Viewed from Different Engels? Differences in Reactions to “Socialism” as a Policy Label

• Author: Adam L. Ozer,Brian W. Sullivan,Douglas S. Van
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/10659129211037402
• Published date: 01 December 2022
• Date: 01 December 2022
• Subject Matter: Articles

https://doi.org/10.1177/10659129211037402

Political Research Quarterly

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DOI: 10.1177/10659129211037402

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We want to talk about funding social services, and ensuring

good engagement in community policing, let’s talk about

what we are for. And we need to not ever use the words

“socialist” or “socialism” ever again. Because while people

think it doesn’t matter, it does matter. And we lost good

[congress]members because of it.

—Representative Abigail Spanberger, Democrat, VA-7.

In the 2020 election cycle, much had been made about

the rise in the popularity of socialism among young vot-

ers, typified by eye-catching headlines like “The

Resurgent Left—Millennial Socialism” (The Economist

2019). This narrative has been bolstered by the success

and popularity of several Democratic Party politicians

that have defended socialism and socialist policies,

including Congress member Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez

and Senator Bernie Sanders. Yet, evidence from public

opinion polls regarding the veracity of claims touting or

decrying the rising tide of socialism in America is rather

mixed. A 2018 poll found that 43 percent of Americans

have a positive view of socialism; an 18 percent increase

from 1942 (Younis 2019). A 2019 poll found 55 percent of

women prefer socialism to capitalism (Harris 2019).

However, other polls reveal a decrease in the popularity

of socialism among U.S. citizens, with few changes

among Democrats and Republicans since 2010 (Newport

2018). Americans also disagree over the degree of social-

ism in America. A 2016 poll indicates that 54 percent of

Republicans see America as becoming more socialist,

while only 16 percent of Democrats agree (Investor’s

Business Daily/TIPP 2016). Moreover, only 28 percent

of Americans report even giving much thought to social-

ism at all, casting further doubt over the new found role

of socialism in America’s political thinking (Yokley

2019). Irrespective of whether America has truly become

more socialist, the term “socialism” itself has made a sig-

nificant impact on American politics, with Donald

Trump’s reelection campaign building its strategy on por-

traying Democrats as radical socialists (Blake 2019).

President Trump demonstrated this in his 2019 State of

the Union Address, where he asserted “Here, in the

1037402PRQXXX10.1177/10659129211037402Political Research QuarterlyOzer et al.

research-article2021

1Electoral Psychology Observatory, The London School of Economics

and Political Science, UK

2University of Houston, TX, USA

3University of California, Berkeley, USA

Corresponding Author:

Adam L. Ozer, Electoral Psychology Observatory, The London School

of Economics and Political Science, London WC2A 2AE, UK.

Email: a.ozer2@lse.ac.uk

Viewed from Different Engels?

Differences in Reactions to

“Socialism” as a Policy Label

Adam L. Ozer1, Brian W. Sullivan2, and Douglas S. Van3

Abstract

The supposed popularity of socialism among young Americans has been a trending topic in American political media

and campaigns. While evidence from public opinion polls disagrees as to whether socialism is truly gaining in popularity,

the use of the term “socialism” has had a profound impact on policy discussions in the media and has featured as

a prominent Republican Party strategy in the 2020 election cycle. This gives rise to important questions: How do

individuals react to the socialist label? Does the socialist label serve as an ideological or affective signal? Are attacks

that frame policies as socialist effective in decreasing policy support? Using original observational and experimental

survey data, we find that individuals have strong polarized affective reactions to the socialist label. However, framing

popular social welfare policies as socialist is ineffective in undermining popular support. Implications suggest that

while framing political policies as socialist may trigger affective polarization, it is likely an ineffective means of political

persuasion. As a result, oversaturation of the term in the media may lead to misleading conclusions about both

political ideology and individual political behavior.

Keywords

affective polarization, socialism, policy support, framing, survey experiment

2022, Vol. 75(4) 1297–1312

Article

1298 Political Research Quarterly 75(4)

United States, we are alarmed by new calls to adopt

socialism in our country . . . Tonight, we renew our

resolve that America will never be a socialist country.”

