ARRESTED DEVELOPMENT: ARIZONA V. GANTAND ARTICLE I, SECTION 7 OF THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTION
Jacob R. Brown
Abstract: In Arizona v. Gant,(fn1) the United States Supreme Court held that the search of a vehicle incident to arrest is permissible in only two situations: (1) when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment; or (2) when it is reasonable to believe that evidence relevant to the crime of arrest may be found in the vehicle. Because Gant expressed a standard more protective than that established by the Washington State Supreme Court, Gant induced a state of confusion in Washington, where it has long been maintained that article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution offers broader protections than those available under the Fourth Amendment. Since Gant, the Court has twice attempted to redefine the search of a vehicle incident to arrest under article I, section 7. In State v. Patton,(fn2) and subsequently in State v. Valdez,(fn3) the Washington State Supreme Court adopted a standard closely resembling the first Gant prong. However, neither decision expressly adopted or rejected the second. Because the second prong is supported by historical Washington case law, the Washington State Supreme Court should adopt a modified version of the Gant rule, with an added proscription on the opening of any locked containers located during the search. Such a modification would satisfy the heightened privacy protections of article I, section 7.
INTRODUCTION
For more than eighty years, Washington courts have struggled to define the constitutionally authorized preconditions of the search of a vehicle incident to arrest. Following a peripatetic path between the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution, Washington jurisprudence regarding the search of a vehicle incident to arrest reveals little in the way of constancy or predictability.(fn4) Never has this been more apparent than in the wake of the United States Supreme Court's imposition of new guidelines for the search of a vehicle incident to arrest as announced in Arizona v. Gant(fn5) Because Washington courts have long provided that article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution offers broader protections than those available under the Fourth Amendment,(fn6) Gant has left judges and lawyers in Washington scrambling to redetermine this already contentious issue.(fn7) A recent oral argument before the Washington Court of Appeals is particularly illustrative-hardly had the deputy prosecutor taken the podium before a perhaps playfully exasperated judge implored, "I hope you can clear this up!"(fn8)
The lack of clarity lamented by the court of appeals results from the interaction between article I, section 7, and the new standard contained in Gant. At the time of Ganfs announcement, the prevailing understanding among federal courts was that New York v. Belton(fn9) provided a bright-line standard, authorizing an officer to search the passenger compartment of a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest irrespective of any concerns for the officer's safety or the preservation of evidence.(fn10) Washington State courts adhered to a similar bright-line standard under State v. Stroud, (fn11) with the added protection, as required by article I, section 7, that an officer could not open any locked containers during the search.(fn12)
The Gant Court rejected a broad, bright-line reading of Belton, and reduced the applicability of the search incident to arrest exception to two situations. First, reasserting concerns expressed earlier in Chimel v. California, (fn13) the Court held that an officer may search a vehicle incident to arrest when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment.(fn14) Second, deriving from Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in Thornton v. United States,(fn15) an officer may search a vehicle incident to arrest when it is reasonable to believe that evidence relevant to the crime of arrest may be found in the passenger compartment.(fn16) The Gant Court therefore established a rule under the Fourth Amendment that was more protective than the bright-line standard previously held permissible under Stroud and article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution. Given Washington's long-held judicial maxim that article I, section 7 provides greater protections than the Fourth Amendment, Gant thrust Washington law into uncertain territory. Since Gant, the Washington State Supreme Court has twice attempted to reconcile the search of a vehicle incident to arrest under article I, section 7, with the Fourth Amendment: first in State v. Patton,(fn17) and later in State v. Valdez(fn18)
Part I of this Comment reviews the development of federal law on the search of a vehicle incident to arrest, specifically with respect to the Chimel-Belton rule and "relevant evidence rule"(fn19) contained in Gant. Part II reviews the history of Washington jurisprudence on the search of a vehicle incident to arrest and the relationship between article I, section 7 and the Fourth Amendment. Part III examines the Washington State Supreme Court's efforts in Patton and Valdez to craft a post-Gant standard in line with both article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution and the Fourth Amendment. Finally, Part IV of this Comment argues that, should the Washington State Supreme Court be faced with a case that squarely implicates Gant's relevant evidence rule, it should adopt a modified version of the rule that contains an added proscription on the opening of locked containers.
I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT PERMITS THE SEARCH OF A VEHICLE INCIDENT TO ARREST UNDER TWO CONDITIONS
The standard for the search of a vehicle incident to arrest under the Fourth Amendment has fluctuated throughout its modern history.(fn20) Cases in the second half of the twentieth century led to the development of two main doctrines that provide alternative bases for the search of a vehicle incident to arrest. The first of these is the Chimel-Belton rule, which authorizes the search of a vehicle incident to arrest in order to protect officer safety or preserve evidence.(fn21) The second is the relevant evidence rule, which permits an officer to search the passenger compartment of a vehicle when it is reasonable to believe that it contains evidence relevant to the crime of arrest.(fn22) The present incarnation of both doctrines appears in Gant, which clarified the Chimel-Belton rule and formally adopted the relevant evidence rule.(fn23)
A. The Chimel-Belton Rule Authorizes the Search of a Vehicle Incident to Arrest in Order to Protect Officer Safety or Preserve Evidence
The Chimel-Belton rule(fn24) derives from two flagship federal cases decided in 1969(fn25) and 1981(fn26) respectively, although its modern roots are detectable as early as 1964.(fn27) Interpretations of the Chimel-Belton rule, which predicates the search of a vehicle incident to arrest upon certain prerequisite concerns, varied from narrow to expansive over the years until finally clarified in Gant.(fn28)
The Chimel-Belton rule authorizes the search of a vehicle incident to arrest in order to protect officer safety or to preserve evidence.(fn29) The rule arises from the Fourth Amendment, which states: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing30the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.(fn30)
As far back as 1925, the Supreme Court held that the warrantless search of a vehicle may meet the criterion of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment.(fn31) Although a warrantless search is generally unreasonable,(fn32) the Court developed an exception to the warrant requirement for valid searches incident to arrest.(fn33)
The beginnings of the modern development of the Chimel-Belton rule are illustrated by the 1964 case Preston v. United States.(fn34) In Preston, the United States Supreme Court required proximity in "time or place" for a valid search of a vehicle incident to arrest.(fn35) The case arose when officers arrested and removed the passengers of a car, drove it to police headquarters, and then searched the car and found drug paraphernalia.(fn36) The Court ruled that the search did not constitute a valid search incident to arrest because such searches are justified by the need to protect officer safety and preserve destructible or concealable evidence, and must therefore be proximate to the arrest in both time and place.(fn37)
In 1969, Chimel further limited the search incident to arrest exception to the area within the arrestee's immediate control.(fn38) Chimel stemmed from a situation in which officers confronted a suspect and executed an arrest warrant against him in his home.(fn39) The officers searched the entire house incident to arrest and seized numerous items, which were admitted against the defendant at trial.(fn40) The California Supreme Court upheld the defendant's resulting conviction and the admission of evidence because "the search of the petitioner's home had been justified . . . [as] incident to a...
