Vol. 3, No. 3, Pg. 10. The South Carolina Rules of Statutory Interpretation.

• Author: By Thomas R. Haggard

South Carolina Lawyer

1991.

Vol. 3, No. 3, Pg. 10.

The South Carolina Rules of Statutory Interpretation

10The South Carolina Rules of Statutory InterpretationBy Thomas R. Haggard"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, "it means just what I choose it to mean-neither more nor less."

"The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make words mean so many different things."

"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be the master-that's all,

Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass, ch. 2

Which is to be the master indeed? In the world of statutory interpretation, is it the legislature, the courts, or the words themselves?

There is no simple answer. What a statute "means' is determined by its words, syntax and punctuation, by the specific intent of the legislature when. it used those specific words, and by the overall purpose of the legislation-all of this, however, only as viewed through the eyes of a court, whose vision has been focused (or not) by the arguments of counsel.

This inherently unstable process is supposedly governed by rules of statutory interpretation. Although I will continue to refer to them as "rules," this, is a misnomer. What we are dealing with, in reality, are some loosely constructed and sometimes mutually inconsistent 'admonitions." Nevertheless, they seem to play a significant role in statutory litigation, and the practicing lawyer can ill afford to

THE RULE OF THE SUPREMACY OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT

This is the cardinal rule of statutory interpretation, It derives from the doctrine of separation of powers. The "courts have no legislative powers, and in the interpretation and construction of statutes their sole function is to determine . . . the intention of the Legislature? Laird v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 243 S.C. 388, 395, 134 S.E.2d 206, 209 (1964). For additional cases, see West's South Eastern Digest 2d,- Stittuteg, Key No.181:(1) thereinafter, this source of additional cases will be cited by relevant Key Number only].

The question is, how can the courts determine this legislative intent? The South-Carolina courts have taken two almost diametrically opposed approaches to this problem.

THE PLAIN MEANING RULE

For Latin buffs, this is known as the principle of ita lex scripta est ("so the law is written"). In Beaty v. Richardson, 56 S.C. 173, 180, 34 S.E. 73, 76 (1899), the Court stated the rule as follows: "The legislature must have intended to mean what it has plainly expressed, and consequently there is no room for construction. . . . Where the words of a statute are plainly expressive of an intent, not rendered dubious by the context, the interpretation must conform to and carry out that intent. It matters not, in such a case, what the consequences may be." Later, speaking of a statute that granted power of eminent domain, the Court clarified the relationship between the plain meaning rule and resort to legislative history. "The grant of power is complete, plain and unambiguous. Legislative intent in such a case is to be determined from the language employed; legislative history only can be resorted to for the purpose of solving doubt, not for the purpose of creating it." Timmons v. South Carolina Tricentennial Commission, 254 S.C. 378, 402, 175 S.E.2d 895, 817 (1970) pert. denied, 400 U.S. 986 (1971). See Key Nos. 181(1), 181(2), 188, 189, 190, 217.3.

12and for sloppy drafters this can be something of an annoyance. Speaking to Justice Sandra Day O'Connor about an interpretation the United States Supreme Court had given to a certain federal statute, Sen. Warren Rudman once said, "Congress gets very upset sometimes when you interpret statutes exactly as we have written them."

Alice also had a problem in this regard.

"Then you should say what you mean," the March Hare went on.

"I do," Alice hastily replied; "at least-at least I mean what I say-that's the same thing, you know."

"Not the same thing a bit!" said the Hatter. "Why you might just as well say that `I see what I eat' is the same thing as 'I eat what I see'!"

Lewis Carroll, Alice's Adventures in Wonderland, ch. 6

The plain meaning rule, however, has a corol-lary and is subject to an exception. The corollary is that when the statute is ambiguous (which is just another way of saying that its meaning is not plain), then the courts can resort to other evidences of legislative intent. As the Court put it in Abell v. Bell, 229 S.C. 1, 5, 91 S.E.2d 548, 550 (1956), "where the language of a statute gives rise to doubt or uncertainty as to the legislative intent, the search for that intent may range be-yond the borders of the statute itself; for it must be gathered from a reading of the statute as a whole in light of the circumstances and conditions existing at the time of its enactment."

