Court Summaries

JurisdictionWyoming,United States
CitationVol. 33 No. 6 Pg. 40
Pages40
Publication year2010
Wyoming Bar Journal
2010.

Vol. 33, No. 6, 40. Court Summaries

Wyoming Bar Journal
Issue: December, 2010

Court Summaries

by P. Craig Silva

Jack Dollarhide v. Scott Bancroft et al.

2010 WY 126

S-10-0023

September 14, 2010

On August 3, 2001, Jack Dollarhide was injured on a construction site while employed by Bancroft Construction, Inc. Mr. Dollarhide was injured when a raised wooden platform (man basket) upon which he was standing fell to the ground. Mr. Dollarhide sought and received workers' compensation benefits. He filed a co-employee liability suit against: (1) Scott Bancroft, the owner of the construction company; (2) Murray Shattuck, the company's general construction superintendent; and (3) Michael Johnson, the company's project superintendent. The first jury trial ended in a mistrial. The second trial resulted in a jury verdict in favor of Bancroft, Shattuck, and Johnson.

During the pretrial process, all defendants filed motions for summary judgment. The motions for summary judgment were properly supported by depositions and affidavits from the named defendants. The affidavits and depositions consistently contended that it was not company policy or practice for the employees to use the man basket; but instead, the company policy and practice was to use the scaffolding on the job site.

As the case approached the first trial, Mr. Johnson decided that he would change his deposition testimony and now claimed that workers did use man baskets and that this was a common practice on this and other jobs. Not surprisingly, Mr. Johnson's deposition was reopened where these items were confirmed and his testimony was changed.

The first trial was held August 10, 2009. During the opening, plaintiffs counsel argued that these false statements had been presented to the trial judge asking the judge to throw the case out on summary judgment and the trial judge refused to dismiss the case. Defense counsel moved for a mistrial on the basis that plaintiffs counsel had now intimated that the trial judge believes the case is meritorious. The trial judge granted the motion and the defendants moved for costs totaling $29,044.31. At about the same time, Mr. Dollarhide moved for sanctions by way of entry of default for the use of the perjured testimony during the pretrial process of the case. Neither of these motions was decided until after the second trial.

The second trial was held on August 31, 2009, and the defendants prevailed. The court then ruled on the various motions finding that Mr. Dollarhide was to pay Teton County $2,235.45 for jury costs attributable to the mistrial. Mr. Dollarhide was to pay defendants $450.78 for the costs of the trial continuance occasioned by the change in defense counsel. In addition, Mr. Dollarhide was ordered to pay Bancroft $2,844.47, Shattuck $778.18 and Johnson $3,537.42 as costs for the defense verdict in the second trial. Mr. Dollarhide was awarded nothing by way of costs.

The first issue was whether mistrial was properly granted. The Wyoming Supreme Court ruled that the trial court's decision was proper as it related to the mistrial. The Court ruled that "[t]he trial judge is the dominant figure responsible for the management, direction, and control of the proceedings. In the adversary system, the jury looks to the trial judge for guidance. A comment of this nature made at the beginning of the proceedings can have a marked tendency to influence a jury in its analysis of the issue." Consequently, the decision to grant mistrial was proper.

The second issue was whether the trial court rightly assessed costs of $2,235.45 for the mistrial against Mr. Dollarhide. In actuality, the defendants sought costs and fees in the amount of $29,044.31. This was sought under Uniform Rule of District Court 503(b) which provides "when a mistrial is caused by any party, the court may order that the party, or parties, reimburse the proper fund for fees and mileage paid to the witnesses, jurors, and bailiffs for attendance." Defendants were reading "fees" in this rule to mean attorney's fees. While not clear from the opinion, it is likely the trial court was not reading the rule in that manner but instead applying "fees" as a word modifying the phrase "paid to witnesses." Therefore, the trial court did not award the larger sum including attorney's fees...

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