Motions for Summary Judgment Where There Is a Motive to Deny

• Publication year: 1998
• Pages: 20

Motions for Summary Judgment Where There is a Motive to Deny Vol. 11 No. 5 Pg. 20 Utah Bar Journal June, 1998

Robert B. Sykes and Ronald J. Kramer, J.

Once again, the law of summary judgment is thrust into the legal spotlight. The recent Paula Jones ruling^[1] in Federal Court in Arkansas prompted a media and talk show feeding frenzy, with much of the discussion focused on the appropriateness of summary judgment where credibility is at issue.

Paula Jones contends that then Arkansas Governor Bill Clinton made unwanted, outrageous sexual advances toward her in May 1991.^[2] The court appears to have rendered summary judgment in favor of Clinton in part because there was allegedly a scarcity of believable evidence.^[3] Under Arkansas law, the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress requires that the defendant knew that emotional distress was a likely result of his conduct; that the conduct was extreme and outrageous; that it caused distress; and that the distress was so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it. Jones v. Clinton, 1998 U.S. Dist. Lexis at 55-56 (E.D. Ark. 1998). Judge Wright held, - inter alia:

Plaintiff's actions and statements in this case do not portray someone who experienced emotional distress so severe in nature that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it.... In sum, plaintiff's allegations fall far short of the rigorous standards for establishing a claim of outrage under Arkansas law and the Court therefore grants the President's motion for summary judgment on this claim .... Reduced to its essence, the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non moving party and the Court therefore finds that there or no genuine issues for trial in this case.

Id. at 61, 63-64 (emphasis added). Of course, Bill Clinton flatly denies any inappropriate conduct; but the court is compelled to accept Paula Jones' version of the hotel room encounter on summary judgment. Doesn't that leave credibility issues on the damages and "outrage" tort that should go to the jury?

Jones v. Clinton presents an interesting study on the tug-of-war between alleged lack of evidence on the one hand, and a credibility question on the other. Credibility disputes where the two parties view the facts differently are undoubtedly more common than credibility situations where the facts are known to only one party, and that party has a motive to deny (i.e., lie). The focus of this article is on that less-common body of summary judgment law which involves a motive to deny by one party. It can be a tricky issue for both judges and lawyers, and warrants analysis.

I. THE LAW OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Summary judgment is only appropriate where there are no genuine disputes over material facts. Hipwell v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 944 P.2d 327, 339 (Utah W7);Russillo v. Scarborough, 935 F.2d 1167, 1170 (10th Cir. 1991). The record and facts must be viewed in a light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. Hipwell at 337; Mares v. ConAgra Poultry Co., 971 E2d 492, 494 (10th Cir. 1992). In fact, the court in applying the standard must construe not only facts but all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the non moving party. Lopez v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 932 P.2d 601, 602 (Utah 1997); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Wright v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 925 F.2d 1288, 1292 (10th Cir. 1991). The Tenth Circuit has observed that" [w]hen different ultimate inferences may be drawn, the case is not one for summary judgment." Exnicious v. United States of America, 563 E2d 418, 424 (10^th Cir. 1977).

The moving party must carry the burden under Rule 56(e) of showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986); Gonzales v. Millers Casualty Ins. Co., 923 F.2d 1417, 1419 (10^th Cir. 1991); Drysdale v. Ford Motor Co., 947 P.2d 678, 680 (Utah 1997). "The moving party carries the burden of showing beyond a reasonable doubt that it is entitled to summary judgment....", Hicks v. City Watonga, 942 E2d 737, 743 (10th Cir. 199D (emphasis added), quoting Ewing v. Amoco Oil Co., 823 F.2d 1432, 1437 (10thCir. 1987). The non-moving party, in order to defeat summary judgment, need only make a "showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322. The summary judgment motion may be opposed by any of the types of evidentiary materials listed in Rule 56(c), except the pleadings themselves. Id. at 324. Those materials include "depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits, if any...." which show that there is a "genuine issue as to any material fact." Rule 56(c). Deposition exhibits identified and authenticated at the depositions are surely included in the broad purview of "depositions."

Summary judgment is disfavored in negligence cases. The Utah Court of Appeals has stated: "As a general proposition, summary judgment is inappropriate to resolve a negligence claim on its merits, and should be employed 'only in the most clear-cut case'." Wycalis v. Guardian Title of Utah, 780 P.2d 821,825 (Utah...