Urban-Rural and Regional Voting Patterns in the California Senate Before and After Reapportionment
| Published date | 01 December 1970 |
| Date | 01 December 1970 |
| DOI | 10.1177/106591297002300408 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
785
URBAN-RURAL
AND
REGIONAL
VOTING
PATTERNS
IN
THE
CALIFORNIA
SENATE
BEFORE
AND
AFTER
REAPPORTIONMENT
BRUCE
W. ROBECK
Texas
A&M
University
HE
CONSEQUENCES
of
gross
disparities
in
the
population
size
of
state
j
legislative
districts
have been
the
subject
of
numerous
studies
in
recent
years.
No
one
argued
the
fact
of
malapportionment,
but
various
researchers
have
often
been
at
odds
over
the
political
and
policy
consequences
of
well
or
badly
apportioned
legislatures.
Proponents
of
the
&dquo;one-man-one-vote&dquo;
doctrine
argued
that
malapportion-
ment
distorted
the
representation
of
popular
will
in
legislative
bodies.i
Legislators
tend
to
take
positions
which
will
benefit
their
districts.
Constituencies
have
distinct
interests
which
are
associated
with
the
social
and
economic
character
of
its
people.
The
political
concerns
of
urban
people
are
different
from
the
interests
of
rural
resi-
dents.
Likewise,
the
problems
in
one
section
of
a
state
may
vary
considerably
from
those
difficulties
encountered
in
other
sections.
Therefore,
if
an
apportionment
system
gives
certain
groups
of
people
(e.g.,
rural)
a
disproportionate
strength
in
the
legislature
at
a
cost
to
other
groups
(e.g.,
urban),
then
the
interests
of
the
favored
constituents
will
be
promoted
to
the
detriment
of
the
interests
of
people
who
are
disadvantaged.
Empirical
verification
of
the
&dquo;one-man-one-vote&dquo;
doctrine
has
proven
difficult.
Studies
of
individual
states
have
produced
conflicting
findings
regarding
the
amount
of
urban-rural
and
regional
conflict
on
roll-call
votes.2
Comparisons
of
all
states
by
several
measures
of
the
degree
of
malapportionment
reported
little
or
no
difference
in
labor,
welfare,
highway,
and
education
expenditures
and
policies,
and
no
variation
in
the
amount
of
party
competition
or
the
frequency
of
divided
NOTE :
Data
processing
facilities
were
made
available
through
the
generous
assistance
of
the
Computer
Center
at
the
University
of
California,
Santa
Barbara.
1
For
some
of
the
more
notable
publications
which
more
or
less
favored
"one-man-one-vote"
arguments,
see:
Law
and
Contemporary
Problems,
Vol.
III
(Spring
1952),
which
is
devoted
entirely
to
articles
on
legislative
apportionment;
Gordon
E.
Baker,
Rural
Versus
Urban
Political
Power:
The
Nature
and
Consequences
of
Unbalanced
Representation
(New
York:
Random
House,
1955);
Malcolm
E.
Jewell
(ed.),
The
Politics
of
Reappor-
tionment
(New
York:
Atherton
Press,
1962).
2
For
an
examination
of
individual
states,
see:
David
R.
Derge,
"Metropolitan
and
Outstate
Alignments
in
Illinois
and
Missouri
Legislative
Delegations,"
American
Political
Science
Review,
52
(December
1958),
1051-65;
Drawing
upon
his
knowledge
of
the
New
Jersey
Legislature
to
dispute
Derge’s
conclusions
on
the
nature
of
urban-rural
conflict,
Robert
T.
Frost
wrote,
"On
Derge’s
Metropolitan
and
Outstate
Legislative
Delegations,"
American
Political
Science
Review,
53
(December
1959),
792-95;
Derge
replied
to
Frost
in,
"On
the
Use
of
Roll-Call
Analysis:
A
Reply
to
R.
T.
Frost,"
American
Politi-
cal
Science
Review,
53
(December
1959),
1097-99.
See
also
John
G.
Grumm,
"The
Means
of
Measuring
Conflict
and
Cohesion
in
the
Legislature,"
Southwestern
Social
Science
Quarterly,
14
(March
1964),
377-88.
However,
other
studies
found
urban-
rural
or
sectional
conflict
on
divided
roll
calls,
see
Murray
Clark
Havens,
City
Versus
Farm?
Urban-Rural
Conflict
in
the
Alabama
Legislature
(University,
Alabama:
Uni-
versity
of
Alabama
Press,
1957);
William
C.
Harvard and
Loren
P.
Beth,
The
Politics
of
MisRepresentation:
Urban-Rural
Conflict
in
the
Florida
Legislature
(Baton
Rouge:
Louisiana
State
University
Press,
1962).
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