VIII. Causation

• Library: Sword and Shield: A Practical Approach to Section 1983 Litigation (ABA) (2015 Ed.)

VIII. CAUSATION

Section 1983, by its terms, authorizes the imposition of liability only upon a defendant who "subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen . . . or other person . . . to the deprivation of any rights" guaranteed by federal law. The "subjects, or causes to be subjected," language has been read by the Supreme Court as imposing a proximate cause requirement on § 1983 claims.¹⁷² The great weight of judicial authority equates § 1983's causation requirement with common-law proximate cause.¹⁷³ This reading of § 1983 is consistent with the fundamental principle that § 1983 should be interpreted "against the background of tort liability that makes a [person] responsible for the natural consequences of his actions."¹⁷⁴

A § 1983 defendant may be held liable for "reasonably foreseeable consequences attributable to intervening forces, including acts of third parties."¹⁷⁵ On the other hand, a § 1983 defendant may not be held liable when an intervening cause was not reasonably foreseeable or when the link between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's injuries is too remote, tenuous, or speculative.¹⁷⁶ As with common-law torts, proximate cause can raise difficult questions in § 1983 actions. "In the context of criminal law enforcement, courts have differed as to the circumstances under which acts of subsequent participants in the legal system are superseding causes that avoid liability of an initial actor."¹⁷⁷

In Drumgold v. Callahan,¹⁷⁸ the First Circuit placed an important qualification on the principle that common-law proximate cause principles govern § 1983 claims. The circuit court in Drumgold held that in § 1983 actions a district court may apply "only those tort causation principles that are compatible with the underlying constitutional right."¹⁷⁹ The circuit court in Drumgold specially held that the district court's causation instruction on a § 1983 Brady v. Maryland¹⁸⁰ claim that told the jury that there may be concurrent causes for plaintiff's wrongful conviction was incompatible with the Brady materiality requirement of a reasonable probability that the § 1983 plaintiff would not have been convicted but for the Brady violation. The circuit court ruled that the district court should have instructed the jury to determine whether the plaintiff has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that he would not have been convicted "but for" the defendant police officer's wrongful withholding of exculpatory evidences.

Causation frequently...