Evolution of Alimony in Utah
| Publication year | 1989 |
| Pages | 8 |
David S. Dolowitz, J.D.
The statute governing alimony in Utah is a very simple one which grants substantial authority to the trial court. Section 30-3-5(1), Utah Code Ann. (1989), provides that, when a Decree of Divorce is rendered, the Court may include in it "equitable orders relating to the children, property and parties." Although this statute has been amended numerous times in the last 45 years, this operative language has remained static. Yet, while this provision remained unaltered, the law governing alimony has evolved along with the legal and social concepts underpinning alimony awards.
In most states, alimony was awarded to the innocent spouse, generally the wife, at the termination of a marriage. The alimony award was partially for support and partially to punish the "guilty" husband for causing the breakup of the marriage. Alimony: New Strategies for Pursuit and Defense, A.B. A. Sec. Family Law 1-32 (1988) (hereinafter cited as Alimony). For substantially longer than most states, Utah has considered alimony to be necessary for support and not tied to fault. For example, in Schuster v. Schuster, 88 Utah 257, 265, 53 P.2d 428, 431 (1936), the Court determined that the marital breakdown was the fault of the wife, yet she was ruled not to have forfeited her right to alimony. This ruling varied from most other states at that time, but since then most states have adopted Utah's position. Alimony, supra, at 1-32.
In 1937, the Utah Supreme Court in Pinion v. Pinion, 92 Utah 255, 259-60, 67 P.2d 265 (1937), delineated the criteria which should be examined in awarding alimony. These were re-examined and restated 14 years later in MacDonald v. MacDonald, 120 Utah 573, 581-82, 236 P.2d 1066, 1070 (1951). These are:
1. The social position and standard of living of each party before the marriage.
2. The respective ages of the parties.
3. What each may have given up for the marriage.
4. What money or property each brought into the marriage.
5. The physical and mental health of the parties.
6. The relative ability, training and education of the parties.
7. The duration of the marriage.
8. The present income of the parties and the property acquired during the marriage and owned either jointly or by either of them at the time of the divorce.
9. How property was acquired and the efforts of each in doing so.
10. Children reared, their present ages, and obligations to the children or help which may in some instances be expected by the children.
11. The present age and life expectancy of each of the parties.
12. The happiness and pleasure or lack of it experienced during the marriage.
13. Any extraordinary sacrifices, devotion or care which may have been given to the spouse or others, such as mother, father, etc., and obligations to other dependents having a secondary right to support.
14. The present standards of living and needs of each, including the cost of living.
The standards for an award of alimony were examined and articulated in a more concise form in English v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 411-12 (Utah 1977). The Utah Supreme Court directed trial courts to consider the length of the marriage and the contributions of each party to their joint financial success, but noted that the trial court must make a careful distinction between distributing property which must be done on an equitable basis, from the post-marital duty of support and maintenance. The Court then stated that:
The purpose of alimony is to provide support for the wife and not to inflict punitive damages on the husband. Alimony is not intended as a penalty against the husband nor a reward to the wife. 565 P.2d at 411 (quoting 2 Nelson, Divorce and Annulment at 11-12 (1961). The Court continued, adopting the rationale of the Arizona courts, :
[T]he most important function of alimony is to provide support for the wife as nearly as possible at the standard of living she enjoyed during the marriage, and to prevent the wife from becoming a public charge. . . .[C]riteria considered in determining a reasonable award for support and maintenance include the financial conditions and needs of the wife; the ability of the wife to produce a sufficient income for herself; and the ability of the husband to provide support.
Finally, the Court observed:
The amount of alimony is measured by the wife's needs and requirements, considering her station in life, and upon the husband's ability to pay. Id. at 412 (quoting Hendricks v. Hendricks, 91 Utah 553, 559, 63 P.2d 277, 279 (1936)). English was followed by Read v. Read, 594 P.2d 871, 872 (Utah 1979), where the Supreme Court ruled that fault should not be used in setting alimony or dividing property to impose punishment upon either party. These decisions, coupled with the decision in Mullins v. Mullins, 26 Utah 2d 82, 83 485 P.2d 663, 664 (Utah 1971), where the Court ruled that when each party had grounds for divorce each could be awarded a divorce, completely separated the question of fault from financial need in determining alimony. This set the stage for the evolution of law to the present situation of confronting the dichotomy of the desire to provide alimony based on need to maintain the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage and the conflicting social goal of an alimony award which encourages rehabilitation and self-support by the recipient.
The reconciliation of continuing the standard of marital living versus rehabilitative alimony and self-support often appears in decisions rendered in the last 12 years without recognition of or discussion of their inherent conflict. The standard articulated in English was restated in Gramme v. Gramme, 587 P.2d 144 (Utah 1978), where the Utah Supreme Court stated:
The purpose of alimony is to provide post-marital support; it is intended neither as a penalty imposed on the husband nor as a reward granted to the wife. Its function is to provide support for the wife as nearly as possible at the standard of living she enjoyed during the marriage and to prevent her from becoming a public charge. Important criteria in determining a reasonable award for support and maintenance are the financial conditions and needs of the wife, considering her station in life; her ability to produce sufficient income for herself; and the ability of the husband to provide support. Id. at 147. This language focuses fully on support and would appear to preclude consideration of rehabilitation, yet any lawyer who has tried a case before Utah courts knows that rehabilitation is a consideration which must be addressed in litigating an alimony claim. In this respect, the law reflects the tensions of society itself which demand both rehabilitation of and support for a former spouse.
In 1983, the Utah Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Durham, reviewed the questions and criteria which emerged in decisions between MacDonald and English, in Higley v. Higley, 676 P.2d 379 (Utah 1983). To reconcile these decisions, the Court reviewed the articulated criteria for an alimony award and then examined the pragmatic consideration of the economic situation facing the parties, particularly a woman emerging from a marriage. Justice Durham noted that government surveys had determined that women earned $.59 for every dollar earned by a man. Id. at 381. While this is dicta (and remains true today), the implication is clear that economics must be considered by courts when setting alimony awards. This implication arises not only from the language, but also from the fact that, immediately following that language, there is the specific declaration:
An alimony award should, in as far as possible, equalize the parties' respective standards of living and maintain them at a level as close as possible to the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage.
Id. at 381.
Since these decisions, the Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Court of Appeals have worked to articulate a framework for application of these principles to reconcile consideration of support against rehabilitation. The courts have provided guidelines that work for many cases, but have not dealt with certain questions which still remain.
I. SPECIFIC...
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