Using Riley v California to Preserve Privacy in a Technological World: a Draft Petitioner's Brief to the United States Supreme Court

• Publication year: 2018
• Author: By Sahar Karimi

USING RILEY V CALIFORNIA TO PRESERVE PRIVACY IN A TECHNOLOGICAL WORLD: A DRAFT PETITIONER'S BRIEF TO THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

By Sahar Karimi ^*1

Introduction

"Modern cell phones are not just another technological convenience. With all they contain and all they may reveal, they hold for many Americans 'the privacies of life.'"

-Chief Justice John Roberts, Riley v. California

As Chief Justice Roberts recognized in Riley v. California, today's technology allows Americans to hold life's privacies in their hands. Privacy is important now more than ever. But, as technology increasingly advances, our privacy increasingly diminishes.

In Riley v. California,² the defendants' cell phones were unlawfully searched incident to their arrests.³ The officers obtained evidence from the defendants' cell phones and charged them with more offenses.⁴ The United States Supreme Court unanimously held police generally cannot search digital cell phone data without a warrant, even incident to arrest.⁵ The Supreme Court's decision was based upon grave privacy concerns implicated with the immense storage capacities of cell phones today.⁶

This case note applies Riley in a fictional Twelfth Circuit criminal case before the U.S. Supreme Court, where the defendant is petitioning on appeal. A more practical stance can show how Riley can truly be applied in real-world situations. This note demonstrates the importance of Riley—a landmark Fourth Amendment case from San Diego, California—and how it can be applied in future cases to safeguard our privacy in a world of technological advancements.

Draft Petitioner's Brief to the United States Supreme Court

No. 17-01

In the SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

ALBERTA CAPINE, Petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.

On Writ of Certiorari
To the United States Court of Appeals
For the Twelfth Circuit

PETITIONER'S BRIEF

Sahar Karimi
California Western School of Law
225 Cedar Street
San Diego, CA 92101

Attorney for Petitioner

I. Question Presented

The Fourth Amendment's "private search" exception permits a warrantless computer file search to exceed the private party's specific viewing when an officer is virtually certain of finding incriminating evidence. An exceeded search requires there to have been an expectation of privacy. Petitioner's roommate opened three computer files, but the officer copied, saved, and opened all thirty-two files without a warrant. Under the Fourth Amendment, should the twenty-nine unopened files be suppressed from evidence?

II. Constitutional Provisions and Rules

This case involves the Fourth Amendment:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seize.

[Page 2]

U.S. Const. amend. IV

III. Introduction A. Standard of Review

This Court reviews the lower court's decision on Fourth Amendment issues de novo. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 691 (1996).

B. Summary of Argument

The Fourth Amendment protects citizens against unreasonable searches and seizures, especially when officers vastly invade digital privacy in one's own home. The private search exception does not allow an officer to exceed a private party's search without a warrant unless there is virtual certainty that the files do not contain private information. Officer Miller was not virtually certain all twenty-nine of the thirty-two files would not contain private information because it was impossible for him to see the file content. Each file is a closed container and, therefore, an individual search. Petitioner had a Fourth Amendment right to have the twenty-nine unopened data files suppressed from evidence because she had an expectation of privacy. These files remained private because the private party had not searched them before the police arrived. The lower court erred when it denied Petitioner's motion to suppress the evidence because (1) Officer Miller did not have virtual certainty to open the twenty-nine files; and (2) each file was a closed container, which was considered an independent search.

IV. Statement of the Case A. Statement of Facts

Petitioner, Alberta Capine, is a supervisor at a local debt collections agency.⁷ Ester Sundon is Petitioner's coworker and roommate. On September 23, 2012, Sundon's computer broke down, and she asked to use Petitioner's computer. Petitioner refused Sundon permission to use her personal laptop. However, Sundon had previously watched Petitioner enter her computer password. When Sundon was home alone, she hacked into Petitioner's password-protected computer.

After logging on, Sundon started looking through a folder labeled "transaction history," which contained sixteen closed PDF files and sixteen closed excel spreadsheets. The files were organized with similar names and approximately the same size. Sundon opened the first spreadsheet, which had a chart of dates, amounts, and names of controlled substances. Then, Sundon randomly clicked on and opened only two more spreadsheets, which looked similar to the first. Sundon did not open or view the other thirteen spreadsheets, nor any of the sixteen PDF files before she called the police. Twenty-nine of the thirty-two files remained unopened and unviewed until police arrived.

Officer Miller, an experienced police officer, arrived and told Sundon to show him only the files she had already opened and viewed. Sundon showed Officer Miller the three files she had randomly opened. He saw the spreadsheets that named some controlled substances. Knowing the scope of Sundon's three-file search, Officer Miller took Petitioner's laptop from Sundon to copy and save all thirty-two files to a flash drive without a warrant.

With all thirty-two files safely in Officer Miller's possession, he opened and viewed every file he saved from Petitioner's laptop without a warrant. All of the spreadsheets looked similar to the three files Sundon randomly opened. The PDF files, however, contained private and personal information, such as names, addresses, and social security numbers. After opening every single spreadsheet and PDF file, Officer Miller confiscated Petitioner's laptop. He finally obtained a warrant, and then searched the rest of Petitioner's laptop.

B. Procedural Posture

Petitioner was indicted for drug trafficking, attempted identity theft, and violating the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act under 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(2)(C). Before trial, Petitioner moved to suppress all twenty-nine files Sundon had not viewed based on the Fourth Amendment. However, the trial court denied Petitioner's motion to suppress and allowed all files into evidence under the private search exception. Petitioner was convicted on all...