State v. Teuscher: the "exception" Swallows the Rule
| Publication year | 1995 |
| Pages | 13 |
| Citation | Vol. 8 No. 8 Pg. 13 |
Gary W. Pendleton, J.
After [six months], I still cannot reconcile the Utah Court of Appeals' opinion in State v. Teuscher, 883 P.2d 922 (Utah App. 1994), with my understanding of Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence.[1] The court of appeals' discussion of the use of other-offenses evidence to prove the identity of the one perpetrating a criminal offense is particularly troubling.[2]
THE CASE
On December 16, 1991, Teuscher called 911 to report that one of the children in her home daycare facility was not breathing. Upon arrival emergency personnel found the two-month-old child lying on the kitchen floor. Despite heroic efforts on the part of medical personnel, the child never regained the ability to sustain life on his own and was pronounced dead the following day.
The defendant initially told police that she did not know what had happened to the child. Later she stated that the child had hit his head on the arm of the rocking chair. When police told the defendant that such an incident was inconsistent with the child's injuries, the defendant changed her statement again and indicated that she had accidentally dropped the child in the playpen.
Medical experts concluded that the child's death was "due to injuries sustained by unnatural force applied to his spinal column such that it was stretched, twisted, flexed, or extended, " and that the child's pattern of injuries was "consistent with being held by the head and violently shaken."
Teuscher was charged with second-degree murder. Prior to trial, the state sought permission to introduce evidence of "prior bad acts" committed by the defendant against children in her care. The trial court concluded that the state could present evidence of the following specific instances to prove the perpetrator's identity and intent and to prove that the child's injuries were not sustained as the result of an accident:
(1) Approximately 13 months prior to the alleged offense, a six-month-old boy named Austin suffered a broken leg while in the defendant's care. The defendant initially denied that anything had happened to the child but later indicated that she remembered him rolling off the couch. Upon being interviewed by police, the defendant denied any knowledge of injury to the child. She later told police that her daughter had dropped the boy. Finally, she stated that she, not her daughter, had dropped Austin after changing his diaper. The defendant had told her daughter that Austin had broken his leg when he fell down some stairs.
(2) During the summer of 1991, the defendant was observed picking up a three-to-four-year-old boy and shaking him "harshly" and "vigorously" for "five to ten seconds, " while his head "went back and forth."
(3) During the summer of 1991 the defendant was observed in her back yard with a four-year-old boy. She called the crying child to her and when he was within her reach, the defendant "reached out and grabbed his hair with her fist and yanked his head over so that it was closer to where she was standing . . . ." The defendant then "proceeded to lift him up and over the railing by one arm into the house."
Additionally, the district court allowed various witnesses to testify that they had seen children crowded into closets in the defendant's home. This evidence was received in order to prove the perpetrator's intent or mental state.
The jury found the defendant guilty of manslaughter. In affirming the conviction, the court of appeals has concluded that since there were others in the home who could have caused the child's injuries, the identity of the perpetrator was in issue and that under Rule 404(b) evidence of specific instances of the defendant's misconduct was properly admitted as proof of the perpetrator's identity. The obvious question then becomes: How did the admission of evidence of the above-described prior misconduct tend to establish the identity of the perpetrator?
ANALYSIS
Character Evidence. Rule 404 prohibits the use of character evidence for the purpose of proving a person's conduct on a particular occasion.[3] Although such evidence is highly relevant, it is excluded for reasons of sound policy. The natural tendency is to give excessive weight to such evidence either by allowing it to bear too heavily on the present charge or "to take the proof of it as justifying a condemnation irrespective of guilt of the present charge." See 1 Wigmore on Evidence §194 (3d ed. 1940) at...
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