoral competitiveness

in two- party systems with single- member districts may also be less

conducive to switching than in multiparty systems with varying dis-

trict magnitudes, where it may serve to (re)capture marginal seats.

Presidential systems may very well undermine party discipline com-

pared to parliamentary systems (Carey 2007), but different types of

presidential system may likely do it differently.

This article probes the explanations of vote switching devel-

oped for the US House of Representatives by focusing on a most-

different case of legislature in a federal presidential democracy:

the Argentine Chamber of Deputies. This case is arguably repre-

sentative of its kind. Like many other countries in Latin America,

Argentina is a multiparty presidential system. Its mean effective

number of legislative groups (ENP) (Laakso and Taagepera 1979)

of 4 between 1993 and 2017 (authors’ data) is similar to those

of Bolivia (3.4), Mexico (3.6), and Colombia (4.8).1 And, as Hix

and Noury (2016) show for Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Peru, in

Argentina the main driver of voting behavior in Congress is also

the government- opposition dynamic (Alemán et al. 2009, 2018;

Jones and Hwang 2005), rooted in informal legislative coalitions

where minor parties pivot along the government- opposition line

under plurality congresses. While the US House is the product of

a two- party system with single- member districts and decentral-

ized candidate selection, and typically operates under majority