Visions of Judgment

• DOI: 10.1177/1065912912446228
• Date: 01 June 2013
• Published date: 01 June 2013
• Author: Matthew C. Weidenfeld
• Subject Matter: Articles

446228PRQ66210.1177/1065912912446
228WeidenfeldPolitical Research Quarterly
Political Research Quarterly
66(2) 254 –266
Visions of Judgment: Arendt, Kant,
© 2012 University of Utah
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and the Misreading of Judgment
DOI: 10.1177/1065912912446228
prq.sagepub.com
Matthew C. Weidenfeld1
Abstract
Hannah Arendt’s conceptualization of judgment may only drive political theorists further from the phenomenon.
Throughout her life, Arendt’s work on judgment was guided by Kant’s thought. Arendt’s reading of Kant’s work raises
two difficulties to which contemporary political scientists should attend. First, Arendt’s reading of Kant is a systematic
misreading of his texts. Second, Arendt’s misreading of Kant pushes her toward a misreading of the phenomenon of
judgment. More important, Arendt’s misreading has led political theorists to assume a divide between the points of
view of the actor and of the spectator, which cannot be reconciled given the resources of Arendt’s thought.
Keywords
judgment, Arendt, Kant, intellectualism
Within political theory, Hannah Arendt’s unfinished
also takes seriously this sense of frustration with Arendt’s
reflections on judgment have led to an explosion of inter-
conceptualization of judgment and, therefore, takes up a
est in the phenomenon. Beiner (1983), for instance, draws
largely negative task. The task involved here is to offer
on Arendt to move toward a concept of judgment that lies
both a critique of Arendt’s reading of her primary source
between the poles of Kant and Aristotle. Benhabib (1988)
in thinking about judgment, Kant, and to offer a critique
looks to Arendt’s work for a starting point for thinking
of her reading of the phenomenal content of judgment.
about moral judgment, which she argues should be aug-
Ultimately, I argue that Arendt’s conceptualization of
mented by a discourse theory of ethics. Zerilli (2005)
judgment may, in fact, drive political theorists only fur-
argues that the central concern of Arendt’s theory of judg-
ther from the phenomenon of judgment itself.
ment is not with validity, as Benhabib seems to argue, but
Throughout her life, Arendt’s work on judgment was
with freedom. Obviously, the list here could go on, but
guided by Kant’s (1987) thoughts on taste and by her
what is striking is that despite wide differences in
reading of the Critique of Judgment.2 While there is no
approaches to judgment and Arendt’s texts, all of these
doubt among political theorists that Arendt’s reading of
authors share in the thought that Arendt’s work reveals
the Critique of Judgment is “idiosyncratic,” as Dana Villa
something crucial about judgment.1 As one looks at this
(1992) puts it, the extent of the violence of Arendt’s read-
growing body of literature, though, what is more startling
ing has at times been lost on scholars.3 It is quite clear
is that Arendt’s unfinished reflections have not only
that Arendt is engaged in a creative destruction of Kant’s
driven quite a bit of recent work but also been a source of
texts, which attempts to recover a select number of
frustration for a number of contemporary theorists (see
Kantian concepts from out of the intellectual debris that
Hermsen and Villa 1999). Arendt’s reflections not only
surrounds them, but at times scholars have seemed to take
are incomplete but also rely on a number of conceptual
up Arendt’s reading as a faithful reading of Kant’s texts.
distinctions that are difficult to locate phenomenally or
For instance, Villa (1992, 297), after noting that Arendt’s
that are, perhaps, confused; for instance, Arendt’s insis-
reading is idiosyncratic, goes on to say,
tence of a line of demarcation between thinking and act-
ing or her distinction between the actor and the spectator
seem untenable or, at least, strain one’s ability to see the
1Elon University, Elon, NC, USA
phenomenon she is attempting to illuminate. This article
Corresponding Author:
finds its starting point in both of these moments; that is, it
Matthew C. Weidenfeld, Department of Political Science, Elon
starts from a concern over the phenomenal content of
University, Gray Pavilion–Pol. Science 210A, Elon, NC 27244, USA.
judgment, initially driven by Arendt’s reflections, but
Email: mweidenfeld@elon.edu

