When Wrong Is Right: Stare Decisis in the Supreme Court of Georgia
| Publication year | 2015 |
| Pages | 0010 |
A Look at the Law
by John K. Larkins Jr.
The doctrine of stare decisis ("let the decision stand") may at first blush seem at odds with the idea that the sacred vocation of a court is to administer justice. Why, and when, should a court adhere to precedent that it believes was wrongly decided? Obviously, the answer to this question is important to appellate advocates. The nature and scope of the stare decisis doctrine is also of critical importance for a court of last resort, such as the Supreme Court of Georgia. In a very real sense, stare decisis often determines what the law is and what it will be.
This article explores the history of the stare decisis doctrine in the Supreme Court of Georgia and recent efforts of that court to use a more systematic analysis to determine the doctrine's applicability.
The Historic Facets of Stare Decisis
The stare decisis doctrine is well known and has been applied frequently since the early days of the Supreme Court of Georgia. It is difficult to craft a comprehensive definition of the doctrine.[1] Generally, the doctrine says that where a judicial decision is rendered on an issue, that decision becomes precedent, i.e., legal authority, that will not be overruled except in extraordinary circumstances. It is a type of legal inertia or presumption favoring the existing state of the law, based on practical policy considerations.
The cases seem to agree that the stare decisis doctrine primarily exists to promote uniformity and stability in judicial decisions (or at least the perception thereof).[2]It is viewed as being critical to public confidence in "the stability and the certainty of the decisions of the court."[3] Thus, the virtues of stability and certainty may be preferred over the issue of whether the decision in question was decided rightly or wrongly. "[E]ven in doubtful cases, it is of infinitely greater importance to public as well as private interests that the law should be definitely settled, affording a fixed rule of conduct, than that it be settled in a particular way."[4]
The stare decisis doctrine is "practical" and has been characterized as an essential part of a "well-ordered system of jurisprudence":
The application of the doctrine of stare decisis is essential to the performance of a well-ordered system of jurisprudence. In most instances, it is of more practical utility to have the law settled and to let it remain so, than to open it up to new constructions, as the personnel of the court may change, even though grave doubt may arise as to the correctness of the interpretation originally given to it.[5]
A court should apply "known principles and previously disclosed courses of reasoning" in its decision-making process; otherwise, the process could lead to unpredictable results[6] and "'become the most intolerable kind of ex post facto judicial law-making.'"[7]
Stare decisis appears to be grounded, in part, on the recognition that many legal issues are "doubtful" and thus can reasonably be decided in differing ways.[8]Under stare decisis, a properly analyzed legal decision, once made, is presumed to express the law authoritatively. "[W]here a precedent is well reasoned and supported by a logically correct application of true legal principles, it becomes authority, and, clothed in its new dignity, it is, and should be, respected as law."[9] It is binding on lower courts and enjoys the presumption of being legal precedent and authority within its own judicial tier. Therefore, assuming that the court believes that a proposed new decision contradicts an earlier decision (otherwise, stare decisis is not implicated in the first place), there is a prima facie presumption in favor of the earlier decision.
Obviously, stare decisis does not make it impossible to overrule prior decisions.[10] It has been frequently said that stare decisis "is a matter of judicial policy rather than judicial power."[11] In other words, the court has the power to overrule any of its precedents that it pleases, but limits that power by the stare decisis doctrine, for policy reasons.
