The Legal
| Publication year | 2022 |
| Pages | 0018 |
The Fireman?s Rule in Georgia: Litigating Claims Brought by Public Safety Officers
This article will explore the contours of the Fireman's Rule and discuss fundamentals related to litigating claims brought by public safety officers for injuries sustained while in the execution of their duties.
BY ERIC RETTER
When a person suffers physical injuries, whether on the job or on personal time, he or she often looks to numerous sources for recovery. These sources may include not only the alleged wrongdoer, but also the owner or occupier of the premises where the injury occurred, or in some cases, those who may have encouraged the tortfeasor.
Public safety officers, including police, firefighters and emergency medical technicians, are not immune to seeking compensation for injuries purportedly caused by the wrongdoing of others. As a high-profile example, numerous Capitol Police officers have filed suit against former President Donald Trump arising out of the injuries that they sustained while on duty at the U.S. Capitol building on Jan. 6, 2021.[1]
Georgia law, however, like that of many other states, contains what is known as the “Fireman's Rule.” Under the Fireman's Rule, “public safety officers ‘are precluded from recovery for injuries received when they are injured as a result of the negligence that caused them to be called to the scene.’”[2] This article will explore the contours of the Fireman’s Rule and discuss fundamentals related to litigating claims brought by public safety officers for injuries sustained while in the execution of their duties.
The Fireman's Rule
The Fireman's Rule is a common-law and public-policy-based rule, which limits the availability of recovery for public safety officers when they are injured while responding to situations in their official capacity. In its most cited form, Georgia's version of the Fireman's Rule provides:
[I]t is a public policy of the State of Georgia that a public safety employee cannot recover for injuries caused by the very negligence that initially required his presence in an official capacity and subjected the public safety employee to harm; that public policy precludes recovery against an individual whose negligence created a need for the presence of the public safety employee at the scene in his professional capacity.[3]
The Fireman's Rule in Georgia
The existence of the rule was first noted in Georgia in Ingram v. Peachtree South, Lt., where the Court of Appeals noted that "while a fireman may recover for negligence independent of the fire, a landowner is not liable for negligence in causing the fire." [4]The initial rationale for the Fireman's Rule is that "one cannot complain of negligence in the creation of the very occasion for his engagement." [5] Georgia courts citing the rule with approval justify the rule by reasoning that "[s]ince most fires occur because of negligence, to hold a landowner liable to a fireman would impose a heavy and unreasonable burden upon the owner." [6]
Beginning in Bycom Corp. v. White, the Court of Appeals has expanded the rule from limiting lawsuits by firefighters against the owners or occupiers of land where the fire occurred to include all public safety officers as against any defendant for the negligence that initially drew the public safety officer to the scene.[7] The two rationales adopted by the
The initial rationale for the Fireman's Rule is that "one cannot complain of negligence in the creation of the very occasion for his engagement."
Court of Appeals in formally recognizing the Fireman's Rule were public policy and assumption of risk.[8] In formally adopting and expanding the rule, the Bycom court approvingly cited the public policy considerations noted by the Iowa Supreme Court in an earlier case:
“[I]t offends public policy to say that a citizen invites private liability merely because he happens to create a need for those public services. [Cit.] Citizens should be encouraged and not in any way discouraged from relying on those public employees who have been specially trained and paid to deal with these hazards. Additionally, a citizen does not have the right to exclude public safety officers from emergency situations or to control their actions once they have been alerted to an emergency and arrive on the scene. Indeed, a citizen may have a legal duty to summon a public safety officer in some instances and to say he may, in the course of discharging that duty, risk tort liability to officers who are specially trained and hired to cope with these hazards, strikes us as inconsistent and unfair.”[9]
“‘The relevant inquiry is whether the negligently created risk which resulted in the … injury was the very reason for [the officer’s] presence on the scene in his professional capacity. If the answer is yes, then recovery is barred; if no, recovery may be had.’”[10] The Fireman’s Rule has been formally extended to cover claims made by police officers[11] and EMTs.[12]
The Court of Appeals has explained the rationale for the Fireman's Rule as follows:
[I]t is the nature of the job undertaken for the employee to be subjected to risks of injury created by people he or she is called upon to serve. By accepting that job the employee assumes a general or primary risk of injury, unlike the specific or secondary assumption of the risk which constitutes an affirmative defense to a tort action brought by one who "(1) had actual knowledge of the danger; (2) under-stood and appreciated the risks associated with such danger; and (3) voluntarily exposed himself to those risks." The justification for imposing this general or primary risk is that the employee is paid to encounter it and trained to cope with it.[13]
The case of Watson Used Cars, LLC v. Kirklani is illustrative of the application of the rule. In Kirkland, plaintiff Kirkland was a Baker County sheriff's deputy who was injured while on duty.[14] An employee of defendant Watson mowed grass and blew the clippings onto the highway, and the defendant conceded for the purpose of the appeal that that act was negligent.[15] Later that day, a motorist was traveling on the highway in the rain, and, when his car drove over the wet grass clippings, his vehicle "lost traction, slid off the roadway to the right, flipped over, and came to rest upright in a field." [16] The motorist called 911 and reported the accident.[17] The 911 call mentioned the overturned vehicle but did not mention the grass clippings.[18]
Kirkland and another officer drove to the scene to respond to the 911 call.[19] When Kirkland approached the scene, he began to brake, and the grass clippings caused his vehicle to slide off the road.[20] Kirkland sustained serious injuries.[21]
Defendant moved for summary judgment, and the trial court denied the motion. [22] In denying the motion for summary judgment, the trial court ruled that “it was not the grass, but Lynch’s need for help that brought Kirkland to the scene.”[23] The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and reasoned that “[t]here is no ‘extrinsic act’ of negligence in this case. Rather, Kirkland was injured as a result of the same negligence (wet grass clippings on the roadway) that caused [the original motorist] to lose control of his car and necessitated Kirkland’s presence on the scene.”[24] Because Kirkland’s injuries were caused by “the same grass clippings” that caused him to be on the scene in the first place, the Court of Appeals held that the Fireman’s Rule applied to Kirkland’s claims.[25]
Similarly, in Martin v. Gaither,[26] a police officer had stepped into the street to direct a car to move, after which he was struck by a MARTA bus. He separately sued the driver of the car whom he had directed to move and MARTA for his injuries. The Court of Appeals affirmed the grant of summary judgment to the driver of the car based on the Fireman’s Rule, because “[h]is injury was proximately related to controlling the flow of traffic and the enforcement of traffic laws, the very reason for him being on the scene.”[27] As against MARTA, however, the...
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