Ultimately, this is not dissimilar to campaign tactics that

the GOP has used in the past, taking advantage of

Democratic squeamishness surrounding the term “lib-

eral” in an attempt to turn the phrase into a broad damag-

ing label to be applied to Democratic candidates

(Neiheisel 2016). In response, many Democratic candi-

dates have rebuked the socialist label, decrying socialism

as the cause of underwhelming 2020 electoral perfor-

mances in the House of Representatives (see quote from

Rep. Spanberger above). In one particularly famous

example, West Virginia Democratic Senator Joe Manchin

even went as far as to compare the “crazy socialist

agenda” to his rear end.1

We leverage original observational and experimental

survey data to answer these questions. We posit that indi-

viduals use the term socialism as an affective rather than

ideological label. Rather than holding a consensus ideo-

logical meaning, individuals with positive predispositions

toward socialism describe policies and entities they sup-

port as “socialist” and describe those they oppose or dislike

as “capitalist.” Individuals with negative dispositions

toward socialism exhibit the inverse pattern. Thus, citizens

with opposing views on socialism may share (un)favorable

opinions of a given policy. Yet, they will not agree whether

its (failures) successes are “socialist” or “capitalist” in

nature. As a result, we find that framing policies as socialist

or capitalist has little effect on popular support for those

policies. While we remain agnostic as to the true objective

ideological definition of socialism, we conclude that fail-

ure to distinguish between ideological and affective con-

siderations when discussing socialism can lead to highly

misleading conclusions about its (un)popularity and effec-

tiveness as a negative campaign strategy.

Processing through an Affective Lens

The use of motivated reasoning in the interpretation of

political information is ubiquitous, as individuals are

driven by two competing motives: the need to acquire

accurate, detailed information and the need to leverage

motivated reasoning to defend one’s own predispositions

and identities from cognitive dissonance (Kunda 1990).

Incoming information is interpreted through a dual-pro-

cessing cognitive system that satisfies both motives.

While factual information is processed consciously

through deliberate systemic processing, that information

is also subjected to a much quicker peripheral affective

lens (Chaiken et al. 1996). This leads to what is known

as hot cognition, in which information is put through an

emotional or affective filter which in turn impacts how

it is systemically processed prior to use in updating

one’s opinion. Evidence shows that individuals are much

quicker to accept and process information that confirms

their predispositions and previously held beliefs, incorpo-

rating new information into their beliefs (more) less criti-

cally when it (dis)confirms their predispositions (Lodge

and Taber 2005; Redlawsk 2002). Thus, upon hearing a

term such as “socialism,” individuals will view that infor-

mation through an affective lens that is colored by their

prior experiences and predispositions. This process is

wholly unconscious, as external stimuli trigger affective

considerations that activate associations linking feelings,

thoughts, perceptions, and subsequent behavior in a man-

ner consistent with motivated biases (Taber and Lodge

2016).

These motivated biases lead individuals toward selec-

tive exposure to information that is congruent with their

own political beliefs. This can lead to higher levels of

affective partisan polarization, as individuals avoid

sources of information that may provide dissonant infor-

mation while becoming more uncritical of sources that

provide information congruent with ones own beliefs and

identities (Iyengar and Hahn 2009; Knobloch-Westerwick

2012; Stroud 2011; Taber and Lodge 2006). This process

is further exacerbated by elite discourse. As media enti-

ties and politicians exhibit higher levels of partisan polar-

ization, individuals follow clear partisan signals that

influence their information-seeking behavior, their inter-

pretation of political facts, and their ultimate policy opin-

ions (Druckman et al. 2013).2 Given socialism’s

aforementioned high level of salience in both the media

and elite discourse, one may expect that previously held

beliefs would color their perceptions of the term. This

would serve to entrench their already deeply held stereo-

types of socialism.

In this research, we narrow our focus specifically to

how individuals respond to identical terms and informa-

tion based on their affective biases in cognitive process-

ing. While citizens tend to forget detailed information

rather quickly, they are often able to remember the posi-

tive or negative affect triggered by that information

(Lodge et al. 1995; Lodge and Taber 2013). The affective

impression often colors the interpretation in a manner

that is favorable to their previously held beliefs, leading

individuals to disagree on the nature of the facts at

hand. Due to this, there does not need to be widespread

agreement on the facts of what constitutes socialist pol-

icy in order for individuals to hold strong, affect-based

opinions. Indeed, Edelman (1964) discusses how vague

or affect-laden information can be, and often times is,

interpreted to however the perceiver feels best suits their

personal and in-group interests. Although dated, recent

research in political science has confirmed this as hap-

pening in two stages: (1) political elites, who do under-

stand these political events through direct involvement,