Historically, the Supreme Court of Georgia has had difficulty defining the circumstances under which a prior decision will be overruled as being wrongly decided. Many cases have stated that "stare decisis should not be applied to the extent that an error in the law is perpetuated," but have nonetheless invoked stare decisis.[12] Some cases seem to suggest that the degree of "wrongness," the magnitude of the error, could determine or affect the analysis of whether the prior decision should be overruled. It seems that doubt, even "grave doubt," as to the correctness of a prior decision is insufficient to overrule it.[13]Justice Bleckley defined the error necessary to overrule a prior decision as "a great and glaring error affecting the current administration of justice in all courts of original jurisdiction."[14] Other cases suggest that precedent may be corrected if the court determines that the prior decision is "clear and palpable error," or "clearly erroneous."[15]
The actual, practical effect of the doubtful precedent, the "reliance interest," is of critical importance. In one case it was said that in order to overrule a prior rule of decision, the court first "should be satisfied by the most convincing logic that the principle is itself unsound, and as well vicious in its effect."[16]More often, the effect of precedent is to foster a reliance interest by citizens who have, for example, entered into business transactions in reliance on the court's decision.[17]Consequently, a court would apply stare decisis "where large numbers of transactions covering a long period of years would probably be disturbed or vitiated, and the rights of those who had followed the law as authoritatively expounded would be adversely affected or destroyed by a different exposition."[18]
Stare decisis traditionally recognizes the separation of powers doctrine. In theory, if the court has erred in a decision, the people of the state, acting through their representatives in the General Assembly, can correct the error.[19] Likewise, in cases involving the interpretation of a statute, the court's interpretation is considered to become an "integral" part of the statute.[20]Thus, "[a] reinterpretation of a statute after the General Assembly's implicit acceptance of the original interpretation would constitute a judicial usurpation of the legislative function."[21] The longer a judicial decision interpreting a statute exists without legislative correction, the greater the presumption that the decision is correct and the less likely that the decision will be overruled, even if it is later determined to be erroneous.[22]
The "Full Bench Rule"and Its Strange Demise
The factors of "stability, uniformity and separation of powers" manifested themselves in Georgia's "full bench rule," first enacted by the Legislature in the 19th century, which codified a strict and unusual form of stare decisis.
In an 1852 opinion of the Supreme Court of Georgia, Justice Lumpkin stated that when a question is decided by the court, the decision is "considered as the law of the land, and respected and carried into full effect as such, the same as a Statute of the State."[23] Justice Lumpkin went on to say that the decision may only be re-examined by the court in "extreme cases," after obtaining leave of court to raise the issue. Justice Lumpkin left no doubt that "[t]he doctrine of stare-decisis, is right, both upon policy and principle."[24]
In 1858, the Georgia Legislature, perhaps influenced by Justice Lumpkin's formulation of stare decisis, especially his equating a court decision with a statute, enacted a statute providing that any decision of the Supreme Court concurred in by all three justices[25]could only be reversed, overruled or changed by the General Assembly, since the decision was the equivalent of a legislative enactment.[26]In 1861, with the implementation of the first Georgia Code, this "full bench rule" was modified to provide that decisions in which all three justices had concurred could only be overruled or materially changed by a subsequent full bench decision "after argument had, in which the decision by permission of the court is expressly questioned and reviewed, and after such argument the Court in its decision shall state distinctly whether it affirms, reverses or changes such decision."[27] (This section was amended in 1896 to take the increase in members of the court into account.)[28]
The practical effect of the full bench rule was that while a lawyer in a jurisdiction other than Georgia would view the most recent decision of the state's highest appellate court as authoritative, Georgia lawyers and judges would search for a unanimous decision of the Supreme Court of Georgia, the older the better.
In 1967, the Supreme Court of Georgia decided Ward v. Big Apple Super Markets of Bolton Road, Inc.[29] In that case, the court declined to overrule a "full bench decision," since all seven members of the court did not concur.[
30
] On motion for rehearing, the appellant argued that the full bench rule had no legal existence after the adoption of the 1945 Georgia Constitution, "because Art. VI, Sec. II, Par. VII of that Constitution expressly withdrew the power from the General Assembly to enact regulations governing the manner in which this court could hear and determine cases "[31]The Supreme Court agreed that the statutory full bench rule violated the new Georgia Constitution, but held that the rule was court-made and continued to exist: "This Court since its creation in 1845 has considered itself bound by its unanimous decisions and will respect and follow such decisions, overruling them only by a unanimous Court [,] which can be...
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