Letters to the Editor
| Publication year | 1998 |
| Pages | 4 |
| Citation | Vol. 11 No. 6 Pg. 4 |
L. Paul Palmer, J.
Dear Editor:
The Law of Summary Judgment discussed by Messrs. Sykes and Kramer in the June 1998 Utah Bar Journal though purporting to be an objective evaluation of the law is quite one-sided. The discussion fails to recognize several valid objectives served by summary judgment including the three discussed here.
First, as recently recognized by Justice Russon in Morton v. Continental Baking Go., 938 P.2d 271, 275 (Utah 1997), there are two sides to every action and defendants as well as plaintiffs are entitled to fair treatment.
Second, summary judgment is not a procedural shortcut but a proper means of resolving issues, permitting the trial court to "isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses." Celotex Corporation v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327, 106 S.Ct. 2458, 2555, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Fairness dictates that if a party's pre-complaint investigation and pre-trial discovery fail to reveal facts which establish the elements of its claim, summary judgment is appropriate and should be entered.
Third, facts related to summary judgment must be material. It is common among parties objecting to summary judgment to generate a smokescreen of "facts" with the objective of persuading the trial judge to believe that where there is smoke there must be fire. To be material, a fact must affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264, 275 (Utah 1985); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 1986. If the facts which are material to a party's case do not support its claims, summary judgment is clearly appropriate.
It is unfortunate that Utah Bar Journal articles are not subjected to some peer review to assure that the information provided is even-handed and a fair reflection of the law.
Dear Editor:
Rule 6.1 should be retained in its present form. The proposed amendment to Rule 6.1 is too narrow and will have the effect of discouraging free services now provided by attorneys.
For example:
a. Serving as pro tem judges in small claims court,
b. Legal assistance to public service organizations in areas unrelated to persons of limited means,
c. Pro bono service to cities and counties,
d. Assistance to persons who, though not defined as "persons of limited means," can Ml afford an attorney, and
e. Pro Bono assistance to the...
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