Uruguay’s Stance on the Palestinian Problem at the United Nations and the Creation of the State of Israel

• Published date: 01 May 2019
• Date: 01 May 2019
• Author: Fernando Adrover Orellano
• DOI: 10.1177/0094582X19831440
• Subject Matter: Articles

https://doi.org/10.1177/0094582X19831440

LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES, Issue 226, Vol. 46 No. 3, May 2019, 26–41

DOI: 10.1177/0094582X19831440

© 2019 Latin American Perspectives

26

Uruguay’s Stance on the Palestinian Problem at the

United Nations and the Creation of the State of Israel

by

Fernando Adrover Orellano

Translated by

Victoria J. Furio

Examination of documents on the decision-making process that accounts for the pro-

Zionist stance of the Uruguayan delegation at the United Nations during the debate on

Palestine reveals that the position coincides with the pro-Zionist consensus among local

political groups and was influenced by the local Jewish community lobby and its contacts

with government representatives.

Un examen de los documentos sobre el proceso de toma de decisiones que explica la

postura pro-sionista de la delegación uruguaya en las Naciones Unidas durante el debate

sobre Palestina revela que la posición coincide con el consenso pro-sionista entre los gru-

pos políticos locales y fue influenciada por el lobby de la comunidad judía local y sus

contactos con representantes del gobierno.

Keywords: Palestine, Israel, Uruguay, Foreign policy, United Nations

This article analyzes the decision-making process that led the Uruguayan

representatives to the United Nations to defend the creation of the State of

Israel in the context of advancing a broader foreign policy. This task involves

study of the Uruguayan government’s internal processes, the organization of

its diplomacy, the debate in the press, and action by pressure groups that sought

to affect the government’s stance. Although it falls within a very well-devel-

oped field of study internationally (the analysis of the Palestinian problem and

its diplomatic dimension), this work is related to another topic much less

explored by local historiography, that of Uruguay’s late-twentieth-century for-

eign relations,1 and to that of the establishment and organization of the Jewish

community and its relationship to the society of which it is a part (Aldrighi

etal., 2000; Bouret, Martínez, and Telias, 1997; Feldman, 2001; Porzecanski,

2003). The period examined falls between the decision by the British, having

failed to provide a political solution in the dispute between the Arab and Jewish

communities at the heart of the Mandate conferred on it in 1922 (Beckerman-

Boys, 2013), to refer the problem of Palestine to the UN and the beginning of

the final phase of the Arab-Israeli War in October 1948 following the break-

down of a truce brokered by the UN.

Fernando Adrover Orellano is a professor of history and researcher at the Instituto de Ciencias

Históricas, Universidad de la República, Uruguay. Victoria J. Furio is a translator living in New

York City.

831440LAPXXX10.1177/0094582X19831440Latin American PerspectivesAdrover / URUGUAY AND THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM

research-article2019

Adrover / URUGUAY AND THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM 27

This article has certain limitations, especially with respect to access to

sources. Since official Uruguayan records do not provide sufficient informa-

tion, in the future it will be necessry to access documents from the British

Foreign Office to learn more about possible British pressure on the Uruguayan

government regarding the problem of Palestine. Dealing with the pro-Arab

sectors and the Zionist groups entails similar difficulties that I am attempting

to correct by seeking access to private archives. Despite its preliminary nature,

this essay explores a little-studied field focusing on unexplored records on this

issue.

The UrUgUayan STance and The PlaTformS of The ParTieS

in conflicT

In order to analyze the Uruguayan stance and its motivations within the

international context of which it was a part, it is necessary to summarize both

the Arab and Jewish positions and the British, U.S., and Soviet stances.

The BriTiSh STance

From early 1947 on, Britain was opposed to the partition of the Palestinian

territory into two states. The Foreign Office and Colonial Office ministers

(Ernest Bevin and Arthur Creech-Jones, respectively) sought alternatives,

attempting to have Arabs and Zionists negotiate on their own terms. According

various researchers (Beckerman-Boys, 2013; Cohen, 1982; Lepkin, 1986), pos-

sible alternatives at the time included (1) partition (generally rejected by Britain

but defended by Creech-Jones), (2) a binational state and British trusteeship, (3)

a federal state with provincial autonomy, (4) a single Arab state, and (5) main-

tenance of the status quo (implementing the 1939 White Paper). Fearing that

Arab rejection would weaken its position in the Near East, the British consid-

ered the first of these of little benefit to their interests. The next two were

rejected by the Jewish Agency, the Arab states, and the United States. The

British desire to separate the issue of displaced persons from the Palestinian

problem was thwarted by pressure from the United States, which was promot-

ing the immigration of 100,000 displaced persons. The Arabs were in favor of

the last two possibilities —they preferred an Arab state, but maintaining the

status quo was considered acceptable if it retained the restrictions on migration

imposed in 1939. For Britain this would allow time to mitigate the displaced-

persons problem (Beckerman-Boys, 2013: 128–136, 259–262). Britain was torn

between the need to maintain cordial relations with the United States (hoping

to gain its support for its negotiating points) and not endangering its relations

with Arab nations for strategic reasons (Cohen, 1982: 108).

The options for the mandatory power were reduced to imposing a solution

without consensus (negative from a strategic point of view and burdensome

resourcewise) and withdrawing from Palestine. The idea of delegating the

problem to the UN prevailed between February and April 1947, but Britain was

unwilling to become involved in enforcing the stipulations of the majority plan

of the UN Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), going so far as to boycott