Case Summaries

• Publication year: 1997
• Pages: 37
• Citation: Vol. 10 No. 9 Pg. 37

Case Summaries Vol. 10 No. 9 Pg. 37 Utah Bar Journal November, 1997

Daniel Torrence & Glen A. Cook, J.

ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK V. FOX CO., FOOTE, ET AL., 320 Utah Adv. Rep. 30 (Utah 1997).

Zions, as personal representative of the Pepper estate, was sued by the Pepper beneficiaries for five claims for relief, including fraud, mismanagement, and negligence. Zions named Fox Company and Foote (accounting firm and accountant) as third-party defendants, alleging they negligently prepared audits of certain businesses owned by the estate. Later, Zions agreed to dismiss its third-party claims against Fox and Foote with provisions for potential future reinstatement.

Zions settled with the Pepper beneficiaries for $2.8 million and later sued Fox and Foote, in a separate action, for that portion of the $2.8 million caused by the accounting negligence of Fox and Foote.

The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Fax and Foote.

On review, the Supreme Court noted that a trier of fact has no practical way to distinguish, in retrospect, what portion of the settlement payment was attributable to Zions' independent liability and what portion, if any, was caused by the conduct of Fox and Foote. By forgoing its right to have a trier of fact decide causation, Zions lost the ability to seek an allocation of a portion of those damages to Fox and Foote.

To preserve its rights against Foote and Fox, Zions could have proceeded to litigation or brought Fox and Foote into the settlement negotiations. Having failed to do so, Zions won't be allowed to ask a court to perform an "autopsy" on its settlement with the beneficiaries.

STATE V. LEYVA, 324 Utah Adv. Rep. 5 (Utah 1997).

"Hey, man, I'll admit to everything else, but the cocaine isn't mine." This and other equally incriminating statements are at the heart of State v. Leyva. After reading Mr. Leyva his Miranda rights, the policeman asked, "Having these rights in mind, do you want to talk to us now?" Leyva responded, "I,don't know," then shortly thereafter proceeded to answer the officer's other questions, making incriminating statements.

The trial court denied Leyva's motion to suppress and Leyva was convicted.

The Court of Appeals reversed Leyva's conviction on the ground that the officer should have limited his questioning to clarifying Leyva's initial ambiguous response of "I don't know."

The...