Injunctions Under Revised Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65 a
| Jurisdiction | Utah,United States |
| Citation | Vol. 4 No. 7 Pg. 17 |
| Pages | 17 |
| Publication year | 1991 |
August, 1991
Mark W. Dykes, J.
I. INTRODUCTION
On September 1, 1991, a substantially revised version of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65A, governing injunction practice, will become effective.[1] This article will discuss the new Rule 65A, with a specific focus on the standards set forth in the new Rule for granting preliminary injunctive relief, and the relevant case law thereunder.
II. 10TH CIRCUIT LAW WILL BE THE GUIDE; THE CRITERIA IN CURRENT RULE 65A REPLACED BY THE CRITERIA OF THE CASE LAW
Subpart (e) of the new Rule 65A largely abandons the former standards for granting temporary or preliminary injunctive relief under that subpart, and replaces them with the classic four factors found in 10th Circuit and other federal decisional law for determining whether such relief should issue. As the Committee note states,
Paragraph (e). This paragraph completely revises the corresponding paragraph of the former rule. The committee sought to modernize the grounds for the issuance of injunction orders by incorporating standards consistent with national trends. There is little case law in Utah interpreting the grounds for injunctive orders, and the committee was divided as to whether the development of grounds should be left entirely to the courts. A majority of the committee believed, however, that courts and litigants would benefit from explicit standards drawn from sound authority.
The standards set forth in paragraph (e) are derived from Tri-State Generation & Transmission Ass'n v. Shoshone River Power, Inc., 805 F.2d 351, 355 (10th Cir. 1986), and Otero Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Reserve Bank, 665 F.2d 275, 278 (10th Cir. 1981). Federal courts require proof of compliance with each of the four standards, but the weight given to each standard may vary. The substantial body of federal case authority in this area should assist the Utah courts in developing the law under paragraph (e).
A. The Nature and Purpose of Preliminary Injunctive Relief,
Concerning the nature of the preliminary injunction, the 10th Circuit has stated:
A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy; it is the exception rather than the rule. In determining whether a preliminary injunction is warranted, a court must be guided by normal equitable principles and must weigh the practicalities of the situation.[2]
Similarly, the purpose of preliminary injunctive relief:
The main purpose of a preliminary injunction is simply to preserve the status quo pending the outcome of the case. In issuing a preliminary injunction, a court is primarily attempting to preserve the power to render a meaningful decision on the merits.[3]
B. The Four Factors and the Movant's Burden.
Subpart (e) of Rule 65A states: (e) Grounds. A restraining order or preliminary injunction may issue only upon a showing by the applicant that:
(1) The applicant will suffer irreparable harm unless the order or injunction issues;
(2) The threatened injury to the applicant outweighs whatever damage the proposed order or injunction may cause the party restrained or enjoined; (3) The order or injunction, if issued, would not be adverse to the public interest; and
(4) There is a substantial likelihood that the applicant will prevail on the merits of the underlying claim, or the case presents serious issues on the merits which should be the subject of further litigation.
These factors are discussed seriatim below.
1. Irreparable Injury.
a. The Standard.
The 10th Circuit is not normally shy about upholding findings of irreparable harm.[4] Several cases are helpful.
In Tri-State Generation v. Shoshone River Power, the court found the trial judge had not erred in determining that the movant, an electricity generating and transmitting cooperative, would suffer irreparable harm if the sale of assets by one of its member utilities to a private utility were not enjoined. Concerning the issue of irreparable harm in general, the court stated:
In federal courts, the moving party must show irreparable injury in order to obtain a preliminary injunction. Injury is generally not irreparable if compensatory relief would be adequate. Thus, Tri-State must show not only that it is injured by the failure to issue the preliminary injunction, but also that damages are not adequate to compensate that injury.
Difficulty in collecting a damage judgment may support a claim of irreparable injury. If Tri-State cannot collect a money judgment, then failure to enter the preliminary injunction would irreparably harm it.
A threat to trade or business viability may constitute irreparable harm.....If a preliminary injunction is not issued, Shoshone will almost assuredly sell its assets. Furthermore, Tri-State has presented evidence which shows that other member cooperatives are also currently planning to sell their assets so as to avoid long-term requirements contracts.
If the preliminary injunction does not issue, Tri-State has no protection against the loss of its business while the litigation progresses. Rather, it would perhaps be left after a trial on the merits with an empty victory. Shoshone may be found to have breached its contract with Tri-State, but in the meantime Tri-State would have ceased to exist. Tri-State has adequately shown that without the preliminary injunction, it will suffer irreparable harm.
805 F.2d at 355-56 (citations omitted).[5]
In Otero Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, the movants secured from the trial court a preliminary injunction ordering the Federal Reserve to continue processing checks drawn on the movants' banks. The court found a possibility of irreparable injury in that interruption of the movants' check-processing system would disrupt service to 19, 000 customers, causing loss of business and customer goodwill.[6]
In Valdez v. Applegate, 616 F.2d 570 (10th Cir. 1980), the trial court determined that the movants, permittees under Federal grazing laws, had failed to establish they would suffer irreparable harm if revisions in grazing permits as mandated by an Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS") and an accompanying management program were allowed to take effect. The 10th Circuit differed:
We disagree with the trial court's findings and conclusions that the plaintiffs...
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