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Weidenfeld
255
Kant’s conception of Aesthetic judgment—departing
reflective judgments, it results in a vision of judgment
from the exchange of viewpoints necessary for rep-
that cannot capture a good deal of the phenomenal evi-
resentative thinking and culminating in the persua-
dence. This is the surprising nature of Arendt’s (mis)
sive exchange that accompanies the rendering of
reading; that is, she reads Kant for her own ends but
each judgment—is thus, for Arendt, political
actually retains from Kant an intellectualism that then
through and through.
leads her to misread judgment.
The intellectualism of Arendt’s approach and the con-
The problem this reading poses is that Kant’s conception
tinued engagement with Arendt’s philosophy of judgment
of aesthetic judgment does not depart from an exchange
has certainly improved our understanding of Arendt’s
of viewpoints or culminate in a persuasive exchange,
thought, but it isn’t clear that this has improved our under-
two points that Villa seems to take as a given; instead,
standing of the faculty of judgment; in fact, the dive into
Villa’s reading actually recapitulates Arendt’s idiosyn-
Arendt’s texts may be transforming political theorists into
cratic reading of Kant. A number of authors conflate
the types of puzzle solvers she was actually quite worried
Arendt’s destruction of Kant’s texts for Kant’s actual
about. In a note concerning her approach to Marx, Arendt
textual arguments. For instance, Norris (1996, 167)
(1958, 104) herself criticized a puzzle solving approach to
argues that “[i]n his third Critique, Kant argues that our
the work of other theorists. “Jules Vuillemin’s L’etre et le
judgments of beauty are underwritten by a peculiar kind
Travail (1949) is a good example of what happens if on
of common sense, one that is inherently public.” As we
tries to resolve the central contradictions and equivocalities
shall see below, while this is how Arendt portrays Kant’s
of Marx’s thoughts. This is possible only if one abandons
text, it is not true of Kant in any simple sense that com-
the phenomenal evidence altogether and begins to treat
mon sense is inherently public. Bikowski (1993, 868)
Marx’s concepts as though they constituted in themselves
seems to take it as a given that “Kant’s faculty of aes-
a complicated jigsaw puzzle of abstractions.” My fear is
thetic judgment forswears objective validation of truth-
that in pursuing Arendt’s work on judgment, political theo-
claims in favor of subjective consensus and community
rists have abandoned the phenomenal evidence and become
standards and norms.” This is an accurate portrayal of
the puzzle solvers Arendt warns us about. My aim, then, is
how Arendt reads Kant, but the reference to community
to make it clear why, if our concern is not just with Arendt
standards and norms cannot be found in Kant’s text. The
but with understanding the phenomenon of judgment, a
violence of Arendt’s interpretive activity, then, is seem-
turn away from a concern with solving the antinomies of
ingly lost at points on even the most careful readers of
Arendt’s philosophy of judgment may be warranted.
Arendt’s thought.
Obviously, the assertions I’ve made here are conten-
Arendt’s destructive reading of Kant’s text, combined
tious, and what follows is intended to substantiate these
with the fact that Arendt’s reading has served as a start-
claims. The argument proceeds in two sections, which
ing point for much recent work concerning judgment in
are aimed at illuminating the two intertwined difficulties
political theory, has left political theorists with two dif-
pointed toward above. The first section shows how,
ficulties. First, as I’ve already begun to hint at, Arendt’s
exactly, Arendt’s reading of the third Critique does a
reading of Kant is a (mis)reading of his texts.4 It goes
great deal of violence to Kant’s texts in a way that is, at
without saying that an original appropriation of concepts
times, overlooked by political theorists. It does this by
and ideas may, of course, be warranted given the fresh
focusing on Arendt’s reading of two of Kant’s concepts,
purchase this gives a thinker on the phenomenon.
the sensus communis and the enlarged mentality. What I
Arendt’s method of “pearl diving” certainly does look to
argue in this first section is that Arendt systematically
destroy texts in the name of bringing their phenomenal
distorts the role of transcendental subjectivity in Kant’s
referents back into the light. Arendt’s (mis)reading of
thought. Arendt, then, offers us a (mis)reading of Kant.
Kant, though, actually pushes her away from the phe-
The second section moves beyond a textual critique,
nomenon of judgment in a counterintuitive way. There
which has the value of reminding political theorists that
are a number of difficulties that her thought leads us
Arendt’s reading is a destruction of Kant’s thought, and
into—most notably, the distinction between the actor and
looks at the consequences the (mis)reading of Kant has
the spectator—which are actually driven by an intellec-
for her...