Israel versus Hezbollah: a rematch inevitable.

• Author: Jones, David T.

Israel made a fundamental error with its invasion of Lebanon: It picked a fight and lost it. Deliberately selecting a maximum response to a painful, albeit limited provocation (Hezbollah's raid and capture of two Israeli Defense Force (IDF) soldiers), after a month of fighting, Israel's primary accomplishment was to have substantially damaged the Lebanese infrastructure, weakened the Lebanese government, and enhanced Hezbollah's reputation. Without recovering its captured soldiers. This is not a victory; it is barely a draw. To be sure, Israel was not defeated in any direct military definition of the term; however, when the biggest, baddest bear in the woods gets nibbled (not to death but to distraction) by ducks, it can hardly be labeled a victory. And not the most adroit spin meisters in Tel Aviv can turn these lemons into lemonade. So why did this happen and what happens next? First, Some Overview. Historically, over time, the best military establishments become trapped in the myths of their own invincibility. It is an insidious, all but inevitable process. They are good; indeed, very, very good and have beaten all comers--repeatedly. It is very hard to justify learning new tricks when the old tricks have been uniformly successful. Improvements are made, but they are at the margins, and tactics and training are routinized. New equipment is very expensive and other societal priorities impinge. So little by little, your personnel become complacent; they are not your best and brightest; they don't train as hard; they are dismissive of their opposition; they assume that they can bring their "B game" to the field and still mop the boards with any opponent. And, it appears as if Israel, particularly its reservists, bought into the Minuteman myth of mounting a Merkava tank and rushing into (always victorious) battle. On the other side, the opposition always focuses on "the best." During the Cold War, the United States trained against Soviet forces (and vice versa): neither military prepared for Vietnam or Afghanistan before being hip-deep in these conflicts. For its part, Hezbollah wasn't thinking of fighting the Lebanese army; it wasn't concerned about Hamas/Fatah; it wasn't worried about the Syrians. It has only one enemy: Israel. So from 2000 forward, it bent its thinking to attempt to determine how to maximize its strengths and deflect Israel-Robo-Cop's strengths. It takes no special defense attache-level insight to conclude that Hezbollah...