Void and Punishable Acts of State in International Law

• Author: A. Verdross-Drossberg
• Published date: 01 June 1949
• Date: 01 June 1949
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/106591294900200201
• Subject Matter: Articles

183

VOID

AND

PUNISHABLE

ACTS

OF

STATE

IN

INTERNATIONAL

LAW

.

A.

VERDROSS-DROSSBERG

University

of

Vienna

Law

School*

*

Translated

by

Edgar

Bodenheimer,

University

of

Utah,

College

of

Law.

1

Alfred

v.

Verdross,

Die

Verfassung

der

Voelkerrechtsgemeinschaft

(1926),

p.

165.

HE

Limits

of

State

Competence.

Any

legal

evaluation

of

human

t

conduct

can

be

made

only

on

the

basis

of

a

legal

order.

However,

since

numerous

legal

orders

coexist,

one

and

the

same

matter

may

be

regulated

at

the

same

time

differently

by

different

legal

orders.

One

legal

order

may

attach

the

legal

consequence

A

to

a

certain

act,

another

one

the

legal

consequence

B,

while

a

third

one

may

consider

such

an

act

as

legally

irrelevant.

It

is

also

possible,

for

the

same

reasons,

that

one

legal

order

will

impute

responsibility

for

an

act

committed

by

an

indi-

vidual

not

to

him,

but

to

his

home

state,

while

another

legal

order

will

consider

the

individual’s

conduct

as

legally

irrelevant,

i.e.,

inconsequential,

or,

conversely,

will

attach

criminal

sanctions

to

it

and

thereby

make

it

’

a

crime.

Such

differences

in

the

treatment

of

identical

matters

could

be

avoided

only

if

international

law

would

delimit

the

competence

of

states

.

as

to

subject

matter

in

such

a

manner

that

a

certain

state

of

facts

could

be

regulated

only

by

one

single

state.

But

this

is

generally

not

the

case.

On

the

contrary,

each

state

may,

as

a

rule,

regulate

any

matter

independently,

without

thereby

violating

international

law.

The

result

is

that

the

com-

petence

of

states

as

to

subject

matter

is,

in

principle,

not

exclusive

but

concurrent.’

There

exist,

however,

certain

limits

to

this

concurrent

competence

of

states.

Above

all,

there

are

limitations

set

by

the

municipal

law

of

each

state,

since

all

national

legal

orders

restrict

their

own

sphere

of

validity

in

some

way.

They

regulate,

as

a

rule,

only

those

matters

which

arise