Vol. 6, No. 1, Pg. 32. What Does Beyond a Reasonable Doubt Really Mean.

AuthorBy Tom J. Ervin

South Carolina Lawyer

1994.

Vol. 6, No. 1, Pg. 32.

What Does Beyond a Reasonable Doubt Really Mean

32What Does Beyond a Reasonable Doubt Really MeanBy Tom J. Ervin

Sage: My son, a man who is absolutely certain of anything is a fool!Son: Are you sure?Sage: Positive!One can never be certain what "beyond a reasonable doubt" really means. In two companion cases decided March 22, 1994, Victor v. Nebraska and Sandoval v. California, 62 U.S.L.W. 4179 (1994), the United States Supreme Court reviewed definitions of "reasonable doubt" given in two jury instructions. Before considering the Supreme Court's recent decisions, however, a short history lesson may be helpful.

Historical Perspective

The due process clause of the 14th amendment guarantees that the prosecution must establish a defendant's guilt by probative evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. Any jury instruction that, taken as a whole, could be interpreted by a reasonable juror as allowing a finding of guilt based on a lesser degree of proof is defective. Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 (1990). Such a defective jury instruction could cause a jury to find proof beyond a reasonable doubt when, in fact, reasonable doubt existed. Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121 (1954).

Two important principles emerge from the Supreme Court's previous decisions. First, in Estelle v. McGuire, 112 S.Ct. 475 (1991), the Supreme Court made clear that the proper inquiry in reviewing a challenged instruction is not

33whether the instruction "could have" been applied unconstitutionally, but whether there is a reasonable likelihood that it was so applied. Second, although the Constitution does not dictate that any particular words be used in a jury instruction relating to the prosecution's burden of proof, the charge must, taken as a whole, correctly convey the concept of reasonable doubt.

The Justices of the United States Supreme Court have not always agreed on the best way to define reasonable doubt for a jury. Although the Court's most recent pronouncement in Victor and Sandoval similarly advances no consensus, it urges trial courts to avoid defining the term. These cases offer no universal reasonable doubt definition, but Victor and Sandoval do ratify the jury instruction currently sanctioned in many state courts, including those of South Carolina.

Victor and Sandoval

Both defendants were convicted of murder arising out of separate incidents and sentenced to death. The trial judge in Victor charged, in part, that a reasonable doubt is a doubt precluding an abiding conviction "to a moral certainty," and is an "actual and substantial doubt" not excluded by the "strong probabilities of the case." The instructions in Sandoval defined reasonable doubt as, among other things, "not a mere possible doubt," but one "depending on moral evidence," such that jurors could not say they felt an abiding conviction "to a moral certainty."

Justice O'Connor delivered the majority opinion in Victor and Sandoval In considering the challenged instructions, the majority reiterated that, although the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard is a requirement of due process, the Constitution neither prohibits the trial court from defining reasonable doubt nor requires it to define the term. In fact, the Constitution does not...

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