Voluntary Confessions: an Examination of the Need to Restore a Pure Voluntary Confession Rule in Corley v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1558 (2009)

• Publication year: 2021

89 Nebraska L. Rev.184. Voluntary Confessions: An Examination of the Need to Restore a Pure Voluntary Confession Rule in Corley v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1558 (2009)

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Note(fn*)

Voluntary Confessions: An Examination of the Need to Restore a Pure Voluntary Confession Rule in Corley v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1558 (2009)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. Introduction..........................................185

II. Background...........................................186
A.The Pre-McNabb-Mallory Voluntariness Test.......187
B.The McNabb-Mallory Rule.........................187
C.Legislative Action Against the McNabb-Mallory Rule .............................................. 189
D.Legislative Intent of Title II ....................... 192
E.Circuit Split on the Interpretation of Subsection
(c)................................................ 195
F.Facts and Background of Corley ................... 197

III.Analysis .............................................. 198
A.The Majority's Argument..........................199
B.Legislative Intent.................................201
C.Negative Implications of the Majority's Rule.......207
D.Policy Reasons for Adopting the Dissenting Opinion ........................................... 209
1.Statutory Interpretation and Supervisory Powers........................................ 209
2.Judicial Autonomy and Discretion.............. 211
3.Judicial Integrity and Technicalities ........... 214

IV.Conclusion ............................................ 217

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I. INTRODUCTION

In the 1960s Congress began responding to public demands for more effective law enforcement.(fn1) Congress was of the view that "crime and civil disobedience" were "surging" in the nation, while at the same time, convictions were dwindling due to the increase in defendants' rights.(fn2) Many members of Congress believed that recent Supreme Court decisions in cases like Miranda v. Arizona,(fn3) Mallory v. United States,(fn4) and McNabb v. United States(fn5) were causing prosecutors to lose convictions because otherwise voluntary confessions were being suppressed.(fn6) Thus, Congress passed Title II of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act in an attempt to define "new standards for admissibility of confessions."(fn7) This was an attempt by Congress to abrogate the unnecessary delay rule in the McNabb-Mallory line of cases.(fn8)

Prior to the McNabb-Mallory line of cases, a confession would be admissible at trial if it was voluntarily obtained.(fn9) However, after the decision in McNabb, which was reaffirmed in Mallory, an otherwise voluntary confession would be excluded if it was the product of unreasonable delay in presenting a defendant before a committing magistrate or judge.(fn10) Since Congress believed that this judicially-created rule was causing too many defendants to be acquitted, Congress included provisions in the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act to restore the pre-McNabb-Mallory voluntariness test used in determining whether a confession would be admitted.(fn11) These provisions were codified at 18 U.S.C. §3501. However, subsection 3501(c) has caused the federal courts difficulty when interpreting this statute. The main question is: Does subsection (c) work to completely abrogate the McNabb-Mallory rule, or does subsection (c) merely limit McNabb and Mallory by creating a "safe harbor" where presentation delay cannot be a reason for excluding a confession, provided it is obtained within six-hours of arrest? Under the former view, voluntariness is restored as the sole test for admission of a confession, even if obtained

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more than six hours after arrest.(fn12) Under the latter view, if a confession is obtained more than six hours after an arrest but before presentation before a magistrate, the confession must be excluded due to unreasonable delay.(fn13) This debate went on for over forty years until the latter view was adopted by the Supreme Court in Corley v. United States.(fn14)

This Note examines the Supreme Court's decision in Corley, comparing the reasoning for the decision with the reasoning for the opposite conclusion, adopted by the dissent and many circuits. Part II provides the background of the McNabb-Mallory decision, Congress' response and intent in 18 U.S.C. §3501, and how section 3501 has been interpreted by the lower federal courts. Part III argues for the adoption of the dissent's view by examining various reasons compelling its conclusion. These include the legislative intent of section 3501, the negative implications created by the holding in Corley, and policy reasons that favor the dissent's view. Part IV concludes by advocating that Congress intended to completely abrogate the McNabb-Mallory rule, thereby restoring a complete voluntariness test to restore judicial discretion and eliminate acquittals based on technicalities.

