VI. Section Claims

• Library: Municipal Law Deskbook (ABA) (2015 Ed.)

VI. SECTION 1983 CLAIMS

The most notable and potentially costly type of claims against municipalities are claims alleging harm that are brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A. Basics

A § 1983 claim has at least four key elements:

a. conduct by a "person";

b. who acted under "color of state law";

c. who proximately caused;

d. a deprivation of a federally protected right.²⁵⁸

If the plaintiff is seeking to establish liability against a municipality, the "conduct" element is focused on whether the deprivation of the federal right was attributable to a municipal custom or policy.²⁵⁹ The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing each element of the claim for relief by a preponderance of the evidence.²⁶⁰

Although § 1983 does not recite a particular state-of-mind require-ment,²⁶¹ the particular personal constitutional right alleged may require a showing that the defendant acted with a certain state of mind. For instance, to establish a due process violation, the plaintiff must establish that a state or local official intentionally or deliberately caused a deprivation of life, liberty, or property; negligent conduct will not suffice.²⁶² Further, a claim under the Equal Protection Clause, alleging racial or gender-based discrimination, requires a plaintiff to establish intentional discrimination.²⁶³ In contrast, the denial of adequate medical care to a prisoner violates the Eighth Amendment if the plaintiff demonstrates deliberate indifference to a serious medical need.²⁶⁴ A wide range of federal constitutional rights may be enforced under § 1983,²⁶⁵ and each constitutional claim must be evaluated to determine whether it requires a showing that the defendant acted with a particular state of mind.

It is important to note that § 1983 does not itself create or establish any federally protected rights. A § 1983 plaintiff must establish that the defendant violated a federally protected right created either by the Constitution or by some federal statute other than § 1983. When a plaintiff asserts a violation of a federal constitutional right against a defendant who acted under color of state law, § 1983 provides the exclusive available remedy.

Federal court complaints are governed by notice pleading, in that the complaint must set forth: (1) a short and plain statement of the grounds on which the court's jurisdiction depends, (2) a short and plain statement of the grounds showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for judgment for the relief the pleader seeks.²⁶⁶ Although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9 requires that certain issues be asserted "with particularity" (e.g., fraud and mistake), there is no requirement that § 1983 claims be pleaded with particularity. In Leatherman v. Tarrant County?²⁶⁷ the Supreme Court rejected a "heightened" pleading requirement for § 1983 municipal liability claims because it is not authorized by Rules 8 and 9. The Court found that § 1983 municipal liability claims are governed by the notice pleading standard of Rule 8.

The Court in Leatherman left open, however, whether a heightened pleading requirement may be imposed on personal capacity claims subject to the defense of qualified immunity. Applying the rationale of Leatherman and Swierkiewicz, the majority of circuit courts hold that, like other § 1983 claims, personal capacity claims subject to qualified immunity are governed by notice pleading.²⁶⁸ The Fifth Circuit adds a procedure involving a request for a Rule 1(a) reply to be filed by the plaintiff that resembles a heightened pleading requirement by forcing a plaintiff to provide more facts to overcome the government official's assertion of qualified immunity.²⁶⁹ The courts have other tools to eliminate meritless personal capacity claims early in the litigation, including ordering the plaintiff to file a more definite statement, according to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e), or tailoring discovery to protect the defendant from unnecessary embarrassments or burdens, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c).²⁷⁰

Federal court jurisdiction over § 1983 claims is authorized by either 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) ²⁷¹ or by the general federal question jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Federal court jurisdiction may be defeated in certain cases by some other jurisdictional doctrine, such as the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the Eleventh Amendment, or abstention (each of which is discussed next).

Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a party who lost in state court may seek to overturn the state court judgment in a federal court § 1983 action. In most cases, such a suit will be barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, named after the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.²⁷² and District of Columbia v. Feldman.²⁷³ A federal district court does not have jurisdiction to overturn a state court judgment, even when the federal court complaint alleges that the state court judgment violates the plaintiff's federal constitutional rights. The rationale is that since the federal district courts have only original jurisdiction, they do not have appellate jurisdiction to review state judgments. Federal court appellate jurisdiction over state court judgments is vested exclusively in the United States Supreme Court.²⁷⁴

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine may apply even when the federal court claim that is the subject of a federal suit was not determined in the state court proceeding, if that claim was "inextricably intertwined" with the state court judgment.²⁷⁵ The Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply, however, to a federal suit brought by a plaintiff who was not a party to the state court proceeding.²⁷⁶

In many § 1983 actions filed in federal court, the plaintiff may assert one or more state law claims along with the § 1983 claim. The state law claim may come within the federal court's supplemental jurisdiction. The supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, codified the United Mine Workers v. Gibbs ²⁷⁷ doctrine of pendent jurisdiction. Section 1367(a) grants the federal district courts supplemental jurisdiction "over all other claims that are so related to claims" over which the federal district court has original jurisdiction "that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III." In United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, the Supreme Court held that a pendent claim is part of the same Article III controversy when the pendent claim arises out of the "same nucleus of operative fact" as the jurisdictional conferring claim.

Supplemental jurisdiction is a matter of both power and discretion. Section 1367(c) provides that the district court may decline to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction when the supplemental claim "raises a novel or complex issue of state law;" the state law claim "substantially predominates over" the jurisdiction conferring claim; the district court has dismissed the jurisdiction conferring claim; or in other "exceptional circumstances." An important procedural aspect of supplemental jurisdiction is that Section 1367(d) provides for the tolling of the limitations period for supplemental claims while they are pending in federal court and for 30 days following a federal court's dismissal of a supplemental claim (unless state law provides for a longer tolling period).²⁷⁸

Another procedure that may occur in these cases is removal. Defendants who are sued in state court under § 1983 may remove the action to federal court.²⁷⁹ A full discussion of removal procedures exceeds the scope of this chapter.

State courts have concurrent jurisdiction over § 1983 claims.²⁸⁰ Note that "[s]tates may establish the rules of procedure governing litigation in their own courts[,]" for example, neutral rules of procedure governing service of process and substitution of parties.²⁸¹ State courts, however, may not apply state rules that unduly burden, frustrate, or discriminate against the federal claim. For example, the United States Supreme Court has held that a state court may not apply a state notice-of-claim requirement to a § 1983 claim, because notice-of-claim provisions discriminate and unduly burden a plaintiff with claims against governmental entities.²⁸²

The elements of the § 1983 claim for relief and the defenses to the § 1983 claim are matters of federal law, and they may not be modified on the basis of state law.²⁸³ In Supreme Court decisions arising from state court § 1983 actions, the Court has normally held that the same rules that govern the litigation of § 1983 actions in federal court also govern the litigation of § 1983 actions in state court.²⁸⁴

Various types of plaintiffs are considered "persons" who are entitled to sue under § 1983. The right to sue under § 1983 is not limited to U.S. citizens; legal and even illegal aliens are also entitled to sue under § 1983.²⁸⁵ The right to sue is not limited to individuals; both for-profit and nonprofit organizations may sue under § 1983.²⁸⁶ There are some limits, however; for instance, the Supreme Court held that a Native American tribe that sought to vindicate its sovereign status was not entitled to sue under § 1983.²⁸⁷ The Court reasoned that "Section 1983 was designed to secure private rights against government encroachment, not to advance a sovereign's prerogative to withhold evidence relevant to a criminal investigation." ²⁸⁸

B. Types of Claims

A wide range of federal constitutional rights may be enforced under § 1983 against defendants who acted under color of state law, including Fourteenth Amendment rights to substantive and procedural due process and to equal protection of the laws. The provisions of the Bill of Rights that have been incorporated into the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment may be enforced under § 1983. These incorporated rights include the rights protected by the First Amendment free speech and religion clauses (the free exercise and establishment clauses), the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, and the Eighth...