Write On!

• Publication year: 2015
• Pages: 46
• Citation: Vol. 38 No. 6 Pg. 46

Write On! Vol. 38 No. 6 Pg. 46 Wyoming Bar Journal December, 2015

Michael R. Smith Professor of Law Director, Center for the Study of Written Advocacy University of Wyoming.

I Can See Clearly Now: Induced Rules and the See Signal in Legal Citation

Many legal writers do not accurately use the See signal in legal citation. Perhaps a brief review of this introductory citation signal will help legal writers See more clearly.

Introduction to the See Signal

Te See signal is one of several introductory signals used in legal writing to introduce a citation to authority. Introductory signals are designed to tell a reader how the cited authority relates to the proposition that precedes the cite. According to The Blue-book citation guide, the See signal is used to inform the reader that while the cited authority supports the proposition, “there is an inferential step between the authority cited and the proposition it supports.”^[1] In practice, the See signal is used most often when a legal writer generalizes the reasoning of a case and induces a new rule from that reasoning.

Consider this example of the See signal in action:

Regardless of the crimes a criminal defendant may have allegedly committed, a court may order restitution only for those expenses caused by the crimes of which the defendant was actually convicted. See Jones v. State, 480 So.2d 163, 164 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).

The use of the See signal introducing the citation to the Jones case informs the reader that the case does not actually state this proposition as an express rule; rather the writer induced this rule from the reasoning and holding of the case. In the Jones case, a criminal defendant had allegedly committed both burglary of a dwelling and dealing in stolen property.^[2] As the result of a plea bargain, however, the defendant was convicted only of the latter offense, dealing in stolen property.^[3] On appeal, the court held that the defendant could not be required to pay restitution for the victims’ broken window because the window was broken during the burglary and the defendant was convicted only of dealing in stolen property and not the burglary itself.^[4] Te court’s holding was stated in terms of the specific defendant; the court did not state the idea as a general rule. Te writer of the above excerpt, however, generalized this reasoning in the Jones case and stated the idea for the first time as a general rule. To inform the reader of this inferential...