The courts recognize an exception to the plain meaning rule when the literal words of the statute would lead to absurd results. For example, in Hamm v. South Carolina Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 287 S.C. 180, 336 S.E.2d 470 (1985), the literal words of the statute required that appeals from an ad-ministrative decision be filed within 30 days after the decision. The Court, however, construed that as meaning within 30 days after receiving notice of the decision, since any other interpretation would lead to the absurd result of allowing an agency to preclude judicial review by simply con-cealing its decision for 30 days. See KeyNos.181(2), 188, 189. This is also known as the rule of "intelligent fidelity." See Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 377 S.E.2d 358 (S.C. Ct. App. 1989).0n the other hand, the Court has also cautioned that "this Court may not countenance judicial fiat by declaring certain applications of a statute 'absurdities.' It is when the wisdom of a statute is least appealing to us that we must most carefully resist natural inclinations to think its application 'absurd.' " Martin v. Ellisor, 266 S.C. 377, 382, 223 S.E.2d 415, 418 (1976).

THE LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE RULE

Under this rule, the courts purport to divine legislative intent by reference to the alleged purpose of the statute, regardless of whether the language used is ambiguous. The legislative purpose rule comes in two forms. A rather innocuous version was stated by the Court in Lewis v. Gaddy, 254 S.C. 66, 71, 173 S.E.2d 376, 378 (1970), as follows: "All rules of statutory construction are subservient to the one that legislative intent must prevail if it can be reasonably discovered in the language used, and that language must be construed in the light of the intended purpose." (Emphasis added.) See Key Nos. 181(1), 184, 215. In other words, the language and the purpose work together, equally, to reveal the legislative intent.

A more virulent form of the legislative purpose rule was stated by the Court in Greenville Baseball, Inc. v. Bearden, 200 S.C. 363, 368, 20 S.E.2d 813, 815 (1942), as follows: "Courts are not always confined to the literal meaning of a statute; the real purpose and intent of the lawmakers will prevail over the literal import of the words." See Key Nos. 183, 184, 188.

Since "legislative purpose" is often ill-defined and incapable of specific proof, allowing courts to construe statutes by reference to their vision of it tends to make the courts the masters of the legislation.

THE STATUTORY DEFINITIONS RULE

It goes without saying that "a legislative body has the power within reasonable limits to prescribe legal definitions of its own language, and when an Act passed by it embodies the definition, it is generally binding upon the Courts."Windham v. Pace, 192 S.C. 271, 283, 6 S.E.2d 270, 275 (1939). See Key No.179. Even under that begrudging statement of the rule, the power of the legislature to define its own terms clearly tends to make the legislature the master. Thus, by legislative fiat, "tangible personal property"includes"intangibles."Code Section 12-36-60.

15The remainder of the rules produce a mixed bag of results with respect to the critical question of who is the master.

THE PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF CONSTITUTIONAUTY RULE

As between two possible interpretations of a statute, one which would render the statute unconstitutional and another which would not, the courts will favor the latter.Bradley v. Hullander, 277 S.C. 327, 287 S.E.2d 140 (1982). See Key No. 212.

THE RULE FAVORING STRICT CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES IN DEROGATION OF THE COMMON LAW

If a statute changes the common law rule, then the courts will strictly construe it and not extend its application beyond what was clearly and expressly intended. Purdy v. Moise, 223 S.C. 298, 75 S.E.2d 605 (1953) (also applies to laws in derogation of the natural-law right of property). Similarly, an interpretation of a statute which would render it in derogation of the common law is not likely to be adopted. Major v. National Indem. Co., 267...