Case Summaries
| Publication year | 1993 |
| Pages | 38 |
| Citation | Vol. 6 No. 3 Pg. 38 |
Clark R. Nielsen and Scott Hagen
CHILD SUPPORT REDUCTION, CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES
The trial court reversibly erred when it failed to apply the presumptive child support guidelines (Utah Ann. §§ 78-45-7 to 7.19) (1992), and reduced child support outside of the guidelines without finding any special circumstances that justified deviation. The trial court clearly had acted without reference to the guidelines in reducing child support. Had the guidelines been followed, child support would have been reduced even further in light of the parties' monthly combined gross income.
Hill v. Hill, 199 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (Ct. App. 1992) (J. Jackson, with Js. Billings and Russon).
ALIMONY, REDUCTION, MATERIAL CHANGES OF CIRCUMSTANCE
The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the trial court's reduction of alimony on the basis of the husband's testimony regarding his closely held professional corporation. The trial court must do more than just rely upon the spouse's stated income. Reviewing the findings of fact entered by the trial court to support its conclusion that there had been a substantial change in material circumstances, the Court of Appeals required a finding whether the circumstances of the parties was substantially changed in a way not contemplated by the original decree. In this case, the husband's personal and business finances were intertwined. The findings entered were too general and did not include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the step by which the ultimate conclusion was reached. The trial court made no factual findings why the husband's income decreased even though his business ownership increased, the company had substantially reduced its liabilities, and in light of husband's net worth statements and business expenses.
The appellate court also criticized the trial court's order that the husband pay only $3, 000.00 of the wife's $15, 000.00 legal bill without any finding regarding the husband's ability or the wife's ability to pay or the reasonableness of the requested fee.
Muir v. Muir, 200 Utah Adv. Rep. 41 (Ct. App. 1992) (J. Garff, with Js. Jackson and Russon).
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS (A.PA.) TIMELINESS
In a per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals recognized that its decision in Wiggins v. Board of Review, 824 P.2d 1199 (Utah App. 1992) was overruled by Dusty's, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 199 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 9 (Utah 1992) (per curiam). The time to appeal an administrative decision commences on the date the final agency action "issues." That date is the date the face of the order bears, not the date it is mailed, as in Wiggins v. Board of Review. (Neither court has commented on the problem created by administrative agencies that mail decisions several days after the date thereof or petitioners who do not receive the mailed decision.)
Bonded Bicycle Couriers v. Department of Employment Security, 201 Utah Adv. Rep. 79 (Ct. App. 1992) (Dec. 4, 1992) (per curiam).
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY, RES JUDICATA
This action in circuit court was not barred by res judicata by an adjudication from the Industrial Commission arising out of the employment relationship between plaintiff and defendant. Res judicata may be invoked when an administrative adjudication has acted in a judicial capacity in an adverse proceeding to resolve a controversy over legal rights. However, defendant was unable to prevail on his claim of res judicata because he could not show that the Industrial Commission adjudicated the same claim that was later raised in the circuit court. The claim was a claim for damages suffered by the plaintiff employer when defendant breached his employment contract by refusing to return a load of freight from California to Utah. Instead of waiting for the freight, defendant returned to Utah without the load and terminated his employment.
A finding by an administrative tribunal that is entitled to res judicata also requires subject matter jurisdiction over the claim. "Since agencies typically have limited jurisdiction, parties would be wise to fully brief an agency's statutory grant of adjudicated jurisdiction and authority before attempting to apply res judicata to its decisions. In this case the Industrial Commission was clearly without statutory authority to adjudicate the employer's claim brought in the trial court, even though the agency did adjudicate defendant's claim against his employer for withholding his pay checks."
S.M.P., Inc. v. Kirkman, 201 Utah Adv. Rep. 53 (Ct. App. Dec. 1, 1992) (J. Bench, with J. Orme concurring, J. Billings concurring in the result).
STANDARD OF REVIEW; INVENTORY SEARCH
The appellate panel affirmed the denial of a motion to suppress evidence obtained in a stop of the defendant and an ensuing inventory search of his vehicle. When defendant and his friends were seen late at night in a University of Utah neighborhood, defendant's car was impounded for a registration violation. An inventory search discovered stolen stereo equipment.
The stop, viewed in the totality of the circumstances, was justified. The officers' initial search was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified it. Also, the officer took reasonable precautions for his own safety and reasonably feared that the occupants of the vehicle might have or produce a weapon. As such, the officer acted in a reasonably prudent manner.
The inventory search also was not flawed because there was reasonable justification for the impoundment and no evidence that the stop and later impoundment was a pretext to conduct a search. The ensuing search was not merely a fishing expedition for evidence. The court did not clearly err in finding that the officer conducted the search according to department procedure. Written procedures of the search are not a prerequisite to a valid inventory search. Judge Orme leaves open the possibility that a written policy may be required as an evidentiary matter to sup- p ort a hearsay objection to an officer's testimony concerning the essence of unwritten policies.
The concurring opinions of Judges Garff and Jackson differ as to the applicable review standards, as previously discussed in State v. Vigil, 815 P.2d 1296 (Utah App. 1991) and State v. Carter and State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181 (Utah 1987). For example, Judge Garff states that "in a mixed question of law and fact the final conclusion as to whether there is a reasonable suspicion is a conclusion of law and therefore the standard is correction of error."
State v. Strickling, 201 Utah Adv. Rep. 69 (Ct. App. Dec. 3, 1992) (J. Orme, with J. Garff concurring, J. Jackson concurring in the result).
HOLOGRAPHIC WILL, REVOCATION
In a handwritten note by the decedent containing the date, her full name, and a style containing her signature, the decedent revoked her 1976 will and an accompanying trust agreement. The trial court determined that, based upon this and other evidence, the handwritten document constituted a holographic will which revoked the 1976 will and trust. Under Utah Code Ann. §§ 75-2-502 and 503, a document may be a holographic "will, " even though no dispositive provision is included...
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