Towards an Institutional Challenge of Imprisonment for Legal Financial Obligation Nonpayment in Washington State
| Publication year | 2021 |
INTRODUCTION
Jane Doe(fn1) is going back to jail. Years ago, Jane was incarcerated for a felony offense committed in Washington State. She left prison owing the state $2500 in Legal Financial Obligations ("LFOs").(fn2) Although she fully intended to satisfy her LFO debts as soon as possible, Jane faced serious difficulties reintegrating into society. She was unable to secure gainful employment after losing her job for being unable to work while incarcerated.(fn3) She had a hard time securing steady housing and had barely begun to confront the social costs arising from state custody.(fn4) The deterioration of her social supports, combined with the economic costs of reentry, as well as costs imposed by the state made her situation bleak indeed. Ironically, the cost of her past incarceration is the very thing that is sending her back to jail. Since her first release, she has paid ten dollars per month without fail toward her account-a typical minimum payment expected of low-income felons.(fn5) Despite adhering to her self-imposed payment schedule, yearly interest and surcharges have nearly tripled her LFO debts in ten years:
| |
|
|
|
|
0(fn9) |
$0 |
$2500(fn10) |
$2500 |
|
1 |
$120 |
$385.60 |
$2765.60 |
|
2 |
$120 |
$431.87 |
$3077.47 |
|
3 |
$120 |
$454.89 |
$3412.36 |
|
4 |
$120 |
$495.08 |
$3787.44 |
|
5 |
$120 |
$540.09 |
$4207.53 |
|
6 |
$120 |
$590.50 |
$4678.03 |
|
7 |
$120 |
$646.96 |
$5204.99 |
|
8 |
$120 |
$710.20 |
$5795.19 |
|
9 |
$120 |
$781.02 |
$6456.21 |
|
10 |
$120 |
$760.35 |
$7096.56 |
The State, finally fed up with her growing debt, is now imprisoning Jane for failing to pay.(fn11) Her debt feels insurmountable.(fn12) Maybe, rather than throw away $120 per year at an ever-growing debt, she will just do her time and stop making payments.(fn13) After all, she can be imprisoned for nonpayment regardless of her good faith attempts to contribute.(fn14)
Jane's case, while hypothetical,(fn15) is representative of the difficulties faced by many low-income felony offenders in Washington State.(fn16) Washington courts impose LFOs on felony offenders(fn17) in order to help fund the criminal justice system and, in some cases, accumulate revenue.(fn18) When individuals fail to pay their LFOs, they can be(fn19) and often are imprisoned.(fn20) Many scholars are decrying Washington's and other states' LFO collection tactics as resurging debtors' prisons.(fn21) Public sentiment is largely critical of LFOs, fueled in part by the discussion surrounding Ferguson, Missouri.(fn22)
The Washington State Supreme Court has been active in this area of the law, handing down rulings that champion the rights of individual offenders. For example, the Court recently invalidated Spokane's "auto-jail" policy, which mandated imprisonment upon LFO default.(fn23) Even when the litigants fail to timely raise arguments challenging their LFOs, the Supreme Court is willing to accept discretionary review and overturn and remand LFO assignments.(fn24) Although the validity of imprisonment for LFO default was arguably irrelevant to the individual litigants' claims in
Relying on the Washington Constitution,(fn30) this Comment provides litigants with the tools necessary to begin building that case, challenging imprisonment for LFO default on a systemic level. This Comment argues that modern courts should return to the original, robust understanding of citizens' rights against imprisonment for debt-an understanding that would invalidate much of the current LFO imprisonment system. Part I provides a brief history of imprisonment for debt in the United States. Part II sets forth the current system of imprisonment for LFO default, focusing primarily on Washington State, and highlights the policy arguments against imprisoning individuals for failing to pay. Part III explains why imprisonment for LFO nonpayment violates the state constitution, examining the original purpose of article I, section 17 as well as the provision's more recent judicial degradation. It separates the case law into three eras, highlighting the cases that incrementally deviated from the foundational doctrine: Modern jurisprudence (the Third Era) deviates from the foundational principles (set forth in the First Era) by applying inaccurate precedent (created in the second Era). Finally, Part IV argues that the statutory scheme enabling imprisonment for failing to pay LFOs violates article I, section 17's foundational jurisprudence.
I. IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT IS PROHIBITED IN THE WESTERN WORLD
History has borne continuous witness to rises and falls in imprisonment for debt.(fn31) Although the practice has had its moments of popularity throughout history, those moments have been stymied by peoples such as the Romans,(fn32) feudal lords,(fn33) the Normans,(fn34) the English,(fn35) and the Americans. Historical arguments calling imprisonment for debt into question are still relevant today.
Debtors' prisons were rampant in eighteenth century England.(fn36) Although creditors could seize a person's property in lieu of imprisonment,(fn37) most preferred to first jail the debtor in hopes of compelling payment, turning to forced property sale only if debtors' prison failed to shake loose the coin owed.(fn38)
In English America, early settlers brought with them the concept of imprisonment for debt(fn39) and by the end of the seventeenth century debtors' prisons pervaded the English colonies.(fn40) However, the colonists soon realized that imprisoning debtors was not the ideal method to compel payment: Debtors' prisons exposed all borrowers, including honest ones, to potential imprisonment in the hopes of protecting creditors from "the tiny minority of scoundrels."(fn41) "Though the threat of incarceration must have kept some borrowers honest, imprisonment rarely pried loose concealed property and only sometimes prompted friends or relatives to pay off the debt."(fn42) Imprisonment for debt locked up valuable labor and forced the public to front the costs of supporting many defaulters' dependents.(fn43) Some debtors' prisons were notoriously inhumane, a fact that, combined with the new Jeffersonian social reform movement,(fn44) fueled arguments in favor of abolishing debtors' prisons.(fn45)
In the late eighteenth century, advocates began employing legal, moral, and efficiency-based arguments to challenge debtors' prisons in England.(fn46) They described imprisonment for debt as inhumane, arbitrary, and inefficient.(fn47) Legislators discussed alternatives to imprisonment, such as executions of property, wage arrestment, and bankruptcy.(fn48) They recognized that debtors' prisons, which caused "barbarity to the poor unhappy class of people, who now breathe out their miserable lives in loathsome prisons on civil actions,"(fn49) were more likely to imprison honest but unfortunate debtors than the dishonest men who were more deserving of punishment.(fn50) Such practice harmed both the honest debtors and the spurned creditors by destroying the borrower's estate without the benefit of punishing those who maliciously...
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