II. BACKGROUND

After several Supreme Court decisions, including McNabb and Mallory, the Court was criticized for "allegedly 'hamstring[ing]' police and 'moddycoddl[ing]' criminal offenders."(fn15) Both the President and Congress seemed to side with this popular view.(fn16) Understandably, tensions arose between Congress and the Court, leading to the adoption of 18 U.S.C. §3501. This section seeks to further explain how the McNabb-Mallory rule came to be, why it was disfavored by Congress, and how Congress responded. This section also explains the intent behind the statute and how it has been interpreted by the lower courts.

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A.The Pre-McNabb-Mallory Voluntariness Test

Before the Supreme Court began developing rules for confessions in cases like McNabb, Mallory, and Miranda, the Court used a volun-tariness test to determine if a confession violated the Fifth Amendment due to coercion.(fn17) Under the voluntariness test, the trial court would look at the "totality of the circumstances" to determine if the confession was the product of coercion-thereby violating the Fifth Amendment-or if it was given by the defendant's own free will.(fn18) If the confession was not voluntary, it would be excluded. The voluntari-ness test and exclusionary rule can be traced back to English common law in 1783, and both naturally became part of the United States common law.(fn19) Initially, the Supreme Court was concerned with "third degree tactics"(fn20) and condemned state or federal convictions that were the product of "third degree" coercion.(fn21) Thus, the traditional volun-tariness standard was the only "absolute prerequisite to the admissi-bility of a confession obtained by the police."(fn22) This rule was virtually extinguished under McNabb v. United States.(fn23)

B.The McNabb-Mallory Rule

In McNabb v. United States,(fn24) the Supreme Court declared that a confession obtained by federal officers during a pre-arraignment delay in violation of Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure would be excluded at trial, regardless of whether the confession was voluntary.(fn25) Rule 5(a) required that an arrested individual be brought before the nearest available committing magistrate without

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unnecessary delay.(fn26) Thus, McNabb applied the exclusionary rule to Rule 5(a). Under this new rule, if an arrested person was not brought before a committing magistrate within a reasonable amount of time, then any confession-even a voluntary confession-obtained by the federal officer prior to arraignment would be automatically excluded. This rule was reaffirmed in Mallory v. United States.(fn27)

The McNabb-Mallory cases show a shift from the Court only being concerned with "third-degree" coercion to the Court considering new dimensions of human dignity and individual rights.(fn28) Thus, the Court's holdings in McNabb and Mallory served the purpose of deterring "evil potentialities" of law enforcement, which condoned secret police interrogations, and "insur[ing] the purity of criminal proceedings by effectively prohibiting investigative arrests."(fn29) Put another way, "the reason for the McNabb-Mallory doctrine was simple-to discourage the police practice of rounding up suspects or 'prospects,' and eliciting confessions from them to support probable cause for the arrest, in the absence of any other probable cause that would be acceptable to a magistrate."(fn30) The police now had a new system to contend with because voluntariness was no longer the standard.

The McNabb-Mallory rule essentially abrogated the voluntariness test and replaced it with a delay test.(fn31) It is interesting, however, that neither McNabb nor Mallory were decided on constitutional grounds (e.g., under the Due Process or Self-incrimination Clauses).(fn32) Instead, the McNabb-Mallory rule was an application of several statutes enacted by the legislature.(fn33) The Court interpreted these statutes to require

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prompt presentation of arrestees before a magistrate and exclusion of their confessions if they were the result of unreasonable delay.(fn34) The holding, therefore, did not rest on whether the confessions in McNabb or Mallory were voluntary, but on whether there was "reasonable promptness" in presenting the arrested suspect before a committing magistrate.(fn35) By choosing this course of action, the Court rendered any voluntariness analysis superfluous unless it could be shown that there was prompt presentation.(fn36)

C. Legislative Action Against the McNabb-Mallory Rule

The Court's holdings...