Counterpoint: Limitations on Measuring Appellate Justice With Statistics and Inference
| Publication year | 2013 |
| Pages | 0029 |
| Citation | Vol. 74 No. 1 Pg. 0029 |
The "rule of law," rather than the "rule of men, is a notion of paramount importance in Alabama. Indeed, it is expressly enshrined in our constitution and is the basis for our strong doctrine of separation of powers.1 The justices of the Alabama Supreme Court take a solemn oath to support that principle, and are directly accountable to the citizens of the state of Alabama in that regard. Accordingly, members of our judiciary-like all of our public officials-should (and do) welcome honest, constructive criticism concerning adherence to the rule of law, as long as that criticism is properly supported with facts and analysis.
In her article on page 18, "POINT: Justice Must Satisfy the Appearance of Justice-A 10-Year Review of the Alabama Supreme Court's Treatment of Jury Verdicts in the Plaintiffs' Favor," Rhonda Chambers-an excellent, experienced appellate attorney-offers some thought-provoking inferences and statistics concerning the decision-making practices of the Alabama Supreme Court over the last 10 years. The focus of Chambers's argument is that certain practices-or inferred practices-of the court might lead the public to perceive that the court has been attempting to hinder the work of plaintiffs' counsel over that time. However, her analysis raises questions concerning her use of raw statistics-as opposed to a case-by-case, rationale-by-rationale analysis-in measuring "justice," and concerning the proper remedy if there ever is something of a crisis in the public's perception of Alabama's appellate courts.
Chambers's article, however, presents no valid basis to conclude that the court has in any way acted with bias toward any group, and the use of statistics, such as raw reversal rates, provides little, if any, basis to support such inferences and conclusions. If the Alabama Supreme Court is to be criticized, then that criticism should be based on a case-by-case basis, where the particular facts and legal rationales can be analyzed.
There is no basis to infer misuse of the "no-opinion" affirmance.
The Chambers article begins with a helpful discussion of the history and proper use of Alabama Rule of Appellate Procedure 53, which, beginning in 1993, allowed the Alabama Supreme Court and Court of Civil Appeals to affirm a judgment without opinion under certain circumstances. While she concedes that there are no recorded statistics regarding the Alabama Supreme Court's use of the no-opinion affirmance, Chambers clearly feels that that device could be misused to "conceal" otherwise helpful published decisions-such as decisions favorable to plaintiffs in Alabama-from view. Chambers presents no evidence that this has been done by the court, but, instead, focuses on stressing the various merits of published decisions as compared to the no-opinion device.
There is no doubt that published opinions often provide many benefits to the bench, bar and the general public, as Chambers correctly observes. Indeed, many of us who primarily practice before the appellate courts have had cases where we would have rather had a published opinion instead of a no-opinion affirmance. However, the value of published opinions must be balanced with, among other things, the equally well-established notion that "justice delayed is justice denied." Especially given the large caseload carried by Alabama's appellate courts, many have welcomed the use of the no-opinion affirmance in moving cases through the court's docket, as that practice makes a significant difference in the time it takes for an appeal to wind its way to conclusion. Even though Alabama's appellate courts generally do an...
To continue reading
